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"Nature is frugal in her operations, and will not be at the expense of a 
particular instinct to give us that knowledge which experience and habit 
will soon produce." 
William James (1890) 
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This thesis examines emotional development from the viewpoint of 
personal evolution of self-hood as a function of the needs that develop in 
the course of acquisition of personal abilities through social interaction. 
Emotion is viewed as a form of behaviour, and its development 
synonymised with that of consciousness. The view of emotions (and 
consciousness) as being totally learned is examined, with regard to what 
the least innate aspects of consciousness might need to be present for an 
individual to be capable of developing self-hood and 'normal' 
emotionalism. 
A simplified overview of classical philosophy is given, with specific 
reference to what is seen as the fundamental question by which 
Philosophy can be divided: is truth absolute, and if so, can it be 
experienced directly? A modified form of Hegelian Idealism (similar to 
that proposed by Marx) is used to outline the origins of the sociogenetic 
approach to the development of personality as characterised by the works 
of George Herbert Mead, and mirrored by the work of Lev Vygotsky. 
In the second section, the concept of the least innate aspect of self-hood 
('the minimum substrate') is examined in greater depth, and the problems 
of reflexivity in language and thought (which is seen as arising 
dialectically with language) described. The impossibility of complete 
precision in description by natural language is discussed, and how this 
relates to the concept of acquiring consciousness through social 
interaction. Imprecision in language is seen in reference to the imprecise 
and 'fuzzy' nature of 'natural categories', and chaos theory is used to 
provide the basis for a description of the interactions of individuals and 
society through language. The acquisition of consciousness through 
experience is given, using a behaviourist approach. 
The third section examines the development of emotions within an 
individual's life-span through a modified form of the James-Lange model 
of emotion, where James' concept of innate reflexes is deconstructed and 
self-organization through negative-feedback is substituted. The minimum 
substrate for emotional development is put forward as identical with that 
for consciousness: the capacity for reflexive comparison. Successive 
replacement is suggested as the appropriate description for how emotions 
develop. 
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The final section is an explanation of why the thesis is written as it is, and 
expounds the virtues of unorthodoxy for the construction of theory in 
psychology. It examines the value of conflict, using the division between 
Radical B~haviourist and Radical Cognitivist approaches as an example. 
The thesis ends with a definition of emotion in a non-dualist framework. 
5 
Introduction 
This thesis rests on a set of simple premises towards the final statement of 
belief that there is nothing innate about emotion. Further, that emotion is 
shaped by the experience of an individual in the course of their life and 
that it can be altered by deliberate conscious action. The apparently 
universal aspects of emotional behaviour are then ascribed to the 
universal factors present in people's environments, rather than as the 
consequence of genetic predetermination. 
It is not a complex idea, but it is, I would argue, an unpopular one. Issues 
of innateness or otherwise of behaviour and thought have been argued 
over for millenia, and are ultimately unresolvable. It is empirically 
untestable, definitively (and ethically), so why ex'i1-mine it? I cannot hope 
to produce any proof one way or another on this issue, and I will not waste 
my time trying. Instead, what I hope to construct is a coherent narrative, 
outlining how it could be described, but not insisting that this is how it 
must be described. Ultimate proof is the exclusive province of God. Let 
him/her /it worry over it. 
The idea is not complex, but the exposition is. Here is the end point: the 
origin of emotions can be described in a manner which does not require 
the recourse to innate mechanisms and/ or instincts as a basis. Here is the 
middle: the development of emotions can be parallelled to the 
development of self-consciousness and cognition in general. Here is the 
beginning: a child sees the world, how it sees the world is a product of 
evolutionary development, what it sees is not. This seemingly trivial 
distinction is important, and stems from a fundamental dichotomy in 
philosophy, relating to the nature of the relationship between a person 
and the reality they inhabit and how it may be possible for one to 
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influence the other, and how the relationship can develop and change 
over time and with experience. 
Some of the difficulties in the exposition of this apparently simple idea 
comes from the historical separation of what are seen to be functionally 
and structurally distinct aspects of human mental performance, that is 
perception, cognition and emotion. Rather than a unified whole of 
awareness, we perceive, think about what we perceive, and react 
emotionally to thoughts about our perceptions. This separation (described 
admittedly simplistically here) puts a separation between the 'outside 
world' of substance and the 'inside world' of thoughts, ideas and feelings, 
a separation that limits interaction and presupposes the possibility of 
independence of one from the other. There is a wall between a person and 
their world, perception represents the hole in that wall, the gap through 
which we peer at reality which stays on the other side. This is an easy 
enough view to accept, because it is the way we experience the world, we 
look at it, listen to it, reach for it. We experience ourselves as acting on the 
world, the personal experience of reality is demonstrably dualist. 
The social construction of emotions (Harre, 1986) is entwined with the 
· ideas underlying the personal development of individual consciousness. 
Both represent an opposition to strict naturalism and when emotion is 
seen not so much as a distinct set of forces or states separate from other 
forms of behaviour, other than in external social labelling, then emotion 
becomes a subset of behaviour (or rather action) in general. Following this 
through, the development of consciousness (self-awareness) synonymises, 
or more properly subsumes, the development of emotion. To clarify 
further, that which we understand in a socially defined way as being 
referred to in the use of the terms 'personality', 'identity', 'self awareness' 
are constituted by 'emotional' action. We are, as the individuals that 
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others know, how we act in the ways that are held to be emotional. How 
our personality is perceived by others is a reflection of our normal range of 
emotional acts. Emotions occur as acts relevant to the perception of the 
relationship between self-perception and prevailing environmental 
contingencies. Emotional action is intentional, and it is the manner in 
which, and the situations wherein, we act in a particular way (ie that 
which is socially held to be emotional) that defines the 'kind' of person we 
are. The pattern of emotion-type actions, stemming from our belief 
structure, defines our self, as others see us, and as we see ourselves acting. 
Given this line of argument, self-awareness, self-consciousness, "I", all of 
these terms are synonymous with the concept of emotional action. Thus, 
the social development of a sense of identity, a set of beliefs about the self, 
can be seen as the same as the social development of 'emotions'. This 
argument will be re-examined and elaborated in greater detail later, but 
this brief outline gives, I hope, an understanding of the rationale for 
examining emotion by examining consciousness. 
It needs to be clarified that what is meant here by development is the 
development within an individual's life-span, rather than a species or 
evolutionary development. This is not to suggest that such does not occur, 
but it is not the immediate current focus of study. To deny the relevance of 
genetic inheritance is farcical, but to over-emphasise it at the expense of 
the role of environmental contingencies is, I feel, equally foolish.The 
question which can be asked however is: what do you need, what is the 
minimum substrate required for the presence/ existence of consciousness 
(self awareness), and how much is explicable by a theory of social (and/ or 
perceptual) learning? One of the principles that I will frequently refer to is 
that evolutionary pre-eminence (genetically speaking) is granted by virtue 
of adaptive advantage, and where that is absent, ie in the case where a 
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particular feature is not necessary, or of no greater value than any other, it 
confers no preferential status (that is, increased probability of genetic 
transmission) on its possessor. Where another means of transmission (eg 
social) can assume an equally successful (proadaptive) role then it can 
come to obviate the influence of differential selection pressure on somatic 
(ie genetic) development. The central idea to be extracted from this in 
terms of the social construction of consciousness/ emotion is that the 
development of 'self' can be seen to proceed within and from the life 
experience of an individual rather than from the evolutionary history of a 
species. From this idea several central concepts/ questions emerge: what is 
the function of consciousness (do we need it, what is its proadaptive 
character, if any?); what is the relationship between an individual and its 
environment such that this relationship allows/fosters the develop.ment 
of consciousness/ self-awareness; what role does language play in this 
development/learning; and if consciousness is constructed, what is it 
constructed from, ie what is the least, the minimum that is required to be 
innately present (how rasa is the tabula); what do you need to 'know' to 
learn? It is my wish to explore these ideas by first outlining some of the 
opinions of the major exponents of these areas, and in particular those 
considered significant to the development of the concepts involved in the 
doctrine of the social construction of emotion (Harre 1986). Regrettably, it 
is inevitable that any such overview will be somewhat selective and 
probably over-simplified, and will omit some of the ideas of these 
thinkers. I shall endeavour to be as representative as possible. 
Concepts to be discussed, then, fall into a few general categories: the 
relationship between subject and object (perceiver and perceived); the 
nature of knowledge (the meaning of meaning); ontological development 
(belief structure); the role of ontology in emotion; the nature of 'feeling', 
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from. what may (and probably will) be describable as a behaviourist 
perspective; the nature of language and its place in the development of 
personality; and in so doing have outlined an action-based description of 
the nature of mind. 
The later parts of this thesis will be concerned with elaborating these basic 
ideas into a description of emotional action, exemplifying these ideas in a 
description of emotional suppression as seen from a modified 'schema' -
based description. The goal is to provide a description of emotional action 
which does not necessitate the positing of metaphysical or classical dualist 
entities to either provide motivation or to which to attribute causality, but 
instead to describe in terms of the function of emotion and its basis in 
rational action. 
11 Dualism Versus Idealism 
"There is nothing new under the sun" 
- George Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman. 
The Classical dichotomy in Philosophy 
An overview as this will be, I shall make no reference to the pre-socratic 
philosophers (or indeed to a great number of philosophical workers) but 
instead follow just the major thinkers, and particularly those prototypic of 
holders of particular, somewhat polarised, opinions. In particular, I will 
briefly outline that line of reasoning which leads from Plato and Aristotle, 
through Descartes, Kant and Hegel through to Marx, G.H. Mead and L.S. 
Vygotsky and on to the ideas of constructionism as they are understood 
presently. The thinkers and ideas emerge to characterise and contrast the 
dichotomy (and the vast intermediate plane) that pervades and underpins 
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contemporary thought on the development and nature of consciousness 
and emotion. 
The dichotomy to which I refer is that of opinion on the relative 
'accessibility' of reality, that is, what is perceived in perception, is 
sensation merely transduction from reality to mind, do we perceive reality 
directly or is the nature of our experience removed and secondary? The 
question of the nature of reality is in many ways beyond the scope of this 
thesis and it is not my intention to examine it intensively and then 
provide new and tightly reasoned arguments for the adoption of one or 
other theoretical position. Rather, I wish to outline the lineage of certain 
tenets of the 'constructionist' approach and so point to the current 
incarnations of 'ancient' ideas as they are proposed in modern guise. It 
will be seen how the central idea of constructionism, that of reciprocal 
determinism of self and society, has its origins in this lingering argument 
over the nature of the relationship between subject and object, paralleling 
the disagreements of geneticists and environmentalists, and diversely 
spread politically in the application of the pragmatists and social 
behaviourists. 
The role of the Soul 
Plato - The realm of Forms 
According to Socrates, and embellished by (and to become almost 
indistinguishable from) Plato, the ability to know, to learn, is synonymous 
with the 'recollection' of knowledge. This knowledge is possessed by the 
soul as it stands as an entity disembodied and immortal, part of a 
transcendent reality not available to the physical body. It is the soul that 
guides the physical body, makes it possible for the body to learn. To 
Socrates, the capacity to learn must exist prior to learning, and learning is 
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an active incorporation of what a person knows already with that which 
they experience. But current experience is coloured by prior experience, 
experience of the soul as it recognises elements of its transcendent 
existence as they are represented in the physical world. Learning is a 
process of recognition for the soul as it encounters previously familiar 
events. This concept stems from the belief still popular today in the 
immortality of the soul and in the reality of reincarnation (Kolenda, 1974). 
Plato took over this idea and expanded on it to create his own formulation 
of the process of knowing and learning with the Theory of Forms. Under 
this doctrine there are two distinct 'dimensions' of existence: that of the 
physical world, inhabited by the physical bodies of people in the course of 
individual incarnations; that of the Realm of Forms, immaterial and 
temporally transcendent. It is in the Realm of Forms that the soul resides. 
All objects that our physical bodies experience are only copies or 'shadows' 
of the true Forms, and our experience of 'reality' is thus secondary and 
mediated. The manner in which we recognise what a thing is is that our 
soul mediates for us with the realm of forms and tells us what it is, that is, 
recognises it by its similarity to the true Form. 
"When the soul is thrust into a new body full of animal sensations and 
desire, it becomes completely confused and must adapt. This confusion 
explains why knowledge of the forms is not present in infants." Lombardo 
(1987) 
Thus, the knowledge that our physical being acquires is merely a 
recollection of what our souls already know. Or more properly, the soul 
reacquires the physical knowledge by which it can make judgements about 
the correspondence between physical entities and the forms that give rise 
to them. The soul in each incarnation has to readapt to the distortions that 
occur as the direct reality of the Forms is warped by the interpretations of 
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the senses, which, moreover, have to deal with the manifestation of the 
Forms not just in one physical structure, but in a range of structures: 
"Plato divides existence into a unified eternal realm of abstract forms and 
a diversified temporal flux of particulars ... [he] ... believed that certain 
knowledge could not be obtained through perception because perception 
reveals flux, ambiguity, and a vast array of unique particulars and 
differences." Lombardo (1987). 
So, there is not one unique Form for each physical object, but rather each 
Form stands as a Universal (or prototype) from which there are a number 
of Particulars. Identification of any Particular is performed by the soul 
assessing the relative correspondence of a particular with the formal 
Universal it stems from. Our ability to categorize combined with the 
natural categories into which things fall is a consequence of our experience 
at this assessment. The Platonic model of experience is superbly dualist, 
. 
not only are body and mind separate but the world itself is nothing but a 
twisted shadow of reality that our proper selves live in, striving to 
recognise the real by the signs hidden in the imperfect copies made by 
nature. 
Aristotle - Direct Perception 
In contrast to the the distinct Platonic/Socratic separation of mind and 
body Aristotle saw the perception of the physical world as being the 
perception of reality directly. There is no separate Realm of Forms, indeed, 
as Aristotle pointed out, reference to the Forms is circular, providing not 
a set of distinct ultimate entities by and of which knowledge exists but just 
a different set of individuals that again must be explained by reference. 
They do not stand alone as any sort of first or primal cause: 
" ... the Forms do not explain anything. They are just glorified individuals -
perfect, heavenly individuals, it is true - but individuals nonetheless." 
Leahey (1987). 
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According to Aristotle, Universals do not have a distinct existence, but 
arise as a result of exploration, they are present in the physical world. 
"Aristotle believed that universals exist in nature and we discover 
them ... Universals are not separate Forms, nor are they just useful labels, 
for they exist as the essences of naturally real species of concrete objects." 
Leahey (1987) 
Aristotle's idea of Universals in nature stems from his teleological 
conception of development, so that in its development an animal 
develops toward its Universal. 
"The purpose of an acorn is to become an oak, to actualize itself as an oak." 
Leahey, (1987) 
Or, as Lombardo puts it (from very much a Gibsonian perspective): 
"Universals ... are embodied within their actualizations. Universals are 
powers (potentialities) revealed through activity. 'The power or potential 
(eg the ability to move is the universal and the actualization (eg a specific 
movement) is the particular." Lombardo (1987) 
Universals, then, are the 'perfect expression of the soul' as it shapes the 
body through the course of development. Aristotle uses the concept of the 
soul differently to Socrates/Plato, attempting to describe its relationship 
with the body in a more 'fundamental' way. 
"The soul is inseparable from the body ... there is only one material reality, 
body., but it has two aspects., physiological and mental. Soul is the form of 
the body and can no more be separated from its material embodiment 
than the form of the Venus de Milo can be separated from the marble it is 
made of...Aristotle put it this way in De Anima: That is why we can 
wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body 
are one: it is as meaningless to ask whether the wax and the shape given to 
it by the stamp are one ... "". Leahey (1987) 
So the soul in a sense becomes itself (or actualizes itself) in its union with 
the body, neither is the other, neither is complete without the other. 
" ... each creature is defined by its soul,. .. [and] ... , each individual is defined 
by his or her individual soul, what we would call the self." Leahey (1987) 
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The body, or rather the individual, develops toward a predetermined form 
over the course of its life (personal potentials become actualized). Aristotle 
is then a strict naturist, the environment providing materials and 
opportunities for actions, but not guidance or determination of potentials. 
Modern form of the Platonic/ Aristotelean division 
It might seem that reference to the greeks is a little unnecessary. The 
purpose is to outline a view from which/by which to look at the nature of 
the relationship between individuals and their environment such that it 
can be used to justify a constructionist position. In the figures (and 
philosophies) of Plato and Aristotle we have the archetypal dichotomy of 
approaches, that which divides the focus of study on the capacities of the 
individual as opposed to the role of the environment. This dichotomy is 
represented today in extreme form by the viewpoints generally thought of 
as belonging to the radical cognitivists and the radical behaviourists. 
The stereotypic radical cognitivist approach (as popularly conceived) 
would conceptualise the human mind as making order out of chaos by 
acting on representations of the world in some fashion through 
alterations in the neurochemical activity of the CNS. Thinking goes on 
inside the head, and the perceptual systems function as channels that pass 
on sense-data to be processed by the mechanisms of reason. The 
stimulation provided by the environment is insufficiently rich in 
structure and information to provide clues to its nature, and knowledge 
must have some a priori basis: 
" ... the knowledge obtained vastly transcends the evidence available in 
richness and complexity, and in each of these aspects, the fineness of detail 
and the precision of knowledge goes well beyond anything that can be 
explained on any imaginable functional grounds, such as the exigencies of 
communication." Chomsky, 1987. 
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The stereotypic radical behaviourists place the emphasis not so much on 
the actions of the mind as on the reactions of the body to events in the 
environment. Given certain environmental contingencies certain certain 
bodily actions may ensue. But, to use the pattern of reactions as evidence 
on which to construct a model of the workings of the mind is not 
plausible. To predict and control, but not to explain. 
"If you are willing to agree that 'meaning' is just a way of saying that out 
of all the ways an individual has of reacting to this object, at any one time 
he reacts in only one of these ways, then I find no quarrel with meaning." 
Watson, 1924. 
It is on the relative degree of plausibility of explanation by reference to 
internal mental structures that really separates the cognitive and 
behaviourist approaches. While the behaviourist approach would not 
assert that people do not think, it would hold that theorising about 
thought should be limited to as simple an explanation as possible, one not 
reliant on hypothesised mental structures that are not directly available to 
testing. A strict behavioural approach would use the evidence of testing to 
seek out plausible hypotheses that relate behaviours to each other and to 
the contingent circumstances. A strict cognitive approach would use the 
evidence of testing to justify (or otherwise) hypotheses about the 
underlying structures that could produce such effects. 
" ... we understand talk about the mind to be talk about the brain at an 
abstract level at which, so we try to demonstrate, principles can be 
formulated that enter into successful and insightful explanation of 
linguistic (and other) phenomena that are provided by observation and 
experiment." Chomsky, 1987. 
Neither extreme of position would deny the existence of mental 
structures, it is the direction of analysis and the question of proof that 
differentiates. Both conceptions have a fundamental dualism, recognising 
that there is a tangible barrier, a definite inside and outside to a person. In 
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either conception there is mind on the inside and environment on the 
outside and mind peers out at environment through the foggy lens of the 
senses. This position is clearly articulated by Plato, where the soul/mind 
uses the physical senses to gain information about the objects in the 
physical world so as to work out what they really are, that is, what Forms 
they are the physical 'shadow' of. Learning is a process of sophistication of 
the act of perception (by experience) to better recognise the correspondence 
between the particulars in the physical world and their 'parent' universals 
in the Realm of Forms. Similarly in the information processing approach, 
sense-data are processed and matched with abstracted prototypes to 
determine class/ set membership. For example the premise that infants are 
innately capable of face recognition fits the platonic model nicely, 
requiring as it does that one be born with a prototypic face that one tries to 
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find in one's surroundings. The aristotelean model may fit slightly better, 
where the universals (ie the category membership determining 
prototypes) are abstracted by experience with particulars, and innateness is 
not requisite. The issue of innateness is pivotal in this. If the capacities and 
the patterns of thought and action are innate and need only to be 
stimulated to develop, then a focus on the strictly mental is appropriate. 
"The human mind, in short, somehow incorporates the principles of 
geometry, and experience only serves to bring them to the point where 
innate knowledge can be used." Chomsky, 1987. 
If, on the other hand, they are learned, then the focus should be on the 
nature of the stimulation. The obvious answer, and the one with which 
people are content, is that it is a combination of the two, some things are 
learned and some you are born with the capacity for, and the question of 
nature versus nurture is not so terribly important so one should focus on 
something that can be studied successfully and avoid all this seemingly 
pointless theorizing. There is definitely merit in this approach. But even 
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while it accepts that there is interaction between person and environment 
it still maintains the implicit conceptualization of dualism in that 
irrespective of the source of the cognitive patterning, this patterning 
involves actions in the head of the actor. Even given that the 
environment influences the manner in which information is processed 
still retains the implicit belief that it is 'processing' that occurs. It still 
asserts that thought goes on inside the head and that structure and order 
are present in how the mind reacts to the world It still relies on 
representationalism and separation of a person from the reality they 
experience. It is still an approach that works in structures, not acts. 
It must be emphasised that this is a caricature of the theses, and that there 
are many researchers that one might label as behaviourist in their 
leanings who fall closer to the cognitivist line. The radical, however, best 
demonstrates the extremes, and thus assists in delineating the variance. 
This is a simple demonstration of how easy it is to get led astray by simple 
statements of theory allegiance. The division into one or other school of 
thought occurs as a consequence of choosing a simplistic division. 
Historically, people are seldom as black and white in their opinions at the 
time as they might appear to be in retrospect. The highly selective nature 
of the concepts examined in this thesis reduces the likelihood of gross 
misinterpretation (I hope). In talking about this simplistic division in 
psychological opinion I wish to illustrate as starkly as I can the beliefs that 
seem to be fundamental to the social-learning perspective, and 
consequently, blend a lot of fine shading of opinion into abrupt borders of 
doctrine. I hope to outline the particulars of theoretical differences that lie 
between the apparent poles of opinion, to show that there are really only a 
few general differences, and maybe only one. The question of the 
availability of knowledge seems to lie at the heart of a great degree of 
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personal disagreement, and the course of thought on this matter can be 
shown in the writings of a selection of thinkers. 
The contrast of the opinions of Aristotle and Plato highlights the central 
problem of human knowledge that still dogs much of Philosophy. This 
central problem of absoluteness in truth and its availability has appeared 
in a number of guises over the centuries. 
Mind and Body 
Descartes - Dualism 
The difficulty in forming concepts is that as scale changes, the groupings 
that one forms, the way in which relations are made, alters. Taxonomic 
groupings, or any statement that something has a particular nature or is of 
a particular kind is very dependent on what your .starting point, or central 
point of reference is. 
"His point was that, within the physical world, unity is invariably a matter 
of degree, depending as it must on spatial proximity, cohesion of parts, 
functional integration or causal connectedness, all of which are 
themselves a matter of degree." Lockwood (1989) 
Descartes attempted to find, by a process of reason, where in nature there 
could be found some form of fundamental unity. Putting it in a very 
simplified form, Descartes asserted that the edges of things are hard to 
find, and that all matter can be seen to be divisible into other forms, 
smaller, or more fundamental, and that an objective perception of reality 
demanded that there be at least one single indivisible entity or 
fundamental truth, else nothing could be proved or be said to be truly 
known. Given that knowledge is known by reference, we require a 
cornerstone of experience, one fact we can rely on to provide a basis for 
our understanding. Descartes believed that it was possible to know things, 
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and set out to justify this belief. Descartes' assertion was that for any one 
person there exists only one unitary entity, and this is the individual 
human soul. This is the one fact that we know is true, and must be true, 
that I exist. I know that I exist because I know that I exist. Thus the famous 
statement: Cogito ergo sum, which translates as either: I think therefore I 
am, or alternatively: I think therefore I am one (ie unitary). This is the 
fundamental fact that one must accept, that one exists. It is an absolute 
requirement that one have faith in one's own existence, and it can be 
proved (so he said) simply by being aware of it. The logic or otherwise of 
this I do not wish to argue. What I want from this is to show how it places 
the great division back between perceiver and perceived. Descartes' view 
of experience puts the soul in some form of reality that transcends that of 
common matter (as Plato), and has the mind mediating between the 
reality outside the body, and viewed through the lenses of senses, with the 
point of influence between the soul and the mind through the pineal 
gland. 
Experience is mediated 
Descartes' model of the mind is much more detailed than this simple 
description outlines, but a detailed understanding is not necessary. The 
central point is that soul, mind, and body are distinct. Reality is a 
secondary experience for the soul, the soul provides the mind with the 
information with which to understand the world, but does not experience 
it itself. There is a set of information inside the head (or at least accessed 
through the head, God alone knows in what world the soul resides), and it 
allows the mind to translate the information that is passed through from 
the senses. 
Kant - knowledge prior to reason 
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"The object of an idea, which comprises only the manner in which I am 
affected by the object, can be recognised by me only as it appears to me. All 
experience (empirical cognition), the inner not less than the outer, is 
nothing but the cognition of objects as they appear to us, not as they are 
(when considered by themselves)." Kant, "Anthropology" (1798). 
Kant was of the opinion that while our consciousness develops through 
experience, it was a necessary fact that there is a distinct separation 
between perceiver and perceived, and that the act of perception, as an 
intervening process, created this. Further, he stated that to know we must 
have prior knowledge, which is a restatement of the fundamental 
reflexive dilemma in knowledge, how can we know what we know 
without knowing that we know what we know, and how do we know 
that? More simply: knowledge is referential, it exists in comparison, 
therefore no fact can stand alone, but where does this first fact come from? 
This is a restatement of the Aristotelean concept• of primal cause, or the 
more familiar chicken-and-egg. Given this, Kant asserted that there must 
exist some prior knowledge, there must be a basis to learning so that we 
can have cognition. 
" ... Kant's solution to the issue of existence and basis of the categorical 
element in thought consisted basically of the delineation of what he 
considered to be the universal categories of reason. For Kant, the 
achievement of objective knowledge was a matter of obtaining 'necessary 
judgements', and he held that because perception alone could never yield 
such necessity, then the process of knowing implied the operation of such 
categories. Since the necessary categories were not arrived at through 
induction, he argued that they were simply 'innate to the understanding, a 
priori'. Furthermore ... this transcendental element in thought was both a-
historical and a-social; that it was an element shared by all men regardless 
of place and time." Goff, 1980. 
The Categorical Imperative 
Kant saw human cognition as driven by the categorical imperative, we 
partition reality according to the structures that we possess from birth and 
that are unaffected by the vagaries of society or social action. This is not to 
say that there is full knowledge present there that must simply be 
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awakened (as Plato would have it), but what exists is the basis of 
understanding in an a priori ability to reason. Kant would have us 
extracting structure from nature, not a structure that we impose on- nature 
but one (as Aristotle) that we find there. While the ability to categorise is 
prior, the categories themselves are not. As interpreted by Kolenda, 1974: 
"Mind makes nature possible; that is, nature as an organized process of 
experience appears to us only as a consequence of the logical contribution 
that the mind makes to that process. this does not mean that mind makes 
nature; it only means that reality appears to us in a certain guise and that 
we can discover the conditions under which this reality is intelligible." 
This discovery is a process that develops through the course of child 
development: 
"The observation that a child does neither weep nor smile until after it is 
three months old appears to be based on the development of certain 
notions of offense and injustice, which point toward reason. In this 
period, when his eyes begin to follow bright objects which are held before 
him, we have the crude beginnings of a process of 'broadening perceptions 
(the apprehensions of sensory awareness) into a recognition of objects of 
the senses, that is, of experience." Kant, "Anthropology" (1798). 
The "apprehensions of sensory awareness" are the workings of the 
fledgeling mind. Kant had a concept of the self that was self-referential, 
while the mind (the ability to categorise) is a unified whole (as Descartes), 
the self is a creation of the experience that the mind has in interaction 
with nature (Kolenda,1974). The child's self is not the same as the child's 
mind, the mind is prior to experience, and constitutes the child's capacities 
to reason, the self is the product of the child's observations and memories 
of its own actions (including cognition) and their outcomes. 
"It is noteworthy, however, that the child who already speaks fairly well 
begins to use the pronoun I rather late (perhaps after a year), in the 
meantime speaking of himself in the third person ... A light seems to dawn 
upon him when he begins speaking in the first person. From that day on 
he will never again revert to the third person. At first the child merely felt 
himself, now he thinks himself." Kant, "Anthropology" (1798). 
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The child's developmental path takes it from an objective view of events 
happening, to a subjective view of itself as an actor. Reason may be a 
given, but the sense of self is not. 
"Kant ... said that in the process of becoming aware of the world, the self 
also.becomes aware of itself." Kolenda, (1974) 
Kant also saw cognitive ability refining itself through the interchange of 
ideas between people, and that without this interchange there is no real 
progress: 
"Because sounds are nothing in themselves or at any rate not objects, but 
merely signs of inner feelings, they are the best means of expressing 
concepts. People born deaf, who must therefore remain speechless, can 
never arrive at anything more than an analogue of reason." Kant, (1798). 
So where are we now? In the course of progression from Plato to Kant we 
have the separation of mind from reality made progressively smaller, the 
degree of in-builtness becomes less and the role of personal experience in 
the creation of the individual rises in stature as science comes to demystify 
and explain and the quest to understand and to control the forces of nature 
and of ourselves demands that we leave less to the foggy realms of the 
supernatural and give explanation in terms of the simple and the tangible. 
But still at basis we have the need we cannot escape to have knowledge 
present at birth, as represented by the prior abilities of reason. We do have 
the beginnings of the suggestion that social interaction has a role in the 
development of reason but remain with the germ of thought as a primary 
given, no matter how small or rudimentary. And while there is an 
interaction between the mind and the world, it is both mediated and 
indirect: 
"Sense is the faculty of intuition in the presence of an object. Imagination 
is intuition without the presence of the object. The senses, however, are in 
turn divided into outer and inner (sensus internus). The outer sense is 
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where the human body is affected by physical things. The inner sense is 
where the human body is affected by the mind." Kant,, (1798). 
Hegel - radical Idealism 
The philosophy of Hegel represents a weighty and complex body of work 
in the history of western thought. Its breadth and the often tortuous 
nature of his writing have provided material for a great deal of argument 
and interpretation·. Hegel's ideas are difficult to understand,, so I beg 
indulgence for the inclusion of long interpretative (but hopefully 
clarifying) quotations_, the extensive re-writing of which would probably 
not contribute a great deal though I shall justify their inclusion by 
expansion. 
Fortunately, it is only my wish to examine a small, but crucial part of 
Hegel's philosophy, his description of the nat\1-re of the relationship 
between a person and the world she inhabits. For the relationship between 
Hegel's work and a description of the development of Emotions I will 
make use more of Marx's revision of Hegel's basic concepts. 
Hegel's goal, in part, was to resolve the millenia-old dispute over the 
'mind-body problem'. As previously described, this problem hinges on the 
relationship between the soul, seen as that immortal part of every human 
being continuous beyond death, and the physical world. Being immortal, 
mainstream philosophical opinion at that time had it that it was of 
necessity immaterial and so not subject to natural laws, and therefore, it 
was asked, how can an immaterial entity produce physical effects? 
Opinion then differed on the degree of involvement of the soul with the 
body, were they separate but communicating, did the body produce the 
mind, or vice versa, or did the soul exist at all? Here we refer back to the 
ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and Descartes and his hypothesized action of 
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the pituitary gland as an intermediary between the temporal and the 
immortal. 
One important implication for adopting a dualist approach a la Descartes is 
that the body begins to be seen as a 'vehicle' in which the soul resides, 
where the workings of reason are then a function of the presence of the 
soul and not of the physical architecture of the body. Further to this, as 
mentioned before, it was held that nothing comes from nothing, so it is 
necessary to have a core of 'knowledge' or reasoning power with which 
you are born, by which to acquire full understanding. Kant referred to this 
as a priori categorisation, by which experience is 'partitioned'. Hegel 
himself followed on from the work of Kant, but significantly reformulated 
it. In all of these conceptualizations, the site of this innate knowledge .of 
the world and the things in it is the soul, and between the apprehension 
by the soul of the thing-in-itself come the material senses. Hence there is a 
division between a person and the reality they inhabit, a separation that 
cannot be bridged. A person experiences only a representation, a shadow 
of things in the real world, not the things themselves. Phenomenal 
experience is then no more than a particularly vivid illusion. Berkeley 
took up this idea to construct the extremest of monist relativist positions, 
postulating that no real world of material substance exists at all, but rather 
that mental phenomena, as apparent products of the action of the senses, 
were simply creations of the mind of God. All reality is divine reality, 
there is no 'real world' separate from the perceiver. Objectivity is a con 
(Kolenda, 1974) .. 
The Dialectic 
Hegel's attempted solution to the problem of the apparent separation of 
the subjective perceiver from objective reality was to outline an extreme 
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idealism, a relationship between thought and the object of thought, 
between the Subject and the Object, which he termed the Dialectic. 
The basic premise of the Dialectic, simply put, is that consciousness is not 
static, but exists as the product of tension between thought (the Subject) 
and its object. For Hegel, the 'Idea' was the nature of the comprehension 
of reality. Hegel saw the perceiver and the perceived to have their 
interaction in the Idea of the act of perception. While each had an 
independent existence (thus denying Berkelian relativism) both were 
unified: 
"Life is at first a sequence of determinate 'objective' conditions - objective, 
because the living subject finds them outside of itself, limiting its free 
realization. The process of life, however, consists in continuously drawing 
these external conditions into the enduring unity of the subject. The 
living being manifests itself as a self by mastering and annexing the 
manifold of determinate conditions it finds, and· by bringing all that is 
opposed to itself in harmony with itself. The unity of life, therefore, is not 
an immediate and 'natural' one, but the result of a constant active 
overcoming of everything that stands against it. It is a unity that prevails 
only as the result of a process of 'mediation' (vermittlung) between the 
living subject as it is and its objective conditions. The mediation is the 
proper function of the living self as an actual subject, and at the same time 
it makes the living self as an actual subject. .. speculative thinking 
conceives 'the intellectual and material world' not as a totality of fixed and 
stable relations, but 'as a becoming, and its being as a product and a 
producing"' Marcuse (1941) 
Marcuse here interprets Hegel's conception of consciousness as an activity, 
a process rather than a fixed entity. While objective reality exists, 
consciousness is an effect of the attempt to resolve the difference between 
objective reality and the awareness of it, or rather, the sensitivity to it. 
Hegel saw the essential nature of the dialectical relationship as inherent 
opposition and instability: 
" ... Hegel believes in the unity or identity of opposites; indeed the unity of 
opposites plays such an important part in the evolution, in the 'dialectical' 
progress [of society], that we can describe these two Heraclitean ideas, the 
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war of opposites, and their unity or identity, as the main idea of Hegel's 
dialectics." Popper (1945). 
Ideas are defined by what they are not, and in negativity. Definition is 
always relative, said Hegel, things are defined referentially, and this is a 
reflection of the dynamic nature of Ideas. Understanding is a successive 
subsumption of experience into consciousness. It is a continual, on-going, 
redefinition through change brought about by action. This action 
comprises the basis of perception. A person, when born, is in a state of 
'antagonism' with their world, an antagonism that is a product of 
objective distinction between their nascent self as Subject, and the 
objective conditions of the world, the source of the Subject, as Objects. The 
act of perception is an act of unification through mutual redefinition that 
alters both the self of the individual that perceives, and the object that is 
perceived through its role in the perceptual 'dyad''. The redefinition of the 
self as it interacts with the objective entities of the world is then an aspect 
of direct interaction with reality. Hegel tries to unify Object and Subject by 
standing back from them, and positing a relation between them as 
members of the set of 'Notion' or 'Idea'. Subject and Object are then just 
different aspects of the Idea that come into existence when no particular 
observational stance is taken. Ideas exist in an unstable balance, with each 
Idea holding the seeds of its own inevitable destruction, or rather 
subsumption, into a further Idea in the very fact of its existence as Subject 
and Object. Change is inevitable and omnipresent. All things exist in a 
continual state of flux, a dynamism that is an essential consequence of the 
instability of nature. This change is progressive, and leads to the arisal and 
determination of the form of individual consciousness through the 
progressive dialectical transformation of the 'social idea' of the self, while 
at the same time the society in which that consciousness takes part is also 
transformed. Hegel's conception of reality is of successive becoming, 
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rather than of a constant nature. Any constancy is seen only in Ideas, not 
elements of Ideas. A person's consciousness comes into being by 
successive 'destructions' and incorporations of the initial ideal 
relationships that exist between it and the world, each destruction bringing 
about the formation of a new Idea, with its own tensions manifested in 
action. The process of development of individual consciousness is thus a 
historical one, reflecting, but not identical with, the society of which it 
partakes. This partaking of society is what Marcuse referred to (see above) 
as "mediation", but which can be re-expressed as 'action'. While there is 
identity between individual and society, this identity exists as a product of 
social action, not as a strict determination by society of the structure of the 
individual, but as they interact in the Idea of the society, and in its 
material manifestations: 
"The evolution of human nature proceeds in terms of the interaction 
between man and nature and the technology and social relations of 
production which mediate that process. In this sense the potentiality of 
human nature may be regarded as a function of the means and relations of 
production." Hyppolite. (1969) 
But society itself, as a product of the interaction of each individual's 
consciousness, has a dialectical nature, revealing its essential nature in 
change: 
"Hegel asserted that Kant had analysed reason as if it were something 
static; that he forgot that mankind develops, and with it, our social 
heritage. But what we are pleased to call our own reason is nothing but the 
product of this social heritage, of the historical development of the social 
group in which we live, the nation. This development proceeds 
dialectically, that is to say, in a three-beat rhythm. First a thesis is 
preferred; but it will produce criticism; it will be contradicted by opponents 
who will assert its opposite, an antithesis; and in the conflict of these 
views, a synthesis is attained, that is to say, a kind of unity of the opposites, 
a compromise or a reconciliation on a higher level. The synthesis absorbs, 
as it were, the two original opposite positions, by superseding them; it 
reduces them to components of itself, thereby negating, elevating and 
preserving them. And once the synthesis has been established, the whole 
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process can repeat itself on the higher level that has now been reached. " 
Popper (1945) 
Popper is here discussing Hegel's concept of the dialectical development of 
society, rather than individuals, of the progression of socially-
institutionalised beliefs and stated ideas, which is analogous, on a slightly 
different scale, to the development of each individual consciousness. 
There is a form of loosely 'fractal' relationship between the nature of 
society as a whole and that of the individuals in it, where the overall 
shape is reasserted in the structure of the components. 
The hegelian view of reality is of a cast dynamic whole, comprised of a 
flickering succession of events. Invariance in this seeming chaos occurs in 
Ideas, and Ideas exist in action, social action. An action that has its basis in 
the objective material existence of the eleme~ts of society and the 
objective material existence of the individual members of society as they 
exist in dialectical Ideas. 'Action' is of course social action, and within this 
comes language, the fundamental action in society, the essence of 
dialectical unity: 
"Language is the medium in which the first integration between subject 
and object takes place. It is also the first actual community 
(Allgemeinheit), in the sense that it is objective and shared by all 
individuals. On the other hand, language is the first medium of 
individuation, for through it the individual obtains mastery over the 
objects he knows and names. A man is able to stake out his sphere of 
influence and keep others from it only when he knows his world, is 
conscious of his needs and powers, and communicates this knowledge to 
others. Language is thus also the first lever of appropriation. 
Language, then, makes it possible for an individual to take a 
conscious stand against his fellows and to assert his needs and desires 
against those of the other individuals." Marcuse (1941). 
The "conscious stand against his fellows" as referred to above can be seen 
as the formation of the self, or the conscious awareness of individual 
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existence, formed in the Idea of social action, in the awareness of the 
phenomenal distinction that divides the unity into the opposites: 
" ... the real object is constituted by the (intellectual) activity of the 
subject ... [which] ... discovers that it itself stands 'behind' the objects, that the 
world becomes real only by force of the comprehending power of 
consciousness." Marcuse (1941). 
The self, the subject of conscious awareness, comes into being through 
social action, and as such is society for itself and by itself. The self exists as 
an individual in its own right, and as an individual as other individuals 
are, as a consequence of the referential nature of reality: 
"The idea of a universal I is an abomination to common sense, though 
everyday language makes constant use of it. When I say 'I' see, hear, and 
so on, I put everybody in my place, substitute any other I for my 
individual I. 'When I say "I", "this individual", I say quite generally "all 
I's", everyone is "I", this individual "I'". 
Sense-experience thus discovers that truth lies neither with its 
particular object nor with the individual I. The truth is the result of a 
double process of negation, namely, (1) the negation of the 'per se' 
existence of the object, and (2) the negation of the individual I with the 
shifting of the truth to the universal I. Objectivity is thus twice 'mediated' 
or constructed by consciousness and henceforward remains tied to 
consciousness. The development of the objective world is throughout 
interwoven in the development of consciousness." Marcuse (1941). 
But it is important to remember that the statement: "Objectivity is thus 
twice 'mediated' or constructed by consciousness ... " as Marcuse expounds 
Hegel, does not imply strict relativism, though admittedly it does sound 
like it. The mediation of objectivity refers to the Idea that links 
consciousness and objectivity in the act of perception. Specifically here it is 
the self, the "I" that has its individual (subject) existence separate from but 
intertwined with the social (objective) existence defined in the process of 
social action: 
"Perception, like sense-experience, first gathers the truth from the object. 
But, like sense-experience also, it discovers that the subject itself 
constitutes the objectivity of the thing ... the analysis of perception goes 
beyond the point reached in the analysis of sense-experience ... The unity of 
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the thing is not only determined but constituted by its relation to other 
things, and its thinghood consists in this very relation." Marcuse (1941). 
Hegel is confusing, and his ideas often seem contradictory or flatly 
unintelligible. "The Unity of Opposites" seems like one of "six impossible 
things before breakfast", and the idealism seems more akin to spiritualism 
than any form appropriable by materialism. Yet, as a description of the 
development and means of constitution of current states of consciousness 
it has great merit. What is/is in consciousness at any time is a function of 
the 'meeting' of 'external reality' and the past history of the individual, 
and each successive encounter with an 'event' does involve a redefinition 
of 'current contents'. 
"What the romantic idealists, and Hegel in particular, were saying, was 
that the world evolves, that reality itself is in a process of evolution." 
Mead, 1956. 
On-going experience, learning, is subsumptive. The actions of learning 
involve things such as accommodation, incorporation, taking in and 
reforming, producing scripts and narratives, involving current object 
states with current and past subject states. 
Hegel's conceptualization strives to overcome dualism by its postulation 
of higher Ideal relationships, but it is Marx's contribution that grounds the 
Dialectic firmly in the material world of people. 
Marx - Consciousness as History 
"All that is solid melts into the air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is 
at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and 
his relations with his kind." Marx, Communist Manifesto, (1849) 
Marx's belief was that Hegel was in many ways correct in his formulation 
of the subject/ object relation, but that it should not be seen in terms of an 
idealist philosophy, but rather, in a materialist. I will, at this point, give a 
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very brief and schematic outline of Marx's economic theory of history, to 
show the materialist transformation of Hegel. Marx provides the cross-
over point, where the detached intellectualism of Hegel was reworked 
into a form that had appropriateness, a simple grounding in the common-
place that provides a model for a plausible real-world mechanism for the 
inter-relationship between individual and society. 
Marx was influenced by the form of the prevailing social structure of his 
time with its marked social divisions and inequalities, and of the 
transformation of society as he saw it through a pattern consistent with a 
historical (dialectical) progression. This progression was occurring as an 
inevitable function of tensions inherent in social structure: 
"The bourgeoise cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the 
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and 
with them the whole relations of society ... Cons'tant revolutionizing of 
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting 
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier 
ones ... " Marx (Communist Manifesto, 1849). 
Change results in the need for more change, production and consumption 
feed on each other to force the march of social and technological 
progression. This progression has lead through successive patterns of class 
stratification from independent village existence, to feudalism, to 
capitalism which, with its sharply divided dichotomy into bourgeois and 
proletarian classes, must then produce the final form of society in 
communism. Progression through these stages involves, and is fuelled by, 
an increasing alienation of the worker from the product of his actions and 
the increasing stratification and formation of stark divisions within 
society. Alongside this is the inevitable concentration of control of the 
means of production in the hands of a few. Increase in industrialisation 
means a subsequent increase in the alienation of the worker, and every 
increase in productivity, according to Marx, meant less of a share in the 
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wealth of society, the product of labour, for the worker. Because the 
worker does not share in the profit of her labour directly, but instead is on 
a constant wage, then any increase in output has only the effect of 
decreasing the value of the work done to produce any object. Increase in 
production means the decrease of the value of labour. Industrialisation's 
increase also results in an increase in control of the means of production 
by the rising industrial class, the bourgeoise, the previous merchant class. 
This class comes to dominate over the earlier feudal masters by economic 
control, and as time progresses the structure of society becomes simplified 
with the submergence of the titled classes, the "feudal nobility", by the 
bourgeoise until only only two major social divisions exist. It is when the 
proletariat becomes aware of its coherent existence and strength, and 
unifies in unionism that it will overthrow the bourgeois industrialist class 
and the final social structure of communism will appear, with only a 
single class: 
"The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the 
social process of production-antagonistic not in the sense of individual 
antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individual's 
social conditions of existence ... The prehistory of human society 
accordingly closes with this social formation." Marx (1859). 
Social Consciousness 
It was Marx's belief that divisions into social classes involves a division of 
consciousness. 
"It is not the consciousness of men [sic] that determines their existence, but 
their social existence that determines their consciousness." Marx (1859). 
The changes that occur are inherent in the nature of relations, and do not 
require an alteration in the subjective nature of the people involved. 
Society comes to be seen as an entity in itself, capable of having properties 
that are unique to it. As a whole, it has individual life. While consisting of 
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individuals it exists independently of any one individual, but dependent 
on all. People's belief in the existence of a real structure, called society, in 
which they have a place, and which determines to a great extent the 
pattern of their lives, functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy. People's 
actions shape society, but their beliefs in how they should act (according to 
their perceived social position, and their socially-derived goals) shape 
their actions. 
Consciousness as Social Practice 
Like Hegel, Marx saw consciousness as a function of a dialectical 
interaction between individuals and society: 
"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production" Marx (1859). 
But rather than seeing the actualisation of these relations in the Idea of 
action, as Hegel, Marx wanted to see it in economic terms, in terms of real 
values of concrete physical objects and human endeavour directly as they 
exist as tangible social entities, as Suchting (1986) put it: 
"Humankind's primary relation to the world is an active one, specifically 
the relation involved in labour. In transforming the world through 
labour, two things happen simultaneously. Firstly, the object of labour is 
· changed, in accordance with certain human aims, into a new sort of object 
- a 'humanised' object. But, secondly, the subject of labour, the labourer, 
develops new sensory capacities adequate to the reception of the new 
objective characteristics thus brought forth - the subject becomes 
'naturalised'. This suggests that what is of primary significance is not the 
'subject' or the 'object' but the practical relation by which the real object is 
transformed in labour .... [in this way] ... the 'subjective', which is the factor 
of the executor of the practice, whose sensory capacities are determined by 
the practice, and the 'objective', which is the factor determined by the real 
object ... are not constituted prior to the practice, but are constituted within 
practice as moments of it." 
Practice (praxis) now comes to dominate over Ideas. Action in a social 
context is not conceptual as can be construed from Hegel, it is material, 
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and its effects are material and are embodied in the 'value of labour' and 
the concept of capital. 
Marx's ideas are, however, of relevance to more than just economic 
theory. His description of perceptual development through practice 
(praxis) and of the class determination of consciousness can be seen 
reflected in the basic tenets of divisions in sociological and psychological 
thought. This appears most overtly in the post-revolutionary soviet 
psychology, in workers such as Leontiev, Luria, Pavlov, and most 
particularly L.S. Vygotsky (Valsiner, 1988). Less overtly it can be seen in an 
altered form in the American psychologists of the 'Chicago School', such 
as James, Dewey, and Mead, and later in the work of J.J. and E.J. Gibson. It 
would be fallacious, however, to refer sweepingly to these thinkers as ned-
marxists, or neo-hegelians, simply applying the ideas of these two in more 
contemporary terminology. It is more appropriate, perhaps, to see a 
parallelism, or perhaps the inevitable re-emergence of an idea that has 
some claim to truth. The theories of Mead and Vygotsky for example, 
have been compared by a number of people, who do not suggest that there 
was interaction between them, merely a common insight given the same 
observations and a similar philosophical history. This particular parallel I 
shall return to in more detail later. 
Socio genesis 
"The self is not contained in any moment or any place, but it is only in the 
intersection of moment and place that the self might, for a moment, be 
seen vanishing through a door, which disappears at once." Jeanette 
Winterson, "Sexing the Cherry". 
James Mark Baldwin 
According to Valsiner and Van der Veer (1989) the 'sociogenetic' approach 
to cognitive development can be illustrated by an analysis of the the ideas 
of Josia Royce and James Mark Baldwin as they impact on the work of G.H. 
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Mead and L.S. Vygotsky . They take this idea and use it to construct a 
simple explanatory diagram which attempts to capture the philosophical 
relationships in graphic form. I have appropriated this diagram below (see 
figure 1). 
r-------,- - - - - - - - Hegel - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Marxism Pragmatism 
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Figure 1. A schematic view of the intellectual connections between major representatives 
of the sociogenetic perspective and their intellectual background. 
Taken from Valsiner & Van der Veer, 1988. 
Valsiner and Van der Veer describe the sociogenetic view as based on two 
basic postulates: 
"First, the ontological postulate: all human cognition is social in its 
nature. By that it is meant that adult human thinking processes are 
interdependent with the social discourse of the given society. Second, the 
developmental postulate: the social nature of human cognition emerges 
in the process of internalization of external social experiences by 
individuals in the process of socialization." 
36 
This is, I think, fairly self-explanatory. They then go on to outline what 
they see as the major contribution of Royce and Baldwin to the later 
syntheses of Mead and Vygotsky. 
From the diagram it can be seen that Royce had direct influence on Mead, 
and also on Baldwin with whom he was closely connected. Baldwin is 
credited with a great deal of influence on the work of Vygotsky, and 
Baldwin himself was influenced in the formation of his basic ideas about 
internalization processes by the french psychoanalyst Pierre Janet, 
particularly his concept of 'suggestion' 1 to formulate his own ideas on 
imitation where the perception of the actions of others can be compared to 
the action of oneself, and modified according to information about the 
results of action: 
"Baldwin's description of the process of persistent imitation involves the 
use of the feedback principle .. .in a process where successive motor 
imitations of the model are compared with their previous traces in the 
nervous system ... Human personality develops with the help of 
'personality-suggestion' - by the suggestive models of activity by the 'social 
others' ... these models provide the 'input material', from which the 
developing children can learn to assemble their own, novel patterns of 
personality ... " Valsiner and Van der Veer, 1989. 
So in Baldwin we have the appearance of the idea of the 'otherness' of self 
as it develops in the process of acquisition of social skills by active 
imitation. Of primacy to Baldwin's ideas on development is the 
construction in, and by, the child of an awareness of phenomenal dualism, 
an appreciation that there is a functional distinction in action and 
perception, that there is an inside and an outside to experience. He 
conceived of two forms of this distinction, one of body and mind, and 
building on this, of subject and object: 
111 ... a motor reaction brought about by language or perception." Baldwin, 
1895i cited in Valsiner and Van der Veer, 1988 
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"The inner world of representation is contrasted with the outer world of 
sense, and only gradually does the inner develop into a locus of control 
over and against the outer. When the child is able to represent the inner 
as having its own control and thus separate from the outer, he has begun 
to develop the mind-body dualism which later on, through a further 
development of the relation between representation and representational 
object, will lend to the subject-object dualism." Lee, 1982. 
The child, according to Baldwin, first appreciates with on-going experience 
that there is a class of action that is 'personal' to herself, that is in its 
nature different to the directly observable, and begins to form an implicit 
distinction between the 'mental' and the 'physical' classes of action: 
"The hardening up of the inner-outer dualism through the development 
of play and experimental objects leads up to the mind-body 
dualism ... [which] ... arises through the child's differentiation between the 
way inner and outer mental objects persist...Outer objects all share the 
quality of external persistence, of control by something external. Inner 
objects are characterised by a sameness of inner co~trol." Lee, 1982. 
So where the child begins as a phenomenal monist egocentric, making no 
distinction between 'objects of imagination' and 'objects of perception'2 so 
that everything is a figment of the imagination, time reveals the 
difference. This difference can be simply stated as a distinction by virtue of 
intention, as, other than in hallucinatory states, one intends to imagine, 
whereas the occurrence of the objects of 'external perceptions' is not so 
subject to personal volition3• The child learns that some things are under 
her control and some aren't, and it is the extension of this belief about 
herself to other people as a consequence of active imitation that leads to 
the arisal of the personal self: 
2Qf course, it can be argued that imaginary events are perceived, resulting 
as they do from physical processes of memorial recombination. 
3However, this is not to suggest that we do not intend to perceive, but 
rather that what we perceive is not under our control. I can choose to look, 
I cannot choose what it is I see, I can choose what to listen to, but not what 
I hear. 
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" ... when children imitate the behaviour of someone else, they discover 
that in the other person whom they perceived as merely outer before the 
imitation, there is a whole range of psychic events, some of which they 
themselves might have previously felt. 11 Lee, 1982. 
Baldwin emphasised the importance of role-playing in the development 
of self. By taking on the actions of others to oneself one becomes the other, 
so that by adopting the surface appearance (the other person's behaviours), 
and making the connection between the surface appearance of oneself (the 
'body') and of the inner actions of oneself (the 'mind'), and applying this 
to the surface appearance of others, the child appreciates the divided 
existence that other people also share with her: 
"Young people first imitate the novel and interesting behaviour of others, 
learning to transform that behaviour into something they can do for 
themselves. In so doing, they create and experience the feelings that 
accompany the imitated behaviour. When they se~ others perform similar 
actions they "eject" these feelings and the accompanying intentional states 
upon the other, reading into the other via this "empathic transference" 
what they themselves feel." Lee, 1982. 
It is not only a monodirectional process of interpretation that is 
responsible, for, while the child is forming associations between external 
actions and internal intentional states, so too the adults in her 
environment construe her actions in terms of the social significance that 
such actions would have for them. Their responses to her actions guide 
and colour her developing cognitive structures and provide her with a 
range of socially appropriate actions, so that the child can function as a 
social actor before any explicit understanding of social significance is 
present: 
"The self emerges out of social interaction. In their interactions with their 
child, parents are constantly interpreting the child's goal-directed 
behaviour in terms of the ideals they have for the child. By empathically 
or non-empathically responding to the child, they segment, create and 
indicate which of the child's activities mean more emotionally and are 
important. .. [and the] ... feedback necessary to establish and confirm its 
cognitive strategies, but also, by the emotional quality of their interactions, 
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determining how it feels about how it represents itself and others." Lee, 
1982. 
George Herbert Mead 
"What I want to make evident is that the development, the development 
of mind as well as institutions is a social evolution ... society in its 
organisation is a form, a specie [sic] that has developed; ... " Mead, 1956. 
Pragmatism 
Mead's approach arose from within the influence of the school of thought 
in American psychology, philosophy and sociology in the beginning of 
this century collectively termed Pragmatism. Pragmatism arose from 
somewhat hegelian roots through the work of such people as John Dewey, 
William James, James Mark Baldwin, and Charles Horton Cooley. 
The pragmatist ideology had some similarities to that of behaviourism, . 
reacting against cartesian dualism and the mentalism of introspection, 
seeking to see people in context, as functioning in a social setting. 
Pragmatism saw the self and society as forming together a "seamless 
web .. .linked in an indissoluble unity ... " (Coser, 1977) following from the 
ideas of Cooley. Self and society were seen as continuous and intertwined: 
" A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so 
likewise is society when regarded as something apart from 
individuals ... "Society" and "individuals" do not denote denote separable 
phenomena, but are simple collective and distributive aspects of the same 
thing ... " Cooley, 1964 (cited in Coser, 1977). 
Pragmatism, while seeing some of the source of behaviour to be found in 
the environment, did not reject consciousness as an entity as did the 
radical behaviourism of Watson, but instead wished to see where it arose 
from, where the origins of consciousness could be found in the world at 
large, and to use the observation of behaviour to provide means to 
describe the processes of the formation of consciousness (Baldwin, 1985). 
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Mead wanted to work from the 'outside to the inside', viewing the 
appropriate goal of behaviourism as: 
" ... [looking] ... first at empirical data on biology, psychology and sociology, 
and then try to determine how these external variables give rise to the 
inner experiences of cognition and emotion ... Behaviourism traces mind 
and other inner experiences back to biosocial causes." Mead, 1934 (in 
Baldwin, 1985). 
Pragmatists such as Dewey and Mead wished to reform society, to put the 
work of scholars such as sociologists to real practical use, and the work of 
Mead is thus coloured by his wish to provide a description of 
consciousness in a general social context, and to demonstrate the 
significance of society for the development of the individual and thus that 
social reform was a worthwhile endeavour. 
Within pragmatism the dominant view (in a · general sense) of the 
formation of consciousness was that of an interactionist, evolutionary 
approach that emphasised the functional role of the mind for a person as 
an actor in the human environment of society: 
"Self is, as we have so often seen, activity. It is not something which acts; it 
. . . Th h ' ' . h 1 . d f 1' . h b . is activity. __ roug_ its activity, t_ e sou_ is; an _ee_mg is t e ecommg 
conscious of its own being." Dewey, 1891. 
Thus, the social significance of action was stressed in theory, and of 
persons as shapers of behaviour to meet socially-determined ideals and 
self-perceptions. Communication, language and interaction were seen as 
determinants of personality and identity, as people consensually form the 
idea of what it is to be a person: 
" ... evolution ... [of institutions] ... takes place in human society, but here it 
takes place ... not through the development of physiological functions on 
the part of the separate individuals. It takes place through what has been 
referred to ... as a universe of discourse. That is, it takes place through 
communication and participation on the part of individuals in common 
activities. It takes place through the development of significant symbols." 
Mead (1956). 
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So an individual is only thus because of their relationship to the forms of 
society, a relationship mediated by the structure of language: 
11No individual can realize himself in impersonal relations ... He can truly 
develop himself only in self-conscious activity, in personality, and that is 
impossible without relations to other persons. 11 Dewey, 1891. 
Cooley 
Cooley's original conception of the individual's relationship to society 
endeavoured to oppose the cartesian-type separation between thought and 
the objects of thought, and thus stressed the involvement of 
consciousness in, or rather as, the substance of society: 
11 ... for Cooley, ... society was uniquely a mental phenomenon. 11The 
imaginations people have of one another ... are the solid facts of 
society ... society .. .is a relation among personal ideas." .11 Coser, 1977. 
However, it was felt by Mead that Cooley went too far, and over-
emphasised the subjective element in society and thus undermined the 
necessary objective reality of society as embodied in practice and social 
symbolism (Coser, 1977). 
Internalization 
Mead followed from Baldwin in viewing the development of personality 
as a process of internalization, but for Mead it was internalization of the 
processes of interaction in the form of speech that was the substance of the 
I 
self. It is by taking on the linguistically-mediated relationship we have 
with others to ourselves, that we as individuals come into being: 
" ... the human self arises through its ability to take the attitude of the group 
to which he belongs - because he can talk to himself in terms of the 
community to which he belongs and lay upon himself the responsibilities 
that belong to the community ... The structure of society lies in ... social 
habits, and only insofar as we can take these social habits into ourselves 
can we become selves." Mead (1965). 
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Thus it is not so much internalization as the imitation of the actions of 
others, but of internalization of cooperative gestures. 
The role of Internal Monologue 
Talking to oneself is very much how Mead saw the self as existing, as an 
entity composed of self-spoken attitudes, attitudes that are expressed as if 
they were to someone else, the 'generalized other' that one must become 
for oneself to be oneself. 
"The 'I' - 'me' relationships in Mead's thought serve as the mechanism by 
which the person relates to society: the active 'I' is constantly in the 
process of taking social roles (thus becoming 'me', i.e. 'the organized set of 
attitudes of others which one himself assumes' - Mead, 1934)." Valsiner 
and Van der Veer, 1989. 
Mead's approach is to analyse people as adults functioning knowingly in 
society, thus the self which he examines is the social self, and not 
cognition per se, thus his view is not particularly developmental in 
attitude, though its significance is for development. To put it more clearly, 
Mead looked at what is 'now', in the adult, and attempted to derive from 
it a simple model for how what currently exists could have come into 
being by some form of learning process, as opposed to examining the 
nature of self-perception in any longitudinal way in the course of its 
personal evolution through childhood. Mead was a sociologist, and his 
interest lay primarily in the nature of modern social functioning as it 
existed at that time, hence his lack of attention to the details of 
hypothetical structure in the mind, and his focus instead on the processes 
of society that could be put forward as candidates for the role of cause. 
Which is not to say that Mead did not consider the mind, but rather that 
from his viewpoint of social determinism it made more sense to 
concentrate on the determining external forces than to risk solipsism by 
looking from the 'inside out'. The mind for Mead was to be found in the 
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act of reiteration of the internalised attitudes one possessed to the 
'generalised other' as it existed in our selves: 
"Thinking is a process of conversation with one's self when the 
individual takes the attitude of the other .. .it is this inner thought, this-
inner flow of speech ... which constitutes the mind ... " Mead (1965). 
It is only when we 'speak our minds' that our minds as such come into 
being. The process of internalization of the generalized other involves the 
learning of appropriate forms for communication, such as are in the 
language, the gestures, the sign structure, which leads to the construction 
of a coherent response framework which supplants the need for an actual 
'other' to exist externally, for there to be a tangible 'public other'. 
Internalization is the making private4 of the norms and ideologies of 
society as embodied in conversational practice, in discourse, by their 
integration into the dialogue between that part of self termed 'I' and the 
generalized other. We tell ourselves of our plans, if you like we convert 
them into a format that readily allows comparisons to be made with 
established norms of conduct and attitude. If you were to take the view (as 
James, for example), that we become aware of our activities by observation 
of our own behaviours, then the function of the self is to make our 
intentions 'external' in a private forum that exposes these intentions to 
'public scrutiny'. We can engage in a referendum in absentia. 
Mead, however, took a different tack to James in terms of what and how 
behaviour was-observed: 
"Mead (1934) accepts James' ascription of centrality of agency to the 
experience of the "I"; but Mead also rejects the Jamesian reduction of 
identifying agency to motor movements, preferring instead to emphasize 
its experiential importance. Rather than following James' path of 
biologizing the sense of volition, Mead situates the "I" within a social 
context, along with the objective self." Damon, 1988. 
4Personalizing, if you like. 
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William James 
Mead followed James in his conceptualization of emotional experience, 
seeing emotions as resulting from the socially-influenced (ie by 
experience) modification of 'impulses' resulting from innate instinct: 
" ... the stimuli that elicit instinctive acts activate "vasomotor processes" 
(Mead, 1895: 164) that produce the "visceral disturbances" that are 
experienced as the basic "feelings" of emotions (Mead,1903:95). These basic 
internal responses serve as the biological component of subjectively 
experienced emotions ... Only during symbolic socialization do feelings 
become intermeshed with symbols to produce the complex emotional 
experiences typical of verbal children and adults." Baldwin, 1985. 
What is required for this private yet public display is that the self be able to 
detach itself from itself, to see itself as another, not just in the form of the 
generalized other to whom the discourse is addressed, but as an other that 
is the performer of acts and the holder of views which are made available 
through the internal dialogue to society. The self must be able to have a 
perspective and be able to look at itself, to have an awareness of its own 
relative existence. It must see itself as a coherent functioning entity, a 
person, so that the relationship to the norms revealed in discourse 
becomes apparent. 
Reflexivity 
"The essence of self, according to Mead, is its reflexivity. The individual 
self is individual only because of its relation to others. Through the 
individual's ability to ta¼e in his imagination the attitudes of others, his 
self becomes an object of his own reflection. The self as both subject and 
object is the essence of being social." Coser, 1977. 
Mead ascribed this role of the actor to the 'me' of the self. While 'I' may 
act, it was 'me that did it'. 'I' am a function of the beliefs that I hold about 
the actions and attitudes made flesh by 'my' behaviour and thoughts. 'I' 
exist now, but that which existed to express that statement was 'me'. Here 
we can see quite clearly the debt owed to Baldwin. In the development of 
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the essential dualisms of Baldwin, that of Mind and Body and of Subject 
and Object, there is the structure to support the formation of the 
differential perspectives that make up the 'I' - 'me' distinction of Mead. 
Mead takes Baldwin's ideas further, by suggesting that not only does the 
person internalize the action of cooperation with others, as well as 
forming the association between personal feelings and those of others 
performing similar actions, but that in a sense they internalize the other 
person as well. Communication and cooperative action are stressed by 
Mead, following again from Baldwin's (and pragmatist ideology in 
general) ideas on evolutionary pressure towards social coordination, and 
consequently language is seen as an interaction, not an independent 
process that any one person can perform in isolation. Language is in 
essence an act between people, and the role of inner speech is to allow 
access to society, to the social mind, much in the same way that external 
speech creates a sharing of experiences: 
''The peculiar importance of the vocal gesture is that it affects the 
individual who makes it just as much as it affects the individual to whom 
it is directed. We hear what we say; if we are talking with our fingers we 
see what we are saying; if with attitudes of the body, we feel what we are 
saying. The effect of the attitude which we produce in others comes back 
on ourselves. It is in this way that participation arises out of 
communication. When we indicate something to another form, we are 
calling out in that individual a certain response in him." Mead (1965). 
Thus, in communication, our aim is to create in the person with whom 
we are in communication a sharing of our particular state. We wish for 
them to feel the same thing when they hear our words that we are feeling 
when we speak them. And in our communication with the generalized 
other we speak with a high degree of confidence that this will be so. 
L.S. Vygotsky 
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" .. .it has been routinely assumed that the child's mind contains all stages 
of future intellectual development; they exist in complete form, awaiting 
the proper moment to emerge." Vygotsky, (''Mind In Society", 1978/1930). 
Soviet Science 
For historical sociopolitical reasons there has been a strong tendency in 
post-revolutionary soviet science to ensure the inclusion of marxist-
leninist principles (i.e dialectical and historical materialism) into all 
theory, particularly during the Stalin era. The influence this has had on 
soviet psychology (as well as the effect of the generally more eclectic 
approach to science in the the soviet union in general) has been to stress 
the social side of social interaction, and to see the standard practice of 
science more broadly than in the west, involving more the arts, literature 
and philosophy, than westerners might. The division into arts versus 
science that we are familiar with is ascribed by 'valsiner (1988) to stem 
from the Russian Orthodox Church's distance from the upheavals of the 
reformation, or the events of the Renaissance: 
"As a result, the differentiation of the spheres of secular and religious life 
(a major result of the Reformation and the advent of capitalist production 
in society) that emerged in Western Europe remained largely unknown in 
Russia." 
Soviet psychology takes very much a developmental approach to social 
psychology, seeing the nature of an individual as not static, but constantly 
evolving. The methodology is then by preference longitudinal. It is not 
assumed that taking a 'sample' of one person is sufficient, or even 
comparable to any other at that particular point, particularly if the 
definition of that point is by age. Each person is a product of their 
individual historical relationship with society, and consequently a product 
of the history of that society. One of the most influential figures in soviet 
social psychology was L.S. Vygotsky, a particularly eclectic figure, 
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beginning his career as a literary critic and considering psychology as a 
"temporary diversion" (Kozulin, 1986), and then going on to continue in 
psychology as his life's work. Vygotsky's influence can be seen in part 
demonstrated in how the noted soviet neuropsychologist Luria saw his 
work as simply elaborating the ideas of Vygotsky, and I will attempt to 
briefly elucidate Vygotsky's description of cognitive development as 
prototypical of the soviet approach. 
Vygotsky did not of course work in a vacuum, but based his ideas on those 
of the people who came before, but his formulation is considered the most 
significant, and well substantiated by a wealth of research work. 
Marxism-Leninism 
Vygotsky believed that the manner in which psychologists prior to his 
' 
time had interpreted the value of Hegel and Marx for psychology was 
incorrect, that they had simply paid lip-service to the dogma, and not seen 
in it the viable model for explaining the development of human thought 
that it contained (Kozulin, 1986). Vygotsky found in Hegel a basis for a 
description of human development in a social context: 
"We believe that child development is a complex dialectical process 
characterized by periodicity, unevenness in the development of different 
functions, metamorphosis or qualitative transformations of one form into 
another, interweaving of external and internal factors and adaptative 
processes which overcome impediments that the child encounters." 
Vygotsky, 1978/1930, (cited in Bidell, 1988.) 
Marx's influence on Vygotsky came in three forms (Wertsch, 1985): firstly 
in his method by the use of the "genetic explanation", looking for the 
source of the genesis of the whole in the characteristics of the unit: 
"The whole of Capital is written according to the following method: Marx 
analyses a single living "cell" of capitalist society - for example the nature 
of value. Within this cell he discovers the structure of the entire system 
and all its economic institutions ... Anybody who could discover what a 
"psychological" cell is - the mechanism producing even a single response -
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would thereby find the key to psychology as a whole." Vygotsky, 1978 (in 
Wertsch, 1985). 
Thus Vygotsky saw the search for the appropriate unit of analysis as 
crucial for the understanding of cognitive development. The second point 
of influence is Vygotsky's adoption and utilisation of Marx's idea of 
activity (praxis) as the appropriate explanatory vehicle for the point of 
interaction between the individual and the whole (Wertsch, 1985). 
Thirdly, the source of individual cognition in the structure of society: 
"To paraphrase a well-known position of Marx's, we could say that a 
human's psychological nature represents the aggregate of internalized 
social relations that have become functions for the individual and forms 
of his/her structure. We do not want to say that this is the meaning of 
Marx's position, but we see in this position the fullest expression of that 
towards which the history of cultural development leads us." Vygotsky, 
1981 (in Wertsch,1985). 
Vygotsky reacted against the then dominance of 'reflexology' in soviet 
psychology, following the ideas of Bhekterev and others who sought to 
apply empiricist conceptualization to the action of consciousness and thus 
undermined the value of it (Valsiner, 1988). Explanation was sought 
under this ideology through 'reflexes', biologically predetermined 
dispositions to conditional action (cf Pavlov) that were invoked as 
elementary explanatory constructs, coming between stimulus and 
response much as in the standard radical behaviourist account, except that 
the lack of explanation in terms of consciousness is 'camouflaged' by 
appealing to the 'reflex'. The end result of this approach is a vast array of 
reflexes, for all conceivable situations (e.g. sex reflexes, mothering reflexes) 
that explain nothing, but merely describe. Mixed in with these constructs 
come attempts to relate one's ideas to the demands of politically correct 
dogma, and thus retain favour with the established scientific community. 
Often in soviet science it was the theory that could demonstrate the best 
justification of itself in terms of marxism-leninism rather than logical 
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reasoning that would be supported by the soviet scientific world (Valsiner, 
1988). The standard method of advancement of personal opinion was to 
engage in argument with a 'rival'. Application of dialectical principles 
meant that acceptance of a new idea necessarily involved the 
abandonment of its predecessor. Opinions were seen as polar, and one 
defended one's ideas against all others. Failure in its defence meant that 
the theory itself was cast out, and the holder risked loss of funding and 
ejection from positions of responsibility (Valsiner, 1988). Such a fall from 
grace caused Vygotsky's ideas to be suppressed after 1936, due to (amongst 
other things) that Vygotsky's theory and research worked involved the 
then outlawed study of 'pedology', "interdisciplinary educational 
psychology" (Kozulin, 1986). Along with the practitioners of pedology, 
Vygotsky was seen as straying from the demands of dialectical materialism 
by focusing on semiotics and the 'signs' in culture, rather than the 
.concrete relationship between a child and its activities in the physical 
world, as explanation for the arisal of consciousness (Kozulin, 1986). 
Vygotsky's influences go far wider than Marx and Hegel, his 
interdisciplinary educational background was mixed with on-going 
interaction with Piaget (with whom, he often took issue), and the rising 
Gestalt school through interest in the work of Koffka (Valsiner and Van 
der Veer, 1989). Vygotsky's theoretical leanings were further heavily 
influenced by the work of the french psychoanalyst Pierre Janet, and most 
crucially by James Baldwin (Valsiner and Van der Veer, 1989). The 
influence of Freud and psychoanalysis in general was widespread in soviet 
psychology, though later opinion turned against this as being 'unmarxist', 
and thus became a further cause for the unpopularity and suppression of 
the work of Vygotsky and others (Valsiner, 1988). Vygotsky took a number 
of ideas from Baldwin, and extended and adapted them into novel forms. 
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He explicitly took Baldwin's concept of the personal self as arising through 
· others, the self being seen to come into being as we become the 'other' for 
ourselves: 
"The concept 'personality' is, thus, a social, reflective concept that is built 
on the basis of the child's use in relation to oneself, of those means of 
adaptation that he uses in relation to others. That is why it can be said that 
personality is the social in ourselves." Vygotsky, 1983, (in Valsiner and 
Van der Veer, 1989). 
Internalization 
Vygotsky's theory involves the development of cognitive skills through 
the successive internalization of action through signs. These actions go 
through a process from external existence to internal, from external action 
as initially imitation in a 'public' social sphere to an internalized 'private' 
but no less social sphere. The actions referred to are social actions, within a 
sociocultural framework and involving the 'tools'' of the society, i.e. the 
language and sign-symbols, mnemonic devices and culturally-instilled 
heuristics and analytical techniques: 
"According to Vygotsky, human behaviour and mind must be considered 
in terms of purposive and culturally meaningful actions rather than as 
biological, adaptive reactions. Objects of human experience ... are socially 
and culturally meaningful things and not just abstract stimuli. Activity 
then takes the place of the hyphen in the formula S -> R, turning it into a 
formula, object <-> activity <-> subject, where both object and subject are 
historically and culturally specific." Kozulin (1986). 
Activity is then mediated, by the physical nature of the tools that one uses, 
in their relation to the society that has created them and that they have 
created. The process of active internalization replaces external physical 
actions by internal signs, structures in cognition (structures of cognition 
more properly), which then act to influence further instances of 
internalization. The 'lower' mental functions such as perception and 
memory act as the building blocks for the 'higher' cultural functions: 
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"If one decomposes a higher mental function into its component parts, 
one finds nothing but the natural, lower skills ... All the building blocks of 
higher behaviour seem absolutely materialistic and can be apprehended by 
ordinary empirical methods. The latter assumption does not imply, 
however, that the higher functions can· be reduced to lower ones. 
Decomposition shows us only the material the higher functions are built 
with but says nothing about their construction." Kozulin (1986). 
Because Vygotsky's theory has a Hegelian basis it can then be seen that 
decomposition could not reveal the pattern of construction because t~at 
pattern no longer exists. Dialectical development implies that succession 
involves subsumption, the process of internalization is equivalent to the 
redefinition of the subject and the object in the Idea of perception: 
"The lower functions do not disappear in a mature psyche but are 
structured and organized according to specifically human social goals and 
means of conduct. Vygotsky used the Hegelian term superseded 
(aufgehoben) to designate the transformation of natural functions into 
cultural ones." Kozulin (1986). 
The transformation into cultural functions was seen by Vygotsky to be 
very much based in language, as language comes to structure the psyche 
according to the interaction of sociocultural conventions as embodied in 
the particular language and the relevance of these to personal experience. 
Overall, Vygotsky's ideas of internalization and of action must be related 
to the the idea of interaction with another, so that the connection between 
signs in the 'internal self' is a reflection of of the relationship between 
signs (and other psychological tools) as they occur in the action of the 
'external self' s:pecifically as this self interacts socially with others. Thus 
the process of internalization becomes the replacement of other people in 
action by the relationship between signs in the internal self: 
" ... the source of the intellectual activity and control over one's behaviour 
in the process of practical problem-solving lies not in the invention of a 
purely logical act, but in the application to one's self of a social 
relationship, in the transfer of a social form of behaviour into one's own 
psychic organization." Vygotsky, 1984, cited in Valsiner and Van der Veer, 
1989. 
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The Zone of Proximal Development 
Vygotsky emphasised that the activities of children never take place 
outside of a social context, and that play anticipates future social activity 
(Holowinsky, 1988). How a child acts, the nature of stimulation that is 
made available to it is shaped by the adult world that it inhabits. The adult 
world and its preconceptions and expectations determines what skills the 
child will practice and thus the course of cognitive development. The 
child proceeds through active imitation and internalizes the model of 
action provided by the adult that extends what Vygotsky referred to as the 
'zone of proximal development', the range of skills that the child has, 
how far it can go before it requires an adult model to provide direction to 
the correct solution: 
" ... [it is] ... the distance between the actual developmental level as 
determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential 
development as determined through problem solving under adult 
guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers." Vygotsky, 1978 (in 
Wertsch, 1985). 
Piaget 
Vygotsky's similarities to Piaget, who also followed a dialectical course in 
theory, are probably obvious, but the differences may not be. They both 
advocated a position that states that developmental progress does not 
occur on the basis of a priori knowledge structures, but instead on 
structures that develop in the course of active internalisation by the child 
of the patterns of action. From this Piaget's stage-type conceptualization 
can be easily seen to follow, as higher cognitive structures do not exist, are 
not grown into in any inevitable maturation sense, but develop, as 
Vygotsky also states, from lower structures. The stages, then, are 
individual, unique to each person, and any apparent general character of 
development between individuals can be put down to environmental 
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regularities and the demands that the acquisition of higher abilities has for 
the possession by the individual of the lower. That is, there is a single 
objective reality for all, and we each, loosely speaking, possess the same 
physical attributes for exploring and understanding it. Piaget's dialectics do 
have, however, some similarities with Kant's notion of categorisation 
(Bidell, 1988). Where Kant sees the structures in cognition as universal, 
and culturally and historically transcendent, so too does Piaget, but Piaget 
has an individual life-history source instead of a fixed genetic basis for 
ontogenetic progression. It is partly these somewhat Kantian leanings in 
Piagetian thought, and the potential for reductionism he saw as inherent 
in the use of physical action as a unit of analysis (Bidell, 1988) which led 
Vygotsky into disagreement with him. It is also the manner in which 
Vygotsky disagreed with Piaget that partly led to the reason for his later fall 
from grace with the power structure in the soviet scientific community; 
namely his belief that, rather than seeing internalisation of action as being 
a 'neutral' process of the assimilation of 'physical' action into schema, as 
Piaget, internalisation should, of necessity, be seen as social, and involving 
the intermediacy of tools and the adoption of the role of the other into the 
self (Valsiner, 1988). Vygotsky felt that Piaget paid insufficient attention to 
the social significance of action, and decontextualised it by not focusing on 
action's semiotic value (Valsiner and Van de Veer, 1989). Vygotsky felt 
that the appropriate unit of analysis for the study of cognitive 
development was tool use, or "discourse activity" (Bidell, 1988), practices 
involving social interaction. 
Sociogenesis conclusion 
It may appear at a first reading that the theorists discussed above are all 
simply restating the central postulates of sociogenesis (Valsiner and Van 
der Veer, 1989) in slightly different forms but in a way that makes no real 
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progress. However, difference does exist, and it is to be found not so much 
in the descriptions that are used as in what it is that they are trying to 
describe, the goal of exploration. These goals have extreme overlaps, and 
are difficult to distinguish because of the shared nature of the explanatory 
constructs as inherited from Hegel, and perhaps earlier, and as they passed 
down to their contemporary form in social constructionism and other 
emerging doctrines of the social constitution of action and meaning. The 
central shared concept, even if not acknowledged as such, is that of the. 
dialectic. The differences emerge from the objects of inquiry; for example 
for Piaget it can be seen as the development of motor and analytical skills 
in childhood; for Baldwin and Royce it's the development of 'personality'; 
for Vygotsky it's the development of the self in childhood; for Mead it's 
the development of self as manifest in the social adult. Again, it is 
arguable that these concepts are not distinct and that, more than simply 
inter-related or inter-dependent, they are synonymous. It is, I feet a 
question of scale and perspective that is fundamental. Each of these 
workers come to the same questions, using the same tools of inquiry, but 
focus at different degrees of magnitude and from different angles. Piaget 
traces cognitive development to the point of 'true adult' socialization, and 
almost takes a reductionist approach, analysing micro-level units of 
analysis (Valsiner and Van der Veer, 1989) such as individual behaviours 
and analytical skills. Vygotsky takes a broader view, a 'step-up' in an 
idealised scale hierarchy of overt social relations, looking from a 
perspective of the interaction between person and society. Further, Piaget 
has an arguably Kantian end to a dialectical process, using 'reciprocal 
determinist-type descriptions of causality to account for the appearance of 
cognitive structures that equate with Kant's a priori categories (Valsiner 
and Van der Veer, 1989). Piaget's adult will utilise the cognitive structures 
that have formed through childhood in comprehending the world, 
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imposing a reality onto confusion, dichotomising experience and dividing 
reality. Piaget looks from inside the child out at the world. Mead too has 
this internalizing, bringing-inwards approach, but, as Vygotsky (although 
perhaps not quite as much), sees that which is 'brought in' as being 
continuous with the society from which it was formed. I am the other for 
myself, and the other that I am is the product of the socially-based self-
perceptions that I have. 
Mead and Vygotsky differ greatly in their choice of subject, while both 
share an approach and common philosophical influences, Mead was an 
academic, who, while actively involved in social reform, held concepts of 
development that were abstractions and applied to 'people', to socially-
functioning adults. Vygotsky worked as an experimental psychologist, 
concentrating on the development of cognition through childhood, and, 
while holding similar beliefs as to mechanisms as Mead, applied them 
much more in empirical research, at a different grain of analysis. It is this 
grain of analysis that is the crucial difference. For example Piaget held that 
an analysis of the social context of action is of lesser importance because it 
is the physical rather than the social environment that is of initial impact 
on the child. The child functions without a social awareness in the first 
stages of cognitive development, and thus in a socially 'neutral' world. 
Mead might conceivably let that pass, not so much from agreement, as 
from a lack of comparable focus. Mead's sociological perspective distanced 
him from this view point. Perhaps, at that micro level of analysis, it could 
be said that society has no influence? However, from a Vygotskian 
perspective, there is no such possibility. The use of the tool as the 
fundamental unit of analysis means that there can be no neutrality. From 
the moment of birth5 the world that the child inhabits derives its form 
5And from some weeks before (see later). 
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from society. As Baldwin, Vygotsky saw the role of the parent's 
expectations as a shaping force for personality. But, are we talking about 
the same thing in these two cases? Do we have comparable theses, or is the 
distinction in scale too great? Is there a point in perceptual development 
that represents the line where the physical structure of the world becomes 
of social significance, and previous to which there is only patterned light 
and sound, uninfluenced by the intentional design of human society? 
Control requires a sense of self, a sense of personal agency, at least a 
rudimentary identification of cause or apparent correlation between a 
particular action and a particular outcome. Control and identity go 
together. As to whether there is such a thing as a world stripped of social 
value, one must question what this 'social value' actually is. What do we 
really mean by the social environment, are we talking about some 
objective facet of existence? Is it part of the physical environment or 
distinct from it? To clarify the point (I hope) we must see that the social 
environment as such does not exist in any sense of material identity, it is a 
social artefact. There is really only the physical environment, in which 
there are people acting. It is the actions of people that constitute what we 
refer to as the social environment, but the use of this term implies 
something other than what it ultimately is, a categorical statement 
performed to simplify reality for social scientists. The 'social 
environment' label merely serves to identify a particular class of action, 
that action which is performed by people. In this idea of social action is 
included the products of action (ie literature, the arts in general, bus stops) 
as they are perceived by a person. Things that involve communication 
involve a social act. Things listed as being in the social environment are 
those that are constructed by society, that is, by people, and hence have a 
social meaning as part of a particular social act. A conversation, if you will 
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(Harre, 1986). But this social meaning only exists in/ as the act of 
perception, it is dialectical. Given this approach, it can be seen that all that 
is required for a 'social environment' to exist is that there be at least one 
person present, and that the nature of this environment is determined the 
perceptual capacities of that individual. The perceptual capacities here are 
directly related (if not equivalent) to the sense-of-self (personal identity) 
that a person has (?is). The 'greater' the sense-of-self that a person has, that 
is the degree of access to the 'social mind' (the refinement of sensitivity), 
the larger or more detailed the 'social environment' becomes. And yet, 
while we might argue that the social and the material worlds are one and 
the same, this still does not adequately address the question of whether the 
social environment is real for a pre-verbal child. Can a pre-verbal person 
have a sense of social consequence, more generally, can we ascribe implicit 
knowledge to a social actor when they cannot provide (or we cannot 
clearly find) evidence of knowing the rules to which they appear to 
conform? It is not possible, other than by the construction of graduated 
(and probably highly suspect) performance criteria, to set strict values for 
the stage of 'identity' that any one person is at. How much identity is 
sufficient to be a 'person'? What belief constitutes an adult? How do you 
assess the 'stage of personality' of a partially verbally-competent child? 
What sense would it make to do so? How then do you decide when a 
person has awareness of their 'social reality'? Accepting this, do you then 
set your performance criteria to include pre-verbal action, and if so, is it 
then possible to verify it? 
The ultimate judge of the social value of any action has to be society. The 
social value of an action is a function of its consequence for how that actor 
is seen to be performing in comparison to the appropriate social norms. 
Our actions, then, can have social significance beyond our intentions, and 
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it is how others evaluate our actions that determine the success or 
otherwise of our social performance. Thus, self-awareness is not necessary 
to be a participant in social action. To be born is enough, plus that the 
current prevailing belief in society in a maturation-type model continues. 
So long as people work under the (somewhat naturist) assumption that 
children are merely small adults, and experience the same emotional 
events (and are .thus implicitly in possession of the same value structure) 
as adults, then demonstration of awareness of social significance will not 
be necessary. 
James Gibson and the Ecological Approach to Perception 
James Gibson was a perceptual psychologist who followed on from James 
and Dewey, with a philosophical intent to restore the place of the 
environment back into its role in the understanding of human 
perception. 
Gibson fought against what he saw as unjustified mentalism in the 
understanding of perception emerging from the use of theoretical models 
that required the intervention of cognitive constructs for meaning to 
emerge from perception. He wanted perception to be seen as direct, and 
unmediated. It was his belief that perception was a matter of sensitivity to 
particular aspects of one's environment, to the rate of change in 
information flow, and to contrast. People are sensitive to change, and to 
the relationships between objects in their environment. Information 
about the distinctiveness of two forms come from cues like occlusion, 
separation under motion, and relation to environmental features, like 
gradation changes with increasing distance for example. Gibson especially 
emphasised that perception is active, and that organisms seek 
information, they are not passive receivers of input but intentional 
59 
hunters of change. In an apparent paradox typical of this area it was felt by 
Gibson that sensitivity is about the detection of invariance, those things 
that under transformation do not change. Things falling into this category 
are such as ratios and rates. The perceptual systems are sensitive to those 
aspects of the environment that under conditions of change remain the 
same. 
Invariance 
Gibson held that the issue of primary importance for perception is 
information, and for perception of motion in particular it is the rate of 
information flow over time that gives us our clues for spatial 
arrangements. Remembering that perception is active, it can then be seen 
that an intentional change in our perceptual systems allows us to make 
change that yields up information to us. For example, moving one's head, 
or simply closing an eye alters how an object will appear. It is the change 
that is produced by our perceptual actions that reveal what is invariant in 
the world around us. 
The Gibsonian position is extremely hard to define, as it is as much of an 
opinion on appropriateness of the methodological stance one should take, 
as it is a model of how we perceive. Gibson was opposed to the 
construction of models, but suggested that rather than inferring how 
people had their actions supported by hypothetical cognitive architecture, 
we should look at what aspects of their environment people were 
sensitive to. But still, an analysis of the environment in isolation from the 
perceiver was to be avoided. 
Gibson's ideas have been taken up by a school of thought often identified 
as the ecological, after the title of Gibson's influential book "The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception" (Gibson, 1979). Ecological is a very 
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appropriate term to use, as the emphasis was very much on the bi-polar 
nature of perception. 
Reciprocity- Effectivities and Affordances 
The ecological approach, as espoused by Gibson, looks at the reciprocity 
between a person and their environment. What a person is capable of 
perceiving (is sensitive to) depends both on what the environment offers, 
and what their physical capacities will allow. The abilities that a person 
possesses are termed their 'effectivities'; the features of the environment 
that a person is sensitive to are termed the 'affordances'. Affordances are 
the opportunities for action that are available according to the effectivities 
that an individual possesses. Examples of effectivities are hands, opposable 
thumb, eyes, colour vision, binocular vision, hearing in a particular range, 
bipedal locomotion etc. Effectivities can be equated with physical features 
that one has, and the way in which these shape action determine how one 
perceives. According to the ecological approach one perceives the 
affordances of things, their uses, directly. Whether a thing has features 
that are useful is relative, so that individuals with different abilities will 
perceive different affordances. The object is the same for both individuals, 
(this is not simple solipsism), but the way in which it is perceived is 
different. 
Action and Praxis 
The ecological approach takes the workings of perception and describes 
them in terms of action. Action is the point where person and 
environment merge, and it is action that is seen as the fundamental unit 
of analysis for Psychology. A ready parallel can be drawn here between the 
concept of action and Marx's concept of Praxis, with Gibson re-drawing it 
in the guise of behaviourist theory as it was in the 1950's. 
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The ecological approach, while striving against Cartesian Dualism in 
seeking to avoid the use of representation-type theories of perception finds 
itself still on the continuum of dualism with the Kantian leaning of the 
concept of the genetic instantiation of primary sensitivities. That is, people 
are sensitive to particular aspects of their environment from birth. As to 
how experience allows the modification of perceptual sensitivities to 
make finer distinctions in what we experience is an issue that is still 
contentious within the ecological school. Refinement of sensitivity 
obviously occurs, as shown in the work of Eleanor Gibson (eg Gibson, 
1988) on the development of discrimination ability in infants, but as to 
whether this should be related to some idea of cognitive structure is as yet 
not unanimous! y £el t. 
The ecological approach stands as a radical approach in Psychology to 
describing knowledge as part of an act of knowing, yet it remains still on 
the continuum of distance between perceiver and perceived, as it assumes 
prior structures of categorisation in the organization of the sensory 
systems for the extraction of change. Its methodological emphasis on both 
the features of the environment and the action properties of individuals 
makes it one of the more balanced approaches, but the effect of describing 
the methodological approach in the standard terms of a theory in 
Psychology has the potential for a great deal of confusion. The ideas of the 
ecological approach are not well conveyed by conventional terminology 
and produce a similar 'mental turmoil' to be experienced when trying to 
come to terms with Hegelian Idealism, and for much the same reason. 
Our language just doesn't have the adequate concepts for communicating 
this kind of personal insight. As to why this is I will look at in more detail 
later. 
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Why examine the nature of knowledge? 
Why go into an examination of whether we can 'know' or not, why is it at 
all relevant? The nature/nurture issue is a great nuisance, it polarises and 
creates divisions that are not not necessarily as great, or as significant, as 
they might appear. It would be very nice to find a way of describing 
peoples' perceptual existence without having to use these divisive terms. 
The dichotomy into innate versus learned clouds the fact there is no real 
opinion held one way or the other. There is no such thing as a completely 
innate behaviour, nor is there such a thing as a totally learned one. So 
why bother arguing this tedious and inevitably insoluble problem? What 
value is there in it? 
What I wanted to outline by describing the differing points of view on the 
nature of knowledge, is a way in which what is held to require a biological 
basis can be seen to exist on a social one. That's a little confused, let me try 
and explain. First principle, the separation between the knower and the 
known is not as great as it seems. The two depend on each other and are 
not separate entities. Second principle, form exists in nature, not in the act 
of perception. 
If we take the view point of people being separate from the world they 
experience, if we exist inside our minds and peer out through windows in 
our flesh, then we need previous knowledge (ie innate) to interpret what 
it is that we experience. How can we know except by comparison to what 
we already know, and where do we derive this very first piece of 
knowledge from? Alternatively, if we relax the borders, if we allow the 
distinction between the seer and the seen to be purely semantic, a 
convenience of language, then we can derive meaning from action, and 
let knowledge arise not prior to experience but as a part of it. Human 
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natural language does not lend itself readily to descriptions of abstractions. 
Language is metaphoric, and is reflexive, as well as being derived from 
everyday experience. The attempt to describe a situation that cannot be 
experienced is beyond its capacities, given its grounding in personal life. 
The reason for attempting to break down the barriers between the self and 
the environment is to allow for a description of the development of the 
self that is intrinsically involved with it. The visual world becomes 
sensible within the practice of looking, not prior to it. There is order in 
reality, it does not need to be applied by the practice of reason. The world is 
full of lines and curves, there are shadows and bursts of colour. There is 
change, but change that is orderly, that exists in patterns and symmetry. 
Yes, we see the world in colours because we have colour vision, but colour 
vision does not create colour, light exists even if we are not sensitive to it. 
Sound exists, there is symmetry in natural wave forms, we are sensitive to 
a particular range of vibrations, we can discriminate between particular 
frequencies, but hearing does not create vibration, even if our ear structure 
is such as to be selectively sensitive to particular energies and insensitive 
to others the nature of the relationship between the cycles exists 
independent of our use for it. The structure of the ear evolved to the 
properties of sound at different frequencies, not the other way around. To 
return to the point I am striving for a little more clearly, it is not necessary 
to have an innate record of the world and how it is formed, you don't 
need to know what is there to be learned. It's not necessary to postulate 
innate capacities for particular forms of knowledge when all that is 
required is an ability and a will to learn. In a way, the strength of human 
reason lies in what we don't know. Because we are so empty we can 
become so full. What I am fumblingly describing is the development of 
knowledge hand in hand with what is known. 
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Why am I spending so much effort (and it is effort) on describing what 
comes down to a concept of natural kinds? That is, that the way in which 
things are related is a consequence of what they are, and exist 
independently of how they are being experienced? Because, I want to see 
the way consciousness works as being a function of what it has been 
required to do in the course of its development. That is, not as some pre-
determined set of rules that exist prior to their application, but as a set of 
experiences that come into being as they are formed. From this, the reason 
that the individual consciousnesses people have (or are) appear so similar 
is because their life experiences are so similar. 
"It used to be assumed that behaviour found to be uniform within a 
species must be determined by the animals' common heredity, because 
heredity is constant while experience varies form animal to animal. This 
is a fallacy of the instinct conception which ov~r looks the fact that in 
some respects the animals environments have as much in common as 
their genetic constitutions." Hebb, Lambert & Tucker, 1971. 
Gross physical disabilities aside, people experience the same 
'environmental parameters' as they grow. For example, gravity pulls 
them down, if they raise their limbs they tend to fall if unsupported. 
Moving the head results in sudden visual change, movement of the chest 
results in the passage of air through the throat, crying results in a variety 
of sensations, and the experience of some sounds can be modulated by 
personal action. The reason for the similarity in consciousness is because 
of the similarity in sensory experience, and the similarity in sensory 
experience is because the environment supports the same range of actions. 
You don't need to enter the world equipped with knowledge, because it is 
there for you to find. 
Much of the philosophical shift away from strict naturism and the 
dominance of the internal mind/ soul on personality came with greater 
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acceptance of the idea of homo sapiens as just another species, and with 
the realization of the role that environment plays in the form that species 
take as exemplified in the Darwin-Wallace theory of speciation by natural 
selection. The attempt to apply the implications of this approach to 
psychology and sociology gave rise to the sociogenetic approach, and 
represents a theoretical shift and implicit acknowledgement of the 
continuum between a person and their environment. What Natural 
Selection says is that there are two sides to the relationship an animal has 
with its world. Not only is there variation in the structural forms and the 
behaviour of an animal coming from its genetic background, but the 
success of any variation also depends on what the environment will 
support. The Natural Selection approach says "look outward", ie don't just 
look to the soul for the source of variation, take a practical approach, see 
what use variation might be. 
A further implication of Natural Selection is that species change. So, 
reality is not static, but dynamic, and no longer is goodness-of-fit the best 
criterion for long-term success, but instead adaptability of behaviour 
becomes paramount. The ability to change as required becomes an 
essential in an uncertain world. 
No less than for any other animal, and perhaps more so than most, homo 
sapiens is best suited for a range of environments by being best suited for 
none. 
1 The Social Co-evolution of Cognition 
" ... nature seems here eternally to impose a singular condition, that the 
more one gains in intelligence the more one loses in instinct." Julien De la 
Mettrie, (1748). 
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A strong parallel can be drawn between the acquisition of language in 
childhood, the acquisition of cognitive heuristics in infancy, and the 
personal construction of emotion throughout the life-span. The unifying 
factor underlying these is the hypothetical mechanism, that of active 
internalisation of environmental contingencies. These lead to an ascent of 
the procedure of internalisation through a hierarchy of complexity and/ or 
abstraction. What I mean by this is that while it might appear that the idea 
of internalization is simple associationism, and the use of the concept is 
akin to reductionism and/or ideas of classical conditioning this is not the 
case. It is not so because each instance of internalization (which is not 
actually divisible into discrete events, but is rather an on-going series of 
processes of indeterminate duration) changes that which internalizes it, so 
that assimilation of relations affects subsequent ·assimilations in a non-
trivial fashion. Each new 'addition' to the total of internalized personal 
experiences will have the effect of altering how further events are 
internalized, with some having an apparently more significant effect than 
others. It is these experiences, building on the experiences that have made 
them possible, that give the 'step-wise' or 'plateau' effect, of discrete stages 
to the graph of human cognitive development. It is to be noted that this 
idealised graph is an average one, with very large variances attesting to the 
great degree of individual variability. 
But what is meant by internalization?. It is undeniable that all theories of 
cognitive development involve the incorporation of on-going experience 
into the individual's growing body of knowledge, the differences arise 
when one considers whether the acquisition of knowledge described is 
active or passive (explicitly or implicitly); the way in which this 
incorporation occurs; what it is that is incorporated; how it is represented 
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in memory (if at all); and what the basis of knowledge acquisition is, that 
is, the learning framework. 
" ... the changes undergone by the Western self are not developmental 
changes brought on by an inner logic, the unfolding of a secret genetic 
code, or the peeling of layers of enlightenment. The self has undergone 
extreme, erratic, often discontinuous change because it is part of the larger 
sociohistorical fabric of its time. The self must function within a particular 
cultural pattern: matching, maintaining, and replicating it." Cushman 
(1990) 
There is, I would assert, an implicit theoretical assumption in mainstream 
psychology that children are born with a pre-existing relational framework 
into which expected components of experience are slotted as they are 
encountered. This viewpoint is well described by Rahmani (1973) as: 
" ... the biogenetic law ... [which] .. .implied that the child's mental growth is 
spontaneous and largely independent of education which could, at most, 
either accelerate or inhibit the manifestation of the innate qualities of the 
psyche." 
It is assumed that this relational framework (cf Kant's idea of a priori 
categorisation) is the underlying cause of the observed (and widely 
accepted) 'universals' in behaviour, cognition and emotional expression. 
The adoption of this idea predisposes one to a dualist position, moreover, 
a position which focuses on development from a teleological perspective, 
seeing an inevitable course to development. 
"It is fairly clear that the process of maturation to the steady state is 
deterministic. Language learning is not really something that the child 
does; it is something that happens to the child placed in an appropriate 
environment, much as the child's body grows and matures in a 
predetermined way when provided with appropriate nutrition and 
environmental stimulation." Chomsky, 1987. 
It is of course too extreme to assert that this implies total determinism of 
thought or predestiny, but it does imply a rigidity of abilities and a 
separation or independence of person and environment. Under this 
conception nature is confused and it is required of reason to impose order 
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onto it, to partition reality. Knowledge has its roots (and limits) set in a 
person's genotype. 
" ... there is a special faculty of the mind/brain that is responsible for the use 
and acquisition of language, a faculty with distinctive characteristics that is 
apparently unique to the species in essentials and a common endowment 
of its members, hence a true species property." Chomsky, 1987. 
The progression of cognitive development in infancy is then seen to 
follow an inevitable pattern that mirrors the laying down of pathways 
(canalizing) in the neural structure of the cortex according to the design 
laid down by the individual's genetic heritage. 
Noam Chomsky is a highly influential figure in psycholinguistics, and his 
theoretical opinions are representative of widely held views on the origins 
of language, as well as the nature of cognition in general, so he provides a 
good example of mainstream thought. He advances the picture of 
cognition as representations of reality that work on data input by the 
senses. Very much an information-processing approach. As quoted earlier 
on, he sees the information available in the environment as being 
insufficient to provide the material from which an understanding of the 
workings of the world could be extracted. He is an avowed dualist: 
" ... we should ... adopt something like the Cartesian concept of innate ideas 
as tendencies and dispositions, biologically determined properties of the 
mind/brain that provides a framework for the construction of mental 
representations, a framework that then enters into our perception and 
action." Chomsky, 1987. 
Within this, the child gains language use as the incorporation of specifics 
of any one language into a schema of language in general. There is a 
specific schema that the child is born with to put the data it encounters as 
speech into the schema it possesses as its guide to translation. 
"The initial state of the language faculty can be regarded, in essence, as a 
language-acquisition device; in formal terms, a function that maps 
presented data into a steady state of knowledge attained. This general 
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conclusion allows many specific variants ... but it is virtually inconceivable 
that it is wrong in any fundamental way." Chomsky, 1987. 
From this starting point of holding laws about language in general that are 
genetically-determined, we then use these laws to extract from our 
environment the features that we know are related to language. 
"The environment determines how the options left unspecified by the 
initial state of the language are fixed, yielding different languages." 
Chomsky, 1987. 
But this process of discovering the particulars of the language into which 
we happen to have been born is not equatable with the concept of 
learning. 
"The term "learning" is, in fact, a very misleading one, and one that is 
probably best abandoned as a relic of an earlier age, and earlier 
misunderstandings. Knowledge of language grows in the mind/brain of a 
child placed in a certain speech environment." Chomsky, 1987. 
There is a forthright frankness in Chomsky's writing that leaves little 
room for misunderstanding. He is bold in his statements, and makes his 
position as an extreme genetic determinist quite clear. Others might not be 
so clear in their statements, but the implications of adopting Chomsky's 
ideas on language acquisition remain as an implicit acceptance of the 
concept of pre-existing relational structures in the brain of the neonate, 
structures that shape the course of cognitive development almost 
irrespective of experience. 
Chomsky's ideas on the prior nature of reason have a familiarity that 
stems from their classical origins: 
"If we are disinclined to accept the immortal soul as the mechanism, we 
will follow Leibnitz in assuming that Plato's answer is on the right track, 
but must be, in his words, "purged of the error of preexistence". In modern 
terms, that means reconstructuring Platonic "remembrance" in terms of 
the genetic endowment, which specifies the initial state of the language 
faculty." Chomsky, 1987. 
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As earlier statedr Plato saw knowledge residing in the soulr but the 
transition from its existence in the Realm of Forms to its incarnation in a 
human body causes it to be confused and lose the sense of correspondence 
between reality and its corporeal appearance. For Chomskyr the position of 
the confused soul can be synonymised with that of the gene. Like the soul 
it has knowledge about the Universal forms it will experiencer needing 
only time for it to become familiar with the particulars of this individual 
life. Sperm and egg are the soul dividedr and their 're-uniting' is the 
equivalent of the soul's rebirth into the physical world. Unlike the 
Platonic soul howeverr the gene is capable of change and is by no means 
immortal. 
If we are not to accept the "biogenetic" viewpoint for cognitive 
developmentr then it needs to be clarified how such the apparent 
complexity that underlies adult behaviour can come into being as an 
inevitable consequence of existence. 
Seek and Maintain 
The idea of the minimum substrate for emotional development has been 
mentioned previouslyr but not deeply explored. The reason for 
considering it is to find a justification for the abandonment of genetic 
predeterminism in emotion by the presentation of a plausible alternative 
that relates personal development to individual needs and abilities. 
The first postulate of the proposed minimum is that: experience of 
'feeling' as a component of emotion is the experience of recall of 
autonomic response to an environmental contingency. Sor emotion is not 
so much introspection as retrospection. We become aware of the memory 
of the previous autonomic response as it elicits an autonomic response 
now. There is little difficulty in equating this with the concept of an 
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automatic schema and so little deviation is required from what is 
currently accepted as the modern interpretation of the James-Lange model. 
How one might deviate from this is in examination of how this schema 
comes into being, is learned, rather than existing as some pre-determined 
basic reflex. Or rather, to see if this 'basic reflex' is not perhaps even more 
basic than we would at first consider. 
The second postulate is that: infant development can be described in a way 
that requires very little teleology of the expansion of consciousness and 
thought. The developmental process need not be described in terms of 
personal goals at all. In the case of the neonate, its actions can be seen not 
so much as the result of drives or motivations, but to centre around the 
capacities of its sensory systems. Its initial actions are chaotic. It is not 
necessary to suggest that it has 'knowledge' of the relations between what 
it can do and how this would affect the world around it, in fact, it is not 
even required that it should distinguish between the 'outer' world and the 
'inner' as it will do later. While all of the newborn's actions are 
exploratory this is not out of any sense of 'curiosity' or purpose or 
anything we would associate with consciousness or intention because 
these have not yet come into being. Consciousness develops as a product 
of the accumulation of memories, in particular those of the direct 
consequence of personal action. 
Third postulate: that there is sufficient information available as the CNS 
develops for it to arise in a structured (ie non-random) form. Is it 
necessary that memories be provided for the neonate as a 'seed of 
consciousness', or does the opportunity exist for the child to have its own 
consciousness come into as the product of its experience alone? The 
child's experience does not begin from the point of birth but at some point 
in its gestation. The child's memories start in the womb. It has 
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experienced light and shade, motion, sound, has been exposed to the 
elements of language, develops recognition of its mother's voice (Maurer 
and Maurer (1988)). The foetus is not isolated in the womb, the uterine 
walls are not steel and there is opportunity for it to coordinate its sensory 
systems actively. While not all of the infant's CNS is complete from birth 
quite a lot of it is, and this neural organisation has the opportunity to 
'learn' its place in the life of the child. Pattern in its growth, the manner in 
which it comes to interact with other system components, need not come 
from some form or organisational design but can come from the nature of 
the interrelationship of its properties, its patterns of actions, as they 
influence, and are influenced by, the neuronal elements that make up its 
environment. So, each neuron learns, has its pattern of firing set 
according to its surroundings. The ability to alter firing conditions is the . 
basis of learning, it is the matrix in which memory exists, it is the 
underlying principle of behavioural development that patterns of neuron 
states are formed according to experience. 
The same pattern can be postulated throughout the course of 
development at whatever level of complexity you choose, whether it be at 
the single cell or the entire active individual. The human organism is 
colonial, a (rather large) group of cells that are individual at basis, but a 
group in their co-ordination of behaviour. At the basis of this interactive 
description of development is the principle of necessity: if it is never 
required, it will not come into existence. If it can be learned, then it need 
not be set. 
To return to behaviour more directly, while there is opportunity for the 
child to learn co-ordination between sensory and motor systems in utero, 
this is somewhat constrained by absolute size limitations, physical 
attachment and the aquatic life-style. And for what will be the major 
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sensory systems, the visual and auditory, the chances for active 
exploration are even more reduced. The sensory systems for internal co-
ordination (eg vestibular, kinesthetic) can come to know each other in 
active display. Those systems responsible for acquiring information 
external to the child are limited in the extent to which they can affect the 
rate of information flow. There is stimulation available to them, but their 
degree of autonomy is low. Full richness of stimulation and opportunity 
to influence it by personal action will only come after birth. It is this 
information about external change that allows for the development of a 
sense of "other-ness", that there is a phenomenal separation between seer 
and sight, and thus a sense of identity. The child is then born with some 
knowledge (ie memory) of the capacities of its limbs (even if in a low 
gravity), through the sensory feedback of the movements of its skeletal 
muscles and the consequences of the rhythmic flexion of diaphragm and 
oesophagus. It has had the opportunity to develop a limited action 
potential. It is not yet conscious, though it has the capacity to become so. 
Fourth postulate: the development of consciousness in the neonate is the 
acquisition of memories relevant to the consequences of the actions of its 
body's muscles. The actions of the muscles (including those directing the 
gaze and powering the voice) are controlled by feedback from the sensory 
systems in relation to their capacity for sensitivity. The sensitivities have 
an upper and lower level of tolerance and a range in-between where the 
rate of information flow does not require modification. Too much 
information will 'motivate' the child to reduce it. Too little will 
'motivate' the child to increase it. In this case, 'motivation' is intended to 
refer to an external label for what in an adult would be seen as intention, 
and be presumed a function of consciousness. However, here what is 
being labelled is an unconscious learned response of the perceptual 
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system. For example, the child learns by experience that moving of the 
head alters the rate of information flow by way of the eyes, and often of the 
ears also. So, where a rate of information changes beyond a point of 
tolerance the alteration in neural activity causes inhibition/ disinhibition 
in a more general process of arousal. The exact consequences of this 
arousal, what the child does to restore the rate of information, is learned. 
What is innate in a child is the capacity to remember, to associate input 
(one experience) with another. It is 'feeling', the recollection of previous 
experience that is at the basis of both consciousness and thus emotion. 
Consciousness arises as the memory of contingency between different 
forms of sensory information accumulates. 
A learning approach to cognitive development does not necessarily imply 
a simple S->R learning paradigm. This is a result ·of a confusion as to the 
necessary externalization of an action/behaviour for it to be so called (it 
must be seen to be believed). Thought is active, as perception is, and just as 
much as movement is. Moreover, the description of the S->R paradigm as 
simply the connection of reflexes fails to see what the response actually 
means to the person who is responding. To view a response as something 
that the body does independently of consciousness is not only simplistic 
dualism, but does not acknowledge that the means by which the learning 
actually occurs is through the observation of the response (either visually 
or proprioceptually) by the respondor. A response that is determined by 
reference to the previously experienced correlations between 
contingencies. Therefore, it is not S->R that is involved, it is S->S, the 
appearance of one contingency evokes the person to construct another 
contingency, to bring about a change in the environment to match a 
personal intention. Stimulus leads to stimulus. All action is initiated to 
create a particular pattern of contingency, concordant with intention, and 
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so fundamentally allied to consciousness. What the infant does when it 
acts is to produce for itself a particular kind of sensation, of input. What a 
child learns is that, more often than not, one form of sensory input (say of 
muscular action) is followed characteristically by another (say visual). So, 
the sensation of raising the hand is generally followed by the sight of the 
hand coming into view, if the sensation continues for long enough. The 
initial learning is learning to control how the rate of information can be 
modulated. This control is based on negative feedback, ie will continue so 
long as a particular state does not exist. As to what states of sensation the 
infant will bring into being depends on what it is capable of doing, 
depending on what it has learned so far, and the principle of novelty. 
Novelty represents the condition where the rate of information flow falls 
off, and the infant acts to modify it. What constitutes information depends 
on learning. Novelty is experience-based, definitively. What constitutes a 
tolerable rate of information flow is highly subjective, but novelty and 
boredom are undeniably great sources of reinforcement.6 
In the apparent feedback-based organisation of behaviour there is capacity 
for self-organization in a manner that appears teleological, but actually 
takes its structure from the opportunities and constraints that it 
encounters. The principle underlying the self-organization of behaviour 
in the neonate can I think be encapsulated as: 'seek and maintain'. All 
behaviours are exploratory because of their naivety. Even crying is 
exploratory behaviour. All control of sensation is active, so that where 
sensation moves out of a tolerance range there is arousal to bring it (where 
6 The use of terms here is perhaps loose, and possibly open to ambiguity. 
But all terms are loaded with meaning and finding words that are totally 
neutral is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Inventing new terms is 
equally pointless, and I believe that these terms do communicate what I 
intend, even with the intrusion of personal differences in absolute 
meaning. 
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possible) back. Looking is active also. The infant seeks out information in 
its environment, at least, that is how an adult observer would describe it. 
At the infant level, the visual system is being modified according to the 
rate of information flow across it so that an acceptable level of change is 
being maintained. The change here referred to is inhibition/ disinhibition 
of the cells of the visual system. 
The choice of which aspect(s) of the action system/ sensory system to 
exercise at any one time depends on the capacity of each to provide 
information/novelty. At birth, all action in this new environment 
provides a great deal of novelty, the co-ordination of the limbs has to be 
adjusted to meet the demands of the new gravity, the auditory system has 
to adjust to higher frequencies and amplitudes than it is accustomed, light 
is brighter, there is more detail and it moves with ·greater speed across the 
retina than before. But this changes quickly, information rate stabilises for 
most aspects of the sensory system, and will stay the same for quite a 
while. The information rate for the visual and auditory systems, however, 
will take a long time to stabilise, if ever. The greatest source of sensory 
change becomes the eyes, and these become the focus of attention. 
Adaptation versus Preparation - Plasticity 
The random shuffling of genes in sex provides the raw material of variety 
that the pressure of life sifts and selects, advancing the best by virtue of 
'good breeding', so that the infant enters the world well prepared for what 
it will encounter. The incorporation of data on the general nature of 
causality into the genotype is seen as a great head start (if not essential) for 
a new-born. But is this necessarily so ? 
One point of view would hold that it is advantageous for an individual to 
enter the world with predispositions to actions that will yield personally 
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favourable outcomes, for example to avoid on-coming objects, to attend 
selectively to salient events such as noxious tastes or the faces of care-
givers, to be sensitive to particular frequencies and groupings of sounds 
(so as to facilitate the acquisition of language), or to have the 'deep 
structure' of natural language encoded into innate neural structures. One 
could then be prepared, anticipate, so as to better utilise the pleasures and 
avoid the dangers of the world. Put in this simple way it seems difficult to 
disagree with, and it would appear that, intuitively, the evidence supports 
it. Infants develop through a predictable pattern that seems so set and 
consistent that the underlying cause must lie at the most basic level (i.e 
genetic) and be irrelevant to the prevailing environmental contingencies, 
other than that they support the path of growth that they are unable to 
alter. The rapid speed of development, for example the acquisition of 
vocabulary, would suggest that some predisposition must exist for this 
ease of acquisition to be explicable. 
Infant development, however, is perhaps not as consistent or predictable 
as we might think. Nor is it really certain that children are born with as 
many capacities as we might assume, but rather may adapt themselves to 
the pattern of the world around them, and acquire those habits which we 
could quite easily assume to be innate. Parsimony and necessity are the 
factors to consider here, as touched on earlier if there is no differential 
selection pressure bearing on a set of attributes (or capacity, behaviour, 
aspect of morphology) then there is no logical reason for the possessor of a 
particular attribute to gain any reproductive advantage. Hence, there is no 
reason for the frequency of occurrence of this attribute to increase in the 
population. Conversely, if an attribute is maladaptive, then its occurrence 
can be expected to decrease in frequency. It is of interest, though not 
necessarily of overwhelming significance as evidence, that supposed 
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evolutionary advance in the animal kingdom (from protozoa to human 
for example, or better yet from prosimian to human) is parallelled by a 
reduction in the proportion of instinctive to learned behaviours in an 
animal's repertoire. This is matched by an increased necessity for parental 
care as the ability of the new-born to provide for its own wants 
diminishes. In the human infant this is present to such an extent that the 
child is often thought of as premature. It is argued that this can be traced to 
the finite pelvic diameters of the mothers so that to match the increased 
brain (and skull) size of the human infant (as compared to hypothetical 
hominid or simian precursors) the child must appear 'preterm', else risk 
the death of the parent through being burst asunder by the limitations of 
flexibility of the pelvic aperture. It can then be argued that if it were 
physically possible for the child to be born 'full term' there would be no 
apparent acquisition of abilities, merely a short practice session before 
launching into life as a toddler. Against this idea, it must be pointed out 
that the trend to neotony in infants occurs prior to the restricting 
influence of skeletal architecture becoming apparent. In the higher 
primates, such as gorillas or chimpanzees, there is a great need for parental 
care and for the infant to develop skills, without the routine practice of 
caesarian birth. In the fossil record for skeletons of early hominids, apart 
from the overall size of the individuals, the pelvic girdle does not show a 
proportional enlargement consequent to any increase in observed tool-use 
or other possible indicator of cognitive development of the race. 
"In spite of all [the] advantages of man over animals, it is doing him 
honour to place him in the same class. For, truly, up to a certain age, he is 
more of an animal than they, since at birth he has less instinct. What 
animal would die of hunger in the midst of a river of milk? Man 
alone ... he knows neither the foods suitable for him, nor the water that can 
drown him, nor the fire that can reduce him to ashes" De La Mettrie, 1748. 
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The advantage that a successive abandonment (or rather, lack of adoption) 
of instinctive behaviours has in favour of learning can be seen in 
adaptivity and flexibility. Instinctive behaviours commonly exhibit 
stereotypy, are automatic and often preconscious (Dixon(1981)), and task-
specific. 
" ... the environment exacts a price for the survival of the fittest; it captures 
them." Bronowski, 1974. 
It is notable (but again, not definitive) that conscious and preconscious 
tasks compete for the same finite attentional resources, so that the 
presence of one precludes the other. However, an argument based on the 
concept of limited cognitive resources (even given personal experience of 
the apparent finite capacity of short-term memory) must suffer from the 
fact that we do not know what the 'dimensions of thought' are, so that an 
increase in consciousness cannot necessarily be said to imply a reduction 
in the 'capacity' for automaticity and instinctive action in much the same 
way that arguments against an analogical basis to memory representation 
that hinge on finite memorial capacity must also be seen as less than 
totally compelling. 
Up to this point there has been a successive descent through a hierarchy of 
complexity and scale, from the large units of behaviour, through thought, 
and down to the level of basic requirement, the hypothesised 'minimum 
substrate'. The goal has been to go as basic as possible, to see how much 
pre-ordination of structure can be eliminated and still feel that it is 
plausible that the framework of reason will come into being. This is not 
reductionism. It is not the same as attempting to explain a 'high level' 
behaviour by describing the individual parts in minute detail, down to 
the neuronal. This may describe a behaviour, but it does not explain it. As 
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opposed to this, an attempt has been made to describe what the least 
requirements might be for the development of a more complex pattern of 
co-ordination that we might refer to as 'higher' behaviour. The most 
appropriate level of explanation is not always the most detailed. 
Having outlined a possible contender for the 'least requirement', we need 
to ascend and examine how the acquisition of successive structural forms, 
stages if you like, come to form into the adult condition of cognition and 
emotion, and how the pattern of the minimum substrate is reflected in 
later behaviours. 
Having suggested the tolerances of the sensory systems as the initial 
influence on the co-ordination of action we need to examine how the 
diversity of potential co-ordinations between the sensory and motor 
systems evolve into a phenomenally unitary element of the self. How 
does all of "Me" become just the one of "I"? 
The Singular Nature of Attention 
As much as consciousness can be described as forming itself through the 
acquisition of experiences, at the same time it also comes into its structure 
by a process of 'systematic forgetting'. This is not meant in the sense of 
random loss of access to previously-known events, but an orderly decrease 
in awareness of that which is often practiced. 
Attention is phenomenally unitary. We have in attention the singular 
aspect of experience, a central focus in our awareness that tells us that we 
are unitary in our essential nature. I know that I am a single entity because 
I am only aware of the experience of one thing at a time. I am finite in my 
ability to perceive, there is a limitation on my experience, and this 
limitation is how much can 'get through' the pin-point channel that 
conveys reality. (phenomenally speaking). Is it possible that the experience 
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of a single point of awareness can be described other than as the result of a 
single entity that is "I" ? Further, is it possible to describe the single focus 
of attention as being acquired by experience, as having it exist as a result of 
some aspect of the relationship I have with the way things occur in real 
life? 
Attention is 'held' as the result of one of two possible causes: stimulation 
in a sensory modality by environmental change that exceeds physical 
tolerance (ie a loud noise, bright light, sudden movement); or as the result 
of a decision-making process that actively directs the perceptual system 
towards that which will yield the greatest level of information. 
Awareness narrows with habit. It is an assumption in our understanding 
that conscious awareness, or attention, is finite in capacity. This is 
synonymised with a hypothetical limitation on short-term memory. This 
personal experience is indisputable, but does the limit of our attentional 
focus on one modality of sensitivity at a time stem from a pre-set 
separation of modalities prior to birth, or can it be described as arising 
through the gradual automatisation of cognitive processes over time? 
Could this narrowing be seen as a consequence of the fact of sensory 
adaptation? 
The modality that 'occupies centre stage' for most of the time is sight. 
Sight is where the greatest degree of novelty lies and hence the least 
adaptation. Attention is the phenomenon involved with the comparison 
of the experience of current events with the memory of past events, and 
occurs when a sensory event occurs that does not fit into a schema 
constructed by prior personal experience. Attention is where there is an 
imperfect 'fit' between current and past, and new connections (ie memory 
traces) are 'laid down' to reconcile this. That is, a new memory is formed 
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of this present experience of 'lack of fit' and its consequences, which will 
in future form part of the chain of events of memorial comparison that is 
referred to as a cognitive schema. 
Consciousness is a process of on-going self-reference, a constant 
reaffirmation of its own existence, shaped by the personal relationship that 
exists between perceiver and perceived. The consistency of personal 
identity comes then from the consistency of reality. Where it differs, 
where there is novelty, there is the phenomenon of the formation of 
novel memory that is awareness/ attention. 
Consciousness is the effect of the quest for novelty and is defined by 
experience. Being defined by novelty, the constituents of consciousness are 
in part determined by the prevailing environmental contingencies and 
these are themselves in turn defined by what is currently novel according 
to prior experience. Thus we have a classic tail-biting dialectical 
relationship in the Hegelian sense, with the concept of novelty having the 
seeds of its own non-self, being defined as it is by what it is not, that is, the 
pre-experienced. The development of consciousness and its current form 
are defined negatively. The environment-defined nature of consciousness 
can be most clearly seen in how it 'ceases to exist' in the absence (or indeed 
the excess) of novelty. Sensory deprivation inevitably leads to sleep, shock 
can lead to a faint, sudden urgent demands can 'push consciousness aside' 
as evidenced in the 'reflex actions': the hand to the face to protect the eyes; 
the leap to the chair to avoid the scurrying mouse. Consciousness is a very 
difficult thing to define, and any definition I choose to put forward will of 
necessity be delimited by the purposes to to which I wish it put. It is not 
possible to concoct a description of consciousness that is satisfactory, or can 
give a correct impression of what it 'feels like' for a person to be conscious. 
That is the ultimate in personal, individual, phenomenal experience. All 
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one can hope to do is to circumspectly describe what the position of 
consciousness might be in the action system that is a person. But, as earlier 
outlined, the unity of consciousness is an illusion, it is not consciousness 
that is unitary but rather the perspectives of action and the inevitable 
dualism of phenomenal experience. Because our experience of ourselves 
as actors in the world involves the belief that 'this body is me', and 
everything not of this body is 'something else'(negatively defined). The 
fundamental division in experience . is the 'inside' and 'outside' 
dichotomy of me and the world. The construction of a 'social self' comes 
when one realises that there are other 'me"s in the world. 
The personal experience of awareness/ attention can then be equated with 
an effect of the 'quest for novelty' in perception. Included with this is the 
experience of attention focused 'internally', on, the products of one's 
experience held in memory. This is a possibility that arises most fully with 
a sense of self, and the development of internal conversation in the act of 
thought. 
Where there is novelty in two modalities simultaneously (or physical 
tolerance is exceeded in both at the same time) we have confusion, which 
is normally resolved by the deliberate selection of the source of 
stimulation that experience reveals as the most likely to be significant. If 
this choice cannot be made because of equal novelty, that is a lack of 
immediate referents for either, then confusion occurs and panic may set 
in. 
Attention narrows because of two phenomena that are linked. Firstly, 
schema formation with experience removes the necessity to formulate 
decisions for most instances of sensory stimulation. This 'cognitive 
adaptation' reduces the number of sources of potential novelty in our 
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experience. Secondly, events that we experience occur to us, in the main, 
in one modality at a time. It is seldom that we are required to consciously 
attend to things in more than one modality, and when we do, we do it 
badly unless there is previous experience of this particular co-ordination 
in which case cognitive schema will remove a lot of the experience from 
awareness. 
Does this account actually cover the unitary experience of attention or 
does it rely on the fact we are limited by physical connection in our 
experiences? To clarify, if we say that we generally only perceive novelty 
in one modality at a time, is this a reflection of reality or the fact that pre-
set limits on attention (ie genetically set interconnections) determine that 
this will occur? Is this just a very basic tautological trap? 
Where the unitary nature of attention lies as far as the physical 
architecture of the CNS is concerned is that, in any one modality, only one 
memory trace at a time is laid down. In a particular modality of sensitivity, 
response states are mutually-exclusive. That is, given a range of possible 
states 1 to 4 for example, if the system is currently experiencing state 2 (e.g. 
the colour Blue) it cannot be in any other state. Experience is singular 
(though the range of possible response states may vary with experience), 
and memory is created according to experience (one does experience 
hallucination and acts of imagination). The most significant event is the 
one consciously remembered. Associations with that event that are said to 
be made 'unconsciously' can be seen as the effect of the active schema at 
that time, which while not consciously attended to, act in parallel. If these 
'unconscious associations' were the greatest source of novelty then they 
would be the ones consciously laid down as new memory. Something 
which is not novel is thus (definitively), because it has already been 
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'recognised' in memory, and therefore does not require attention, and 
certainly does not need to be 're-written' as a new memory trace. 
Seeing attention as other than a 'mechanical' phenomenon or the result 
of the existence of some single physical entity is intuitively difficult to 
swallow. Further, it can be asked does it actually have any value to define 
its non-existence in this way? That is, why bother? 
Attention viewed as an entity invites interpretation as merely a synonym 
for the soul, and creates the potential for it to be akin to an homunculus or 
some other observer in the head who views the workings of the 
perceptual apparata and selects which is worthy of inspection. Attention as 
a 'thing' is a return to Cartesian dualism. Attention as the label for the 
experience of the process of the formation of novel memory is, however, 
an intuitive threat to personal identity, a further step toward removing 
structure from our selves and relying on the course of experience to grant 
us reason. Personal experience demands a sense of 'identity' and balks at 
accepting the notion that a current experience like awareness might be 
reduced to a mechanical process. Reluctance aside, the alteration of the 
characterisation of attention away from some sort of neurophysiological 
'filter' system that directs the limited processing resources, as it is often 
conceived of (Dixon, 1981t to a behavioural description of Attention as an 
effect of the process of automatisation holds value. This lies in its 
simplicity, reducing the number of entities required for the mind to 
function and moving towards a plausible account of human 
consciousness that parallels human experience. if the arisal of 
consciousness and the structure of cognition can be described by the 
application of a simple set of rules of a highly plastic structure then this is 
preferable to a model of consciousness dependent on the interaction of 
discrete neural entities, cast by genetics and with a lesser capacity for 
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functional adaptation. The primary rationale is, as ever, necessity. If it can 
be described more simply then it should be. If it can be found in experience 
then it need not be carried around in the head. If an entity can be described 
as an effect, then it should be. 
A Pause for Clarification 
The hypothesised pattern of cognitive development according to a radical 
learning approach goes something like this. Firstly, co-ordination between 
the sensory and motor systems develops (to form 'action systems') 
according to the experiences that the infant has in how its behaviours 
affect its sensory experiences. Experience narrows the range of actions the 
child performs according to the relative change in personal environment 
in proportion to the effort expended (return, in terms of change, for 
investment, in terms of energy). The automatfzation and successive 
'disappearance' of aspects of sensory experience from the process of new 
memory formation because of gradual adaptation to the range of normal 
'inputs' gives the phenomenal impression of narrowing attention. 
With sufficient experience of the relationship between personal action and 
its results an awareness of 'self-ness' comes into being. That is, certain 
sensory experiences only occur when a particular range of sensory 
experiences precedes them. For example, skeletal muscle feedback from 
the neck combined with vestibular information of head motion 
commonly precedes what one experiences as a total movement of the 
world across one's visual field. Sufficient of these experiences accumulate 
to distinguish changes that "I" effect, from change that occurs 
independently of me. When you have acquired this sense of self, which 
(being pre-linguistic) is implicit, then at the same time you develop a 
sense of 'other'. Once a sense of what it is that "I" control develops, then 
social influence becomes possible. This is the primary categorisation, that 
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there is order (one event follows another), and that some change is created 
by "Me", and some isn't. The beginning of phenomenal dualism is the 
minimum element for the development of what we would consider the 
process of reason, that it, understanding how the world works by 
categorisation, by knowing what is 'associated' with what. 
After the process of learning the gross contingencies of reality and the 
subsequent development of a sense of self comes the acquisition of natural 
language. But of course the development of language starts not from a 
definite point, but simultaneously with the more general process of 
learning the relationship between the developing self and the word 
around. 
Natural Language and Reflexivism 
Language suffers from the same potential problem as "knowledge" when 
an attempt to define meaning is attempted. This is a problem of 
determining an absolute point of reference. 
To put the problem simply, the meaning of a word in ordinary usage is 
given by its relationship to other words. Definition is referential. When a 
word is unknown (ie first encountered) its meaning is given by the careful 
use, by a person who is familiar with it, of synonyms and analogy. The 
tool which language uses to analyse itself is language. The meaning in 
language is self-relational and subjective, the focus of analysis and the 
method of analysis are one and the same. 
The problem then is that if language is to be said to be meaningful, where 
does this meaning come from? Why is language the way it is, and how is 
it that different people use it in similar ways? Is the meaningfulness of 
language derived from the commonality of the underlying physical 
structures that support it (as Chomsky), and so a product of how the 
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structures are set in place by our shared genetic inheritance? Or does the 
meaningfulness of it arise in some other way? 
Reflexivism in language is really only a problem when one adopts an 
'instantaneous' view of it, a cross-section of language as a finished product 
(ie adult language use) rather than language in the longitudinal (ie 
language acquisition). 
The problem of the identity between meaning and language, that is, that 
the meaning of a word is derived from what it refers to is one of 
imprecision: rather than a word pointing at a clear and definite real-world 
thing, there is often a number of possible things to which this could refer, 
and often the relationship between these things is not obvious, other than 
they can be referred to by the same name. Wittgenstein found for the word 
'game', where the things that this word referred to did not share a single 
feature common to all, other than the name (Lakoff, 1987). This is not a 
definition particularly satisfying to a philosopher seeking the criteria for 
establishing truth. Wittgenstein referred to this particular clustering of 
things with no obvious unifying links, but still with criss-crossed 
relations, as having a 'family resemblance'. Given that some words do not 
have a direct relationship to features in the real world he felt that this 
undermined the concept of language finding its meaning in relativism. If 
the structure of language does not reflect the structure of reality, then 
meaning has to be found elsewhere. 
The world is an untidy place to live in. 
An immediate question here is whether it is a necessary criterion that 
there be a single structure, clearly definable, to which language should 
point. This is not to advocate solipsism or radical skepticism, there is one 
world for all of us, and it is real. Rather, the inter-relationship between 
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things, and sets of things, is not pre-determined, but comes into being as 
and how we explore. I stress that this is not solipsism, it's a 'point-of-view' 
approach. What I am aiming toward is that there is no reason why 
language should have a concrete structure and a fixed relationship to 
'things', because 'things' don't have a fixed relationship to each other 
either. For example, the classical definition of things living as given by 
Linnaeus, the fundamentals of taxonomy, was not derived from an 
orderly listing of features or parts that different organisms have, but 
instead by how he thought they should be on a gut level (Lakoff, 1987). To 
him it seemed obvious that certain kinds of organisms belonged to similar 
groups, and he set out his hierarchy accordingly. The interesting thing is 
that people agree with it, in the main, but will insist on finer details of 
speciation according to their particular familiarities. It's a situation 
familiar to us all as development of a degree of expertise allows us to 
make finer value judgements about inter-relationships. To an eskimo, a 
tree-is-a-tree-is-a-tree, but they have words for over a score of different 
kinds of snow (Whorff, 1956). The Whorffian hypothesis has it that 
differences in language-use, the degree of specialization in language, is a 
direct reflection of specialization in perception, and is one of the 
cornerstones of radical social constructionism (Harre, 1986). Eleanor Rosch 
in her later work also found that the apparent discrete organization in 
memory in to prototypes falls apart as the manner in which questions are 
phrased is changed (Lakoff, 1987). Her original conceptualization of 
memory structure, put very simply, was based on time-delay studies in 
decision of category membership, which showed a lesser reaction-time (ie 
faster decision) for words that are prototypical of particular categories (e.g. 
sparrow as opposed to penguin for bird (yes/no)). From this she 
hypothesised a memory structure that had prototype nodes (in network 
fashion), possessing many features of the category, with other less-
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representative members around it. In her later work, however, she asked 
subjects to rate items on their degree of category membership. According 
to a view-point of categorisation that has an all-or-nothing idea of set 
membership, this should be impossible. If set membership is defined in 
terms of reference to a prototype in a fixed, structured, memory, then 
quantifiable degrees of birdness, rather than is a bird/is not a bird, for 
example, should not be possible. Rosch found, however, that subjects felt 
that category membership could be conditional, rather than absolute. 
If we accept that categorisation in the world is highly flexible and that set 
membership is not a strict matter of possession of particular defining 
features, then it ceases to be a necessary requirement for 'meaningfulness' 
for there to be a direct correspondence in the sense of mirroring or 
parallelism in structure between the frameworks of reality and language. 
Moreover, this does not have to be transcendent. That is, any 
correspondence that exists for me need not be exactly the correspondence 
that exists for you, because language, as cognition, is acquired actively, and 
in a personal context. The flexibility in what words refer to, the lack of 
strictness in both language and reality, means that words need not refer to 
the same thing, just similar things. 
Referential Meaning in the Natural Sciences 
The reflexivism supposedly inherent in the use of language and the 
apparent lack of objectivity in Psychology has been pointed at as a serious 
flaw and the standards and practices of the Natural Sciences, Physics in 
particular, have been held up as an example of 'good' science. If 
Psychology could have the qualities of Physics and follow the strict 
empiricist line, then it would have a much greater claim to be examining 
the truth. But is Physics so free of subjectivity, does it really work on 
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objective fact, and what does objectivity really mean? Can objectivity be 
conditional? 
Measurement in the Natural Sciences is held to be objective, using 
external parameters of description that can be readily viewed and used by 
all without the possibility of individual prejudice and hence without the 
potential for reflexivism that comes from using natural language 
descriptions of events. But within the techniques of measurement there is 
a referential hierarchy, millimetres rely on centimetres which refer 
ultimately to metres. The metre has been defined by consensus as a fixed 
unit whose length relates to an unchanging property of nature, the 
wavelengths of light. This many complete waveforms occupy a space that 
is one metre long. Time has been defined by reference to the fundamental 
unit of the second, which is quantified by being the period within which a 
set number of caesium protons are emitted by its exceptionally regular rate 
of atomic decay. Yet, how was the decay rate of caesium determined, if not 
by reference to a unit of time that was in existence before it? Why choose 
any particular number of complete waveforms for the fundamental unit 
of length? How long should a metre be? Practical convenience is the 
motivation behind structure in measurement. Caesium emission rate was 
chosen because it was regular, according to current standards of 
measurement, and because its rate allowed a whole-number of emissions 
that approximated to the current evaluation of what a second was. The 
choice was not arbitrary by any means, but it was certainly not objective. If 
anything it was political. 
The basis of measurement of time and distance has a built-in level of 
imprecision because it was created to match an existing system that was 
imperfect, but has a wide-spread acceptance. Its great advantage is not that 
there is something fundamental about the emission-rate of caesium or the 
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wave-lengths of light, but that these are consistent, and can be used by 
different people to get very similar results, and have almost the same 
meaning when used in explanation. Similar, but ultimately not identical. 
But this is not expected, agreement has been reached that a certain level of 
imprecision is acceptable, it is quantifiable, and is included in results. 
Perfection is not anticipated, but instead a certain level of possible variance 
is good enough. This concept of the unlikelihood of perfection has been 
taken to extremes in the replacement of the clockwork universe of 
Newton and the infallible predictability of La Place with the infinite 
relativism of Einstein and Heisenberg. It is accepted that there are limits 
on what can be known, and that it is impossible to be absolutely certain, 
even time and space are relative. 
Physics accepts its limitations, accepts that the results it describes and the 
predictions that it makes are conditional, probabilistic. So why single 
Psychology out for criticism over something which in the practical world 
of the Natural Sciences is accepted as near axiomatic? It is implicit within 
theory that truth is not absolute, but this does not undervalue it, it merely 
puts it in its place. Even if theory in Physics has a relationship to the 
reality that it describes that has been decided by committee, planes still fly 
and bridges only occasionally fall. Even if Psychology uses natural 
language that can be very imprecise and sometimes highly subjective, 
that's no reason to reject it outright as a method of investigation. In a 
fuzzy area like human personality, maybe fuzzy tools are best. 
Meaning for Objects versus Meaning for Events 
Another objection that has been raised to referential meaning in natural 
language is the supposed incompatibility between the use of a word to 
refer to an event, and to an object. Can meaning be derived from reference 
to something occurring over time and something basically instantaneous? 
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However, is there a difference, a real distinction between 'things' and 
'events', or is one merely a different form of the other? That is, what we 
refer to as an event is a description of a thing (or things) plus context, 
where a 'thing' is a thing ostensibly in isolation. What links them, and I 
think in this instance there is a single feature in common, is that both are 
perceived: an object is an event, because it is experienced, it is involved in 
the act of perception. Even such a paradigm of the ideal, thought, is a 
physical act, an event which takes time. The table is the table one sees, (or 
imagines). Words, like other events, are learned in context. Natural 
language (ie first language) is not acquired by memorising lists of words in 
isolation, but by encountering them, discovering them, in the course of 
the disorderly process of one's life. 
So if we accept that the lack of fixed edges to· categories allows that 
referentialism can give meaning to language, and that this reference can 
be conditional, a matter of degree, rather than absolutes, then we need to 
ask how the structure of language influences how we think, and vice 
versa. 
Relationship between thought and language 
"We have forgotten what features in the world of experience caused us to 
frame (pre-scientific) concepts, and we have great difficulty in representing 
the world of experience to ourselves without the spectacles of the old-
established conceptual interpretation. There is the further difficulty that 
our language is compelled to work with words which are inseparably 
connected with these primitive concepts. These are the obstacles which 
confront us when we try to describe the essential nature of the pre-
scientific concept of space." Einstein (1934). 
In the 'learned consciousness' conceptualization of development, of 
which the sociogenetic approach is an example, language plays a key role 
as the means by which an individual gains access to/shares in those 
experiences that are phenomenally social in nature. By this it is intended 
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that social interaction, either directly (person-to-person through speech) or 
indirectly (through the written word), is seen as a form of perception, but 
not perception of the concrete or material directly, but through the 
vicarious experiences of others. Language allows communication, and this 
communication is in the form of externalized metaphors. These 
metaphors are encoded through common (and learned) social practice in 
the form of words and sentences. But this is perhaps going too far too fast, 
some elaboration is required. For example, in what way do we equate 
language with metaphor, what are these metaphors derived from? And in 
the use of metaphor is there not a threat of dualism, having a 
representation of external reality and, moreover, does the form of this 
representation (or its arisal) equate to prior categories? The avoidance of 
dualism comes, I believe, with the conception of language abiiity 
developing through experience, rather than arising as an inevitable end-
product of physical (cortical) development. 
Universals in Language and Cognition 
The universal similarities that are held by many to exist in the deep 
structure of language across different cultures is held to point to a 
common source of arisal in the genetic history of different races as 
opposed to common elements in their social history. Given the cultural 
(and geographic) separation of the races that have been the subject of 
linguistic analysis it is considered unlikely that social interaction could 
account for the perceived invariants in structure. A particular structural 
arrangement in the cortex is held to be required to break down the flow of 
speech into phonemes. The brain must have some form of 'expectation' 
or 'preparedness' for language use, thought (ie patterns of information 
processing) must precede language. If one were to take issue with this 
view, where then would one put the invariance? In the shared genetic 
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background of all, or a common hard-wiring? Or could one put the 
invariants in the individual's environment? That universals in language 
(or in emotional expression) exist does not presuppose that these are solely 
due to the structure of the individual, but can be seen instead to represent 
constants in function, in the needs and intentions of diverse peoples as 
well as common invariant physical relationships represented in 
environmental contingencies in the world they inhabit. To return to 
language acquisition more directly, an alternative to a strict genetic 
determinism is to see language as a spatial metaphor, and that this 
metaphoric nature comes as a consequence of the source of language 
ability in the developed structure of cognition. Cognition is to be seen as 
arising through perceptual action, but of course perception is guided by 
cognition, and both have their natures determined by the reciprocal 
relationship between an individual's potential for action and the actions 
which the environmental contingencies will support. To reiterate an 
earlier point, perception should not be seen as a channel that passes 
information 'from the world to the mind', but as an act demonstrative of 
the reciprocity between a person and their environment. 
What is being suggested here is that the patterns of thought that one has 
(referring here to non-linguistic thought) is a function of the physical 
experiences one has in the course of development. It is further to suggest 
that the manner in which one categorises is based on one's life history, 
and the nature of categorisation is not predetermined, that categories are 
not objective aggregations based on determining common features or 
necessary elements. Rather, they are contextually and personally 
determined on the basis of one's abilities and prior beliefs (if any). Why 
the emphasis on categorisation, you might ask. As Kant puts it, we are 
driven by the categorical imperative. Human thought can be seen as a 
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process of decision-making, of performing a current act on the basis of the 
outcome of similar acts under similar circumstances, in the past. Note the 
use of the term 'similar'. What a thing 'is' is determined on the basis of 
what a thing is 'like'. In other words, the category into which it falls 
determines its 'thingness'. But of course, this is not necessarily an all-or-
nothing process. It is not essential to have strict borders to categories, 
things can (and it would appear tend to) have degrees of category 
membership on the basis of their degree of relative 'thingness'. Rosch 
(1978?) equates relative set membership with perceived similarity to an 
abstracted prototypical member of that set. The process of abstraction 
(according to Lakoff 1987) is performed on the basis of subjective 
relationships, that is, the significance that a thing (including an event) has 
for the individual who is experiencing it. 
Two premises have to be accepted (or at least, not rejected) here. First, that 
cognition is a process of categorisation, parsing experience and forming 
intentions (ie selecting an action) on the basis of experience; secondly, that 
this process of categorisation is subjective. That, while the world has a real 
existence, experience of it is personal. Cognition here is still being used to 
mean pre-linguistic (or rather, other than linguistic) thought, but the ideas 
apply as well to linguistic (self-conscious/ conversational) thought. In fact, 
logically speaking it must, given that the goal to which this is intended is 
to show the possibility of linguistic thought arising out of the learned 
functional pattern of pre-linguistic thought. But the pattern of cognition 
that forms as a result of physical experience does not have to be 
conceptualised as a 'copy' or a 'mirroring' of the world. Internalization of 
the contingencies of the environment is not passive, it is an act, a 
dialectical process. 
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Thought is not a neurochemical process. 
The human desire for 'objectification' underlies the philosophical 
arguments over the nature of the relationship between a person and their 
environment, the so-called Mind/Body problem. The reason for the 
disagreement can be seen to reside in the unfamiliarity of the holist 
solution offered by the emergent materialist or the neo-hegelian approach. 
A solution other than to separate mind and body (person and 
environment) is counter-intuitive, it necessitates a conceptualization of 
the relationship that is frankly irreducible to known concepts or pre-
experienced entities. It is a description that defies reason because of its 
highly abstract nature, in many ways similar to the recursive self-
definition of mathematics (more on that later ... ). It is the concrete nature 
of human reasoning, its insistence on an appropriate analogy to a real-
world situation or entity that creates the difficulty in accepting a dialectical 
account of human experience (and development). 
Why pursue this line of argument, what is its relationship to emotion 
behaviour? The relationship between a person and their environment, 
their mind and their body, as described by a dialectical process does, I 
believe, describe the nature of emotion. Emotion can then be seen as a 
process across time, not a structure preset, hardwired, genetically 
determined, but a function of the reciprocity of action. Thus with 
consciousness also. The problem of how a non-material emergent 
structure such as consciousness (or 'mind', or 'self') can affect material 
entities such as neurons or the nuclei of atoms ceases to be a problem if a 
structural definition is abandoned and a process definition is adopted. By a 
'process definition' I refer to what would generally be generally termed a 
behavioural account. But, as Mandler (1984), I would prefer to refer not so 
much to behaviour as 'action', given the connotations that the former 
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term has, such as a denial of a role for consciousness in the organisation of 
action. To be clear, the advocation of a process view does not suggest that 
there is no underlying physical structure for the action of consciousness, 
but rather that to equate a particular action necessarily with a particular 
physical organisation is to risk confusion of structure and function and to 
revert to simple representationalism, seeking objects in the head or 
pictures in the mind's eye. Physical reductionism (meant here as seeking 
the nature of thought solely in the structures of the brain) will not yield 
any more information than a context-relevant description of action. Even 
if it were possible to describe a particular thought in terms of neural 
activity and electrochemical functions, what purpose would it serve? 
Thought is not a neurological phenomenon. Thought occurs only in 
relations. Thought is about things and of things, when you describe a 
particular pattern of neural activity that is exactly what you are describing, 
nothing more. Thought is an experience that a person has and it gains its 
existence in a relationship, in action, not in an independent skirmish of 
tissues. Emotion also is not a neurological or physical process. Emotion is 
a social phenomenon, one that exists not so much in as of a relationship, 
in particular the reciprocal relationship between a person and their 
environment. Emotion is something that happens to a person, but is 
something that a person does, it is an action. · 
To reiterate, thought is not neurological. Defining thought so as to include 
its referents might be seen as simple pedantry. In what way does this 
recognition of the context dependent (and determining!) nature of 
thought assist in its understanding? The reason for this is to demonstrate 
the delimiting nature of human language on the process of imagination. 
Defining thought as a social act, or memory as social, is disturbing. Our 
need to see the world in terms of things we are familiar with is pervasive. 
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We prefer to give these very personal acts a unique position in space 
(peferably inside the head of the actor), and a concrete structure (preferably 
an organelle of the brain). Even our spiritualism has a concreteness about 
it, energies, spirits, higher planes of existence, all things in motion. It is 
very difficult using language to describe these types of relationships (ie the 
material dialectic), given the grounding that language has in the 
internalized causality that is cognition. Even when language is used 
abstractly, to describe other than physical events, the relationships between 
words (as embodied in syntax and grammatical rules) predefines and 
delimits the content of communication. Even coined words, neologisms 
and jargon have only a relative existence and only an illusion of 
independence or freedom from the constraints of convention and social 
custom. 
Does Consciousness exist ? 
For a person to be conscious does not require that they possess 
consciousness. A person can think without having a mind 'full of 
thought'. In considering the nature of cognition it is necessary to swiftly 
come to a personal decision about whether you are prepared to entertain 
metaphysical entities lumbering_ around in your descriptions, or reject that 
the mind is in any way composed of other-than-physical stuff. A firm 
decision about dualism has to be made. If you accept it, then you concede 
the possibility of the mind existing as an unknowable aspect of spirit, and 
have a convenient bottomless bag into which to fit your hypotheses about 
models of mental action, and, moreover, you will be unable to decide 
between competing models that claim the same mental status and fit the 
observations equally well. It is here that the statement that consciousness 
does not exist becomes more significant. With a rejection of dualism and 
the convenience of ideas such as emergence and gestalts, you move away 
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from a consciousness which can be possessed, or be a 'property of 
conscious thought' to a situation where consciousness becomes people 
thinking and acting. The concept of consciousness is not necessary for the 
systematic description and understanding of human life. We use it 
because when we question what and who we are, seeing ourself as a 
discreet and indivisible entity, we seek for a single discrete label for all 
those actions which we perform which others are not (and cannot) be 
privy to. Our thoughts are our own, as the thoughts of others are theirs. 
What we see in consciousness is that thing that produces thought, we seek 
a single agent for what is seen as a single action. If other people also think 
(and I believe we tend to assume that), and they are singular, then I am 
probably singular too. Looking for a single agent for a single action we 
arrive at the concept of consciousness to provide a name that we can 
attach to what we feel must be there, that unique aspect of ourselves 
beyond the strictly physical. Consciousness is an artefact of the need to 
communicate, and the grounding of language in metaphor. Verbal labels 
relate to single entities, the very term 'group' refers to a single entity, 
collectives are individuals. We count a herd of wildebeest as being one, 
even though it may comprise a million individuals. This collectivisation 
is merely a convenient effect of our use of language, and is artificial, a 
product of the way in which the tools that are used shape what is found. 
There is no unity in reality, trees, buildings, chairs and fish all fall apart, 
are all divisible into their parts, and those parts into parts, and who is to 
say that all atoms are created equal? 
Consciousness does not exist, instead people think. Likewise, emotions do 
not exist, people feel. The denial of the existence of consciousness is a 
statement about the ghosts we create for ourselves. 
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Perhaps paradoxically the way to transcend this limitation has been to 
abandon language (in the form of words and their meanings, ie statable 
facts) and revert to apparent pre-lingualism, to 'insight'. Thus the 
progression through stages of intellectual development is circular, and we 
teeter on the brink of mysticism once again. Once more we are close to 
postulating a non-material 'stuff' that is higher thought emerging from 
language but not dependent on it for form. This I would like to avoid at all 
costs. Rather than a thing which is 'unknowable', we have instead an 
acceptance (or acknowledgement) of a relationship that exists beyond the 
current context of definition, but exists none the less! I'll try to clarify this. 
In the situation where we are prepared to say that we 'know that 
something is', but cannot 'put it into words', a number of possible 
explanations appear: our personal vocabulary is insufficiently broad to 
possess the label for this thing (our sense of self is too narrow); its nature is 
so highly abstract that it cannot be related to anything in shared perceptual 
experience (lack of social metaphoric reality); we are blessed by divine 
inspiration; that 'knowledge' which we 'possess' is present only in 
preconsciousness, that is, as part of an automatised action schema (more 
on that later) and can then be only inferred to exist by the observation 
(post hoc) of knowledge dependent action.That we say we can understand 
a very abstract idea such as that of thought as a dialectical process is to 
express a belief that such a statement is true on the basis of our belief in 
the validity of logic. In our 'understanding' of the meaning of thing such 
as dialectical processes we progress through stages of logical inference, "if 
this is so therefore so must this", and are in a sense using a 
metaphoric/analogical process, but the structures against/from which we 
are forming the metaphors are not directly real-world objects, but 
metaphors themselves. There is then a hierarchy of necessary 
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substantiation, the lowest of direct perception, the middle of metaphoric 
speech acts, the top most of abstract conceptualization. But note that the 
form of the hierarchy is determined by its grounding in direct, 
phenomenal, experience. 
Mental Entities as Social Metaphors 
Deliberately adopting a stance where the use of metaphoric entities in 
describing consciousness is avoided has the potential for major headaches. 
Entities are a convenient means of abbreviation, a short-hand method for 
lumping a complex set of descriptions under a small number of headings 
which are then assigned 'properties' according to observed effects, much 
in the same way as gravity is a property we assign to large bodies. 
Consciousness is similar. We have Memory, Emotion, Cognition, 
Attention, and so on. These abstract concepts, as discussed before, have 
their meaning only in as much as they refer to something concrete. 
" .. .images are come from the concrete world of our senses, because that is 
the only world that words describe. But all our ways of picturing the world 
are metaphors, likenesses that we snatch from the larger world of eye and 
ear and touch." Einstein, 1936 (in Bronowski, 1974) 
When we discuss abstractions, the properties we assign to then relate to 
the concrete events that they point to in · our personal experience. 
Attempts to talk about these entities as events , rather than as things, 
creates a problem the basis of which lies in linguistics and the limitations 
of reference. 
It is important to remember that this short-hand way of conceptualising 
reality is a strength, and not just a draw-back. That a word can refer to an 
event, so that a memory of an experience in one modality can evoke 
memories in a variety of other modalities, is quite a feat. Being able to 
break the complexity of an experienced event down into a single word is a 
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great time-saver, to say the least. The construction of categories and the 
use of family relationships to understand the common elements in reality 
is fundamental to cognition. That it is not infinitely flexible is inevitable, 
for a number of reasons, eg there must be consistency in what is referred 
to; sets have to have a finite point of delimitation else they are not sets 
(ignore fuzzy set theory for the moment, that is different to the common 
understanding of a set); and as there is individual differences in people's 
experience, hence the events referred to will never be of a perfect match. 
If one does attempt to step outside the entity approach and describe the 
'thing' as an 'event', for whatever reason, one runs into problems of 
diluting a definition by over-precision. An excessive attention to minute 
details can broaden a description to the point that it ceases to have utility. 
This is analogous to the set without finite borders, and is a result, once 
again, of the reflexivism of language. But it is not inevitable. It is a matter 
of knowing when enough is enough. As to whether there is an objective 
value for this, I think not. If communication is satisfied, that is if there is 
consensus, and the point is conveyed, then common sense is probably 
good enough as an arbiter. The common understanding and depth of 
knowledge in the communication situation will put an appropriate 
constraint on detail. 
This thesis itself is an example of an attempt to provide an event 
description for an entity, in this case Emotion. Within it, there has been a 
successive beak-down of the constituent entities of language, feeling, and 
consciousness into events of personal action. Further, the basis of 
development of each of these entities has been examined from the 
viewpoint of self-organisation through necessity, rather than by reference 
to an actual unique physical entity such as the gene. At all points there has 
been a risk of over-description, while at the same time running the risk of 
104 
over-simplicity. The two appear to go hand-in-hand, paradoxically 
enough. By removing the guiding influence of genetics you risk losing the 
stability of a logical intent behind the direction of development, and 
increase the unpredictability of its final nature, thus the number of 
possible end-states proliferates. At the same time, the implication that 
there is a commonality underlying all forms of behaviour, that is, action is 
performed to maintain a 'status quo' which is then changed by the results 
of this action, seems simplistic in the extreme. Chaos and simplicity, an 
unlikely partnership, but not an unacceptable one. 
The inevitable question, as I see it, that arises from this line of reasoning 
is: how far to take it? Is it reasonable to go to the logical extreme and assert 
that all cognition arises out of active internalization? Obviously, to be 
internalized, there must be something to do the internalizing. What is 
logically required for internalization to occur? Briefly, it must be possible 
to acquire a memory of an event, to access that memory on the basis of 
current context, and to make a decision on whether or not to repeat the 
action(s) performed previously. That is, did the previous action(s) under 
these conditions lead to a 'favourable' outcome? One must choose 
between possible actions on the basis of current intentions. It can be seen 
from this hypothetical minimum function set that one's 'picture of the 
world' is very undetermined. If your sole birthright is the ability to 
compare, but not any standards by which to make comparison, then it is 
the pattern of interaction between you and your world that will construct 
the functional relationships you possess. That is, the range of possible 
action choices is determined by your (recalled) experiences of actions and 
outcomes (remembering that the perception of an outcome is itself an 
action, thus it is recall of action that is involved, not a person acting on the 
world or in the world, but rather of the world). Pre-linguistically, you are 
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only able to do what you have done, or to be more precise, what you have 
experienced as capable of being done. That is, you can observe the actions 
of others or note the effects that random (ie unintentional) action has on 
your environment. It can be seen that the common patterns of thought (ie 
categorisation) that people possess can therefore be related to their 
common experiences. And what is common (ie invariant) to these 
experiences are the properties of physical objects and the physical structure 
of the active individual. It is a prediction of the approach that persons who 
do not share the same experiences of the world will not share the same 
patterns of thought (internalized causality). Evidence for this comes from 
the developmental patterns of congenitally blind and congenitally deaf 
children, where there are lags evident in their development which would 
appear to correspond to a lack of experience in active exploration. Of 
' 
course, this is highly confounded with social factors as well as the nature 
of the disability. Further, the cause of the disability may also have effects 
on development other than to restrict experience. There may be damage or 
underdevelopment of the cortex associated with the condition. As an 
example of social confounding factors, it is accepted that a lack of physical 
contact between mother and child post partum can effect the degree of 
parent-child bonding, leading, it is believed, to an emotional deficit (ie 
child feels unloved, is timid) which can affect its willingness to explore or 
to express itself. It is noted for mothers of blind children to avoid physical 
contact initially, which can disrupt attachment. Parental over-
protectiveness can prevent the child from a full range of physical 
experiences. A child (like any sensible person) is lazy. It will do what it 
must to achieve its ends, but only as much as is necessary. Where an over-
attentive parent obviates the necessity for action it will not occur. If 
everything it requires is brought to it that can result in a delay in learning 
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to walk or even to reach. But for a child it is not a case of what is not 
practiced is lost so much as what is not attempted is not attained. 
Parallels between spoken language and other overt behaviours. 
Language is given almost a unique status in our understanding of human 
cognition. It is often seen as that aspect of our species which gives us the 
right to deem ourselves 'sapiens', and is held almost in reverence, its 
complexity and the unlikeliness of its spontaneous arisal seen as akin to 
proof positive of the existence of a divine hand and a singular destiny in 
human evolutionary history. But is it so unique? Hoping as ever to avoid 
dead-end quibbling over definitions, I mean here language as the spoken, 
communicative act, which may or may not engender human 
consciousness; the ability to communicate abstract concepts through the 
encoded transmission of intentional sound str~ctures. What language 
comes down to at basis is the ability to recognise units of speech that are 
heard as mapping onto units of speech that one produces, and vice versa. 
The recognition of family relationships between remembered auditory 
events. It can be argued that language is more than this, that it involves 
the intention behind the act, the motivations, the meaning, but is that 
language or is it context? At the risk of inviting an accusation of hair-
splitting and/ or pedantry, I would say that language is the process of inter-
relationship between events in memory (without speculating on how this 
occurs), whereas intention is the relationship between the events 
themselves. Yes, language cannot/ does not occur without intention, but 
the two are distinguishable. 
So far in this thesis I've been putting the view that individual 
consciousness, referred to as the social self, is language-based, that it 
consists of language, is an on-going conversation of the self with itself in 
relation to current context which is determined by the external 
107 
environment or consequences thereof. Now, I'd like to reverse that and 
say that consciousness is much more than that, and the social self is a 
minor player in awareness. To be brief, I would restate that language and 
the ability to acquire language are not genetically determined. What is 
genetically determined is the ability to form family relationships between 
stimuli both within and across modalities, synesthetically, and that 
language is a set of stimuli socially constructed, and transmitted 
historically in the lives of people, rather than being encoded into cellular 
proteins. Consciousness, awareness, is an on-going process of conversation 
not just in terms of auditory representations but kinesthetic information, 
proprioceptive, gustatory, a continual firing of nerves and a passing on of 
dynamic information about states. Conversation encompasses more than 
a quiet chat. The learning of language and the the acquisition of physical 
skills can be parallelled. In the acquisition of a new language, or of any 
new word, a conscious mapping process occurs between the auditory 
symbol with which one is familiar and the symbol which one is trying to 
learn. With time, as practice reaches such a level that the mapping 
becomes automatic, one begins to 'think' in the new language and 
awareness of the mapping process ceases. In the acquisition of a new 
physical skill a similar sequence of events occurs, an action-sequence 
(schema) is consciously constructed out of the 'parts' of skills that one 
already possesses. These are practised until the sequence becomes a unique 
act in its own right and the parts from which it is formed merge into a 
single whole. In language, auditory input and verbal production, which in 
the understanding of speech are inseparable, put units of speech 
competence (vowels, consonants) together to form new combinations. 
These derive their intention from the family relationships of the contexts 
within which they are produced. The uniqueness of language is that its 
usage creates within the overall murmur of internal 'speech' a single 
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entity, the social self, the "I", which derives its singularity from the fact 
that unlike the other voices of the body it has come into being through its 
direction 'outward' to effect changes in the environment at a distance. 
Consciousness is more than language, without language people can still 
function, can still learn, stand, run, feed themselves and reproduce. And, 
just as there is more to consciousness and awareness than whatever is the 
current focus of attention so is there more to "Me" than "I". In terms of 
"I", the social being, the "self-aware self", internal dialogue is all that I am, 
but in terms of "Me", there is much more. "I" am one aspect of the totality 
that is "Me", and it is "I" that has emotions, even while feeling is part of 
"Me" also, because it is "I" that attaches the labels. 
All this use of I and Me is confusing. To clarify, when the Social 
Constructionist view-point states that emotions are socially constructed, 
what is meant (broadly speaking) is that the labels that I choose to use and 
the situations in which I use them, are a product of the language that I use 
(and its available range of labels), in combination with the socially-derived 
rules of conduct that comprise an individuals' moral code. It is not 
essential to this viewpoint that one has an opinion one way or other on 
the nature/nurture question of either language or consciousness. The 
commonest view is that of the basic range of feelings, that are genetically 
determined, which are modified by experience into the diverse options of 
emotionality (for instance, Ekman). From this it follows that a sense of self 
is present from birth, one is pre-disposed to particular behaviours which 
form the basis of our side of our relationship with our environment. We 
are then born with a sense of identity, even if we do not yet have the 
specifics of language to express this. 
The function of consciousness 
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To say that consciousness has a function is perhaps not as accurate as to say 
that consciousness is a function, though I do not mean this in the sense of 
the philosophical doctrine of Functionalism. Confusion arises in talking 
about consciousness, I think, because of an understandable confusion 
about what exactly is being discussed. This occurs when it is not made clear 
whether it is consciousness per se that is referred to, or that individual 
aspect of consciousness which I would define as being the set of beliefs one 
holds about oneself as an actor in the world, generally referred to as the 
Self. Following the sociogenetic approach, the self is linguistically 
constituted, a set of verbalizable expressions of belief by which one is able 
to make comparisons about oneself as to the relative degree of similarity 
to some desired, and socially-defined prototype of belief or 'mode of 
being'. Defining the Self as a set of beliefs has a slightly unsettling effect, 
resulting again I think from the confusion between consciousness as it is 
known, and Self-hood. Popular understanding of the concepts make no 
significant distinction, yet they cannot be used interchangeably. The self, 
like consciousness from which it is derived, is determined by reference to 
environmental contingencies, in this case, those of the 'social 
environment' that is created with the acquisition of language. The self is 
defined by the holding of attitudes, that is, what the effects of particular 
events in the world have on us. Our opinions. But not only of events 
'outside' of ourselves, but of our own 'mental actions' also, which are 
'judged' in reference to standards formed by the active internalization of 
'social-environmental' contingencies or principles of the prevailing moral 
order. Again the same mechanism of dialectical progression, here coming 
much closer to Marx's later ideas of class consciousness. 
The effect of Language dysfunction 
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"Most people are other people. Their thoughts are someone else's 
opinion, their lives a mimicry, their passions a quotation." Oscar Wilde. 
If language use is the mechanism of acquisition of higher cognitive 
function through education/ socialization, what happens when full 
language development is impaired? 
Evans (1988) in a study on deaf children at a state residential school in the 
United States, investigated the relationship between the structure of 
language used (in this case American Sign Language), and the way in 
which cognition and social concepts develop. He asked the question: if 
language is the basis of cognition, knowledge and self-concepts, then in its 
absence, can one be said to think? 
" If reality, perspectives and conceptual frameworks are " made up of 
words ti ... , is a prelingual deaf child's head empty of ideations? Silent? 
ti Since many writers have defined thinking as. ti internal conversation 
" ... shall we conclude that a deaf child cannot think? Evans (1988) " 
Evans discusses the limitations of sign language in capturing the structure 
of 'Social Reality', that matrix of symbolic meaning that social interaction 
overlays on the strictly physical aspects of our environment (though this 
distinction can be seen as potentially misleading). While sign language can 
readily accommodate the communication of information of a concrete and 
literal nature, it has significant limitations with the subtle and the abstract: 
" It is a symbol system virtually devoid of metaphors, irony, humour and 
figurative language because these are 'nearly indigestible' for deaf 
adolescents ... In sign talk literalism and concretism result from the use of 
visual and sensory data ... Evans (1988) " 
Evans' work was performed in an institutional environment, and cannot 
be said to be representative of all deaf people, but it does point to the effects 
that limitations in language experience, both in quantity and diversity, can 
have on cognitive development. The institutional existence is one very 
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much of a world in itself, with its own local culture and context, where 
experiences are circumscribed, and do not represent those available to the 
members of the hearing world. Thus there are two forms of deprivation 
here, of the abstract world of spoken language, and of the range of social 
experiences that are available to those who have the skills to participate. 
Reading is also impaired, denying them access to the vast range of 
vicarious experience contained in literature. This lack of experience in life, 
Evans found, leads to a difficulty in distinguishing between fantasy and 
reality, they lack the background to know what is likely: 
11 .. students with crippled language fail to understand, ie, to know the 
world. They see the world (and especially the televised fantasy world that 
shows how two men can fight, beat, and whack each other with blunt 
objects with little damage) but do not understand it. Evans (1988) 11 
The children know what they see, and only what, they see. The symbolic 
meanings, and the requirements for the suspension of disbelief in fiction, 
that are linguistically conveyed, and which may in fact not be explicitly 
stated, can be totally opaque to them, and may not even be suspected. 
Young deaf children in the institution also suffered from a ' moral 
impairment ', and see personal relationships and the dynamics of social 
interaction in a narrow, simplistic, and rigid way. Evans (1988) quotes an 
educated deaf adult, who describes the beliefs of the children: 
11 They say, ' I want to be in the hearing world. ' Because they think it's 
going to be better. But it's not going to be any better. They don't even 
know that there's laws out in the world ... They think I out in the hearing 
world 1, that means having freedom. Gonna find a job like this [snaps 
finger]. It takes no time to find a job. They think that's what the hearing 
world is like ... Yeah, I used to say that myself...! Thought the hearing world 
was going to be jobs, going to be married, was going to have a car and all of 
this. It's gonna be a lot of fun. 11 
Personal relationships between the sexes was seen in a highly stylized 
manner, all relationships involve romance, platonic interaction was not 
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understood, and all romance involved sex. This was held to be a result of 
the interactive models presented to the children by their TV viewing. 
Quite a lot of blame was laid on the confusion that resulted from the 
children receiving 'entertainment', but understanding it as 'education', 
due to their overly uncritical and naive view of social realities, where 
things are not necessarily as they seem. The symbolic dimension to 
interpersonal interaction creates the potential for a vast multiplicity of 
interpretations for any one action dependent on the context that may be 
conveyed solely linguistically. A lack of access to these alternative 
meanings for the same actions is a great barrier to comprehension of how 
social life and the moral order functions. The vocabulary of young deaf 
children is extremely circumscribed, relating only to the narrow range of 
experiences that they have personally encountered, in addition to being 
very small by comparison to those hearing children of an equivalent age. 
Sign language itself has a lexicon of approximately 25'000 signs, compared 
to about 1 million for spoken English (Evans, 1988), so the range of things 
that can be described is drastically limited. 
11 ••• sign language is a general symbolic system that slices social objects into 
gross chunks. Cosmopolitan English, by contrast, slices the social objects of 
its cosmopolitan field into tiny slivers. 11 
The deaf children in Evans' study had difficulty understanding that words 
can have multiple meanings. For them, with language learning through 
the matching of a directly-seen object or action with a directly-seen sign, 
only one such matching makes sense. Further, the application of signs to 
stand for a class of objects is not easily grasped. 
To further complicate matters, the structure of sign language does not 
match that of spoken English, and has a looser form, using no pronouns, 
and with much more grounding in the context of the specific conversation 
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at that time. Imaginary speakers and time dimensions are indicated by 
reference to spatial positions, and word order is of much less significance. 
So when a child whose first language is sign comes to learn English they 
suffer a great handicap in adjusting to the unfamiliar demands of 
linguistic convention as well as the grasping of the greater needs to deal in 
abstractions and concepts of which they are likely to have had little or no 
experience directly. 
The significance of a handicap in language development comes with the 
limitations for the potential experience beyond the direct. What language 
provides, or rather what it means, is the growth of consciousness through 
personal action. If we follow the sociogenetic line then not only does 
language function as a 'bridge between minds', but is the instantiation of 
personality, 'we are what we think', and 'we think what we say'. 
Communication with other people is sharing of concepts, an expression of 
the structure of our 'mental processes'. When we incorporate what others 
say we also incorporate what they mean, we parallel their thoughts. Of 
course, as communication involves interpretation and accommodation 
with what we already know, it is by no means a perfect copy. It is a parallel 
at best, an analogy, personally constructed in the act of perception. With 
limitation on communication comes a limitation of the potential for 
expansion. If we accept that language is referential, as earlier suggested, 
then we can only learn successively, with step-wise evolution of structure 
between concepts as they can be related back to our personal experience. If 
the language that we use is limited in the number of lexical units that it 
has, then the potential for cross-reference is diminished also. So, the 
capacity to explain is reduced by reference to a limited set of items and thus 
the sensitivity of categorisation, the distinctiveness and the total number 
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of sets that can be constructed to partition experience, is likewise 
diminished. 
With reduced ease of access to communication comes a reduction in the 
potential for vicarious experience. The experiences of others taken for 
oneself magnify one's lifetime, and let one live what others have, and 
benefit from their errors and successes. A diminution in language is an 
enforced separation from full intercourse with the social environment, 
and with this opportunity denied then the potential for internalization of 
social action is cut back, and thus the development of a fully-active social 
self prevented. The social self, as mentioned earlier, is held (by the 
sociogeneticists) to be the result of the internalization of social 
contingencies, much as I have earlier outlined consciousness arising as the 
internalization of 'physical' contingencies. Where in pre-linguistic infant 
cognitive development the visual systems were seen as providing the 
majority of the experiences for the development of consciousness, in the 
linguistic human the use of language becomes the source of mediation for 
the internalization of social experiences toward the development of social 
consciousness. Without this mediation a great deal of the information 
available in social practice will go unnoticed. 
The Meaning of the Social Environment. 
What do we mean when we refer to the social environment? What is this 
thing, that it is being suggested can provide the substance/form/template 
for the construction of cognitive functioning? Is it part of the physical 
environment or distinct from it, as an 'emergent entity'? To put it in an 
appropriate perspective we should keep in mind that the social 
environment in and of itself does not exist, it is a social artefact. There is 
ultimately only the physical environment, in which there are people 
acting according to beliefs. It is the actions and interpretations of people 
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that constitute what we refer to as the social environment, but the 
ordinary language use of this term implies something other than what it 
is, which is a categorical statement applied to simplify reality for social 
scientists. The 'social environment' label merely serves to identify a 
particular class of action, that action which is performed by people. In this 
idea of social action is included the products of action (ie literature, the arts 
in general, bus stops) as they are perceived by a person. Things that 
involve communication involve a social act. Things listed as being in the 
social environment are those that are constructed by society, that is, by 
people, and hence have a social meaning as part of a particular social act. A 
conversation, if you will (ref Harre). But this social meaning only comes 
into being in the act of perception, it is dialectical. Given this approach, it 
can be seen that all that is required for a 'social environment' to exist is 
that there be at least one person present, and the nature of this 
environment is determined by the perceptual capacities (the effectivities) 
of that individual. The effectivities here are directly related (if not 
equivalent) to the sense-of-self (personal identity) that a person has. The 
'greater' the sense-of-self that a person has, that is the degree of freedom of 
access to the 'social mind', the refinement of sensitivity, the larger /more 
detailed the 'social environment' becomes. So the infant, even pre-
linguistically, is involved in social action, where it has developed a sense 
that it is unitary, that there is a direction that exists between it and the 
world. The social environment for the child is identical with the physical, 
the meaning of things is direct as it has yet to learn the associations that 
come with the use of words. 
The progression in the evolution of the sense of self is then an active 
internalization of the physical environment, and accommodation of 
experience into a constantly evolving consciousness. With the 
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internalization of the pattern of co-ordination of vocalization that is 
language, there comes available a further shading of meaning on the 
strictly physical, that we term social. This 'further shading' is the 
formation of associations between the names of things, and the 
development of a pattern of relationships between words taken in 
isolation from the things that they refer to. The reflexivism in language is 
a function of the process of abstraction, but not a process in the sense of a 
distinct ability of the mind, but as a description. A description that is really 
no more than a label to distinguish one part of the overall act of 
internalization from another so as to communicate an experience to 
another person. 
Parallels between acquisition of natural language and acquisition of 
cognition 
Parallels can be drawn between the relationship an individual has with 
their physical environment and that with their social environment. In 
this way the development of consciousness/ thought by a process of 'active 
internalization' of the causal relationships seen in the form of 
environmental contingencies and causality in social relationships as 
understood in terms of emotion and personality (and enshrined in 
language) can be seen as analogous. 
To reiterate: an infant learns 'the way the (physical) world works' by 
observation, or, more properly, by acts of perception. They learn how the 
social world works by learning the language of that society. It is the 
concepts communicated in the form of language , as well as (and, 
temporally speaking, primarily) the very nature of the form that comprise 
the child's developing self-awareness ('sense of self'). The process of 
language-learning is the process of the development of self-consciousness. 
Language is consciousness, but it must be differentiated from total 
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consciousness. It is, in a way, arbitrary to impose a simple dichotomy on 
consciousness, to say that thought has only two discernible forms rather 
than to see a continuum with two poles that are held to be archetypal, but 
within our conception of self-consciousness it is held that 'Identity' is 
discrete. That act or thought of which we are not 'consciously aware' is by 
definition 'unconscious'. There is only one personality with a number of 
different traits, as opposed to a range of reactions given environmental 
contingencies, a constant coherent 'mental' structure, rather than a 
developing person with a changing and contextually variant set of 
beliefs.This can be readily seen as a result of our observation of social 
reality, that it is only one person who acts, therefore there is only a single 
motivating 'mind\ not a collection of attitudes. 
To return to language learning, the function of language and its 
relationship to the idea of knowledge must be examined to see how it can 
serve in a mediating role between a person and their environment. To put 
it simply, language is the mind of a society, and with its learning a person 
constructs a unique self-consciousness. How can it be said it is unique, why 
isn't this simple social determinism? Because, the learning of anything is 
active, and, moreover, is done qualitatively in terms of personal capacities 
and consequently unique personal experience. That which we learn today 
depends on what we learned yesterday, context is as much an aspect of the 
past is it is of the present. The concept of capacities must not be confused 
however with 'innate mechanisms' or 'hard-wired' structures or any 
suggestion that consciousness develops teleologically as a process of 
maturation, proceeding to an inevitable end point. Rather, the capacities 
to learn depend upon previous experience. This can be pointed at as 
potentially circular, and simply a re-labelling or redefinition rather than a 
different viewpoint, but this I do not believe to be so. There is a difference 
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between 'innate' and 'capable', the former implying an ability that merely 
requires practice, the latter that it can be learned but does not yet exist, 
even in some quasi-embryonic form, nor will it necessarily exist in the 
future. But the question of capacities can be taken to a further and 
somewhat more abstract level, to ask whether a capacity can be other than 
innate, to ask whether we can acquire knowledge (in the action sense of 
knowledge) without pre-existing knowledge? Syntax without semantics is 
parody, not substance, the slate cannot be blank else it were no slate at all. 
I 
However, the fact that it can be written on does not presuppose any 
particular sentence, neither will the words write themselves. Self-
consciousness (the aware self) will not necessarily develop without 
experience, and, moreover, that the form of this consciousness will relate 
to the particular relationship that develops between the capacities of the 
person and the contingencies of the environment, specifically, the physical 
contingencies as represented in directly-observed physical causality and 
those represented within the body of socially-existent knowledge that is 
held in and comprised of, language. 
How is it that a child can be said to "learn how the (physical) world works" 
by direct observation, as previously asserted without an innate source of 
references by which to 'partition experience'? The hinge point of the 
concept of learned consciousness is, as outlined previously, that an 
individual is in a dialectical (conversational) co-evolutionary relationship 
to their environment. To elaborate ... 
The fundamental assumption underlying communication is that both 
parties (assuming for the moment a simple dyad) share concepts in 
common, that the means of communication is supported by a common 
'understanding'. In spoken language this is an abstraction into the mode 
of speech (oral production, aural reception), in perception more generally 
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this understanding is that perturbations (changes) in environmental 
contingencies (eg the optic array) are caused by 'things'. There is an 
implicit mapping between 'things' and the effect of their existence for us, 
commonly understood as changes in the dynamic structure of 'the senses'. 
The experience of perception for us, however, is not of changes in us, but 
of awareness 'inside' of things 'outside', that is, outside the 'self'. 
Our language use perpetuates a dualist conception of reality, and its use 
requires us to make choices about how we will view the world without 
realising that there are in fact choices to be made. We (subject) look at 
/listen to/reach for things (object), not engaging in any reciprocal dialogue. 
We have ideas in our heads, in our minds, things are physical or mental, 
these concepts become enshrined in our everyday language use without 
our ever appreciating the philosophical position to which we are 
committing ourselves. But it is not to suggest that this is necessarily a 'bad' 
thing, or inaccurate, or misleading. Personal experiential reality (ie that of 
'direct observation'), phenomenal existence in other words, is dualist. We, 
as objects to ourselves as well as subjects as ourselves, experience life in a 
disjoint manner, that is, the possession of a sense of identity implies a 
separation of self from 'something else', and hence the phenomenally real 
creation of subject and object. My reason for attempting to make this point 
is to establish the utility and relational nature of language as a product of 
interaction, so that even if the subject/ object distinction can be described as 
an artefact of the nature of language as a 'reflection' of reality it is not then 
'downgraded' as to its value. Language is a reflection of human social life, 
that is, of people in their interaction with their environments, and is an 
accurate reflection of that, rather than an objective deus ex machina (if I 
can use it in this way?), it is a social product, as well as a social creative 
force, and it is by this standard that it must be measured. It is not then 
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necessary to abandon the common-language framework to be able to 
discuss aspects of 'objective' (ie non-social) reality, if there is any such 
thing, so long as these biases and preconceptions and underlying 
assumptions are acknowledged, and a consensual understanding of the 
terms is reached. Even if psychology is no more than a series of language 
games, a translation of phenomena into the appropriate 
terminology/ jargon, it does not degrade it as knowledge, if the language 
games are reflecting social reality. That is, if the purpose of psychology is to 
understand the nature of human experience then it is not incompatible 
with this aim to describe this nature at a level of explanation that is 
appropriate. To clarify, a description of social interaction between people 
in terms of conventional language is more informative than to reduce 
this description to an objective level of description, ie a neutral level such 
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as the neuronal. And, of course, it can be argued that there is no level to 
which things can be reduced that does not involve language use, and 
hence presupposition and consequent biases and assumptions. 
Reductionism does not necessarily increase the explanatory value of a 
construct. 
Chaos as a model for personal evolution 
Fractals 
Fractal geometry is the term used for the mathematical description of the 
physical characteristics of structures that show circularity, a term used by 
the mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot who is credited as the first to 
describe them. Circularity is meant in that the final shape of the structure 
is a reflection of the shape of the individual components, so that the 
whole is formed by a recursive sequence of repetitions of the parts that 
form it. To give a simple example, the final form of a snowflake is a 
reflection of the shape of the individual i_ce crystals that make it up. 
121 
Examination of any individual part of the snowflake reveals a shape that 
is identical to that of the entire flake. In a fractal form, serial repetition of a 
single base unit, with the addition of a degree of randomness, results in 
the formation of a larger structure that replicates the form of the base unit. 
The shape of mountains can be modelled by use (on computer) of 
successive iterations of the forms of component crystals. The dendritic 
patterns of alveolae and ferns fronds, the growth patterns of neurons 
show fractal nature, as does the curling of smoke from a cigarette in still 
air or turbulence in river currents. 
The basis of a fractal is simple repetition plus uncertainty. Uncertainty is 
essential to a fractal, as fractals are a demonstration of the structure 
inherent in chaos. 
Chaos theory in brief 
Fractal forms are the physical manifestation of the abstract properties 
underlying chaos theory. In chaos theory, apparently complex structures 
are described by the use of small components interacting in a 
pseudorandom fashion. It's not true randomness, because the base units 
have a finite and predictable structure, but the randomness comes because 
of the stochastic nature of the formation of the final structure (if you can 
call it final). For example, weather. Weather shows an apparent regular 
cycle of changes, which it was imagined reflected an underlying consistent 
pattern that, when enough detailed records had been made, would allow 
for accurate long-term prediction. What has actually appeared is a picture 
of weather cycles as a chaotic jumble that defies prediction. As a chaotic 
system, the structure of the weather pattern at any one time depends on 
the structure at the time immediately preceding it, but no further back. 
The smaller the units of time one uses for retrospective analysis, and the 
shorter the overall period examined, the more there appears to be a 
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relationship between the current state and the previous. But as one goes 
further back, and one's scale broadens, the less dependent the present is on 
the past. Short-term predictions of chaotic systems can be made, but the 
uncertainty that is part of it means that the further one goes the less 
reliable one's predictions become. 
The uncertainty in chaotic systems means that there is a progressive 
evolution in form, a gradual drift between states that has a general nature 
that comes from the recursive expression of the base unit, but a specific 
nature that is not predictable. 
What form does this uncertainty take? In the growth of crystals the rule 
for its growth might be to follow a particular angle of growth, moving in a 
particular orientation according to the available bonds, following a pattern 
of successive lefts and rights, and where the randomness comes in is 
where one part of the crystal contacts another and has to go off at another 
angle. So the pattern that has been formed before influences the 'next 
generation', but not predictably. Continued interaction between the 
current expression of the rule and the effects of previous expressions 
brings a randomising effect to the growth so that at the level of the 
formation of individual crystals chaos reigns. But at the level of the 
organisation of the overall shape of the entire crystal there is order. 
Within a single feature of weather, for example a cloud (very fractal), there 
can be order on one level of analysis (eg there is a cloud) while there is 
chaos on another (the relationship between water or ice particles). This is 
one identifying feature of a fractal, the successive alteration from order to 
chaos with changes in the scale of analysis. As one more closely examines 
any fractal structure there is alternation between an apparent unitary 
nature and a fragmented nature. For example, a leaf is a unitary entity, but 
closer examination shows it as a collection of individual cells. Each cell is 
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unitary, but closer examination reveals that each cell is composed of bits. 
The base unit of the leaf is the cell, so examination ends there, but for 
fractals as an abstract entity there is one form, the Mandelbrot Set, where 
successive changes in scale of examination show an infinity of potential 
detail, where every unit (derived mathematically) can be revealed to 
expose an infinite succession of parts. The alternation between the unit 
and the part in chaotic systems results from the expression of the order 
inherent in the base unit, and the subsequent disorder inherent in the 
error variance in each successive generation. 
The requirements for the creation of a chaotic system are the successive 
iteration of a base unit, plus a degree of error in how these units are 
arranged. Natural social systems, for example the biodynamics of species 
likes lemmings and locusts shows a chaotic growth pattern. Economic 
systems like the stock exchange show chaotic fluctuations. 
What fractal geometry and chaotic systems demonstrate is how apparent 
complexity and order that appears to be controlled by a large underlying 
pattern of predictable relationships can be seen to evolve from the 
successive interactions of low-level units, and that apparent teleology can 
be described as no more than pseudo-random evolutionary drift due to 
uncertainty and instability. 
Social reflexivity as chaotic self-organisation 
Human society can be described as demonstrating a chaotic order. Society 
as a unit is composed of a host of individuals, is composed from the beliefs 
of these individuals about how society exists. The structure of society is 
then derived from the beliefs of individuals about the structure of society 
according to how they have been educated by society to believe the 
structure of society to be. The successive iteration in the chaotic formation 
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of society is human communication in the forms of social practice. The 
uncertainty and instability is derived from the fact that communication 
between individuals involves the translation into verbalisable concepts of 
personal experiences that are understood by metaphoric self-reference. 
Meaning is derived from personal experience, comprehension comes 
from personal context, so that the individuality of words has the capacity 
for their gradual evolution, and like a vast game of 'Chinese Whispers' 
cause words to shift in their uses to match current needs. Further, the 
roughness-of-fit of words to the untidy reality they purport to refer to 
leaves a great deal of possible error variance for fluctuation in structure. 
"'When I use a word', Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone. 'it 
means just what I choose it to mean - neither more or less.' 
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.'· 
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which ,is to be master - that's 
all."' 
Lewis Carroll, "Through the Looking Glass" 
Here again is Marx, where social consciousness and Society reflect, and the 
imperfection of the reflection brings the tension and instability that is the 
spur to social evolution. If we extend the comparison of society as a chaotic 
system to socioeconomics, then Marx's predictions about the future course 
of social evolution suffered from the same problem as long-term weather 
forecasts, that stochastic systems are not readily amenable to any more 
than short-term analyses. 
As part of its fractal legacy Society can be seen through increments of scale 
to consist of individuals, individuals to consist of beliefs, beliefs to consist 
of other beliefs and so on, the successive change from unit, to collection of 
part, to unit, where here the 'belief' is where further reduction becomes 
problematic. Each individual can then be seen as a fractal entity in its own 
right, constructing itself through the course of its life through successive 
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iterations of modified reflections of social experience, a personal historical 
process which is only predictable in a very general sense. Thus, self-
reference is the iteration that, with the variance resulting from the 
tensions inherent in language-use, gives rise to the personal evolution of 
the social individual. 
~ The Social Co-evolution of Ideological 
Dualism in Cognition and Emotion 
A model for the unlearning of emotion 
So where do we end up? The overall goal of this thesis, I discover at last, 
has been to produce a statement that I have already used several times so 
far, in a number of different ways. This statement .is that the development 
of emotion can be synonymised with the development of cognition. This 
is somewhat reflexive, using the final outcome as a prior assumption. The 
end substantiates the means. 
To clarify, if emotion is seen as as self-created (by the self it creates), that is, 
it develops as the personal sensation of the co-ordination of the action 
systems as they interact with the personal parameters of the physical 
world, then emotion is the awareness of one's self. 
Emotion is fundamentally reflexive, it is the personal experience of self-
examination in the process of recollection. Emotion is then an aspect of 
knowledge, and so of cognition, the personal experience of how the world 
works. 
What is then required is a description of how the personal development 
of emotion is subsumed within the more general process of the 
development of individual reason. 
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The James/Lange Model 
The James-Lange theory of emotion, is, very simply put, that we 'feel' an 
emotion first, unconsciously, then identify it consciously by an act of 
introspection. 
"My theory is that...the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the 
exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the 
emotion." James (1890). 
There is a 'primary' emotional reaction which we label. We are aware of 
our emotional state because, and how, it is happening. It is not that: "I cry 
because I am sad", but rather: "I know I am sad because I find myself 
crying". Feeling is primary. This idea requires a two-component 
description of the experience: the 'physical feeling' (qualia) of the 
'affective' component; and the 'cognitive' comppnent arising from the 
conscious introspection by the aware self of the current 'body state'. 
Perturbation first, identification, and thus emotional experience, second. 
This model appears intuitively to twist the experience of an emotion 
around, at least at a first reading, but introspection leads one to see that 
there is an apparent phenomenal disparity between onset of a 'feeling', 
and awareness of it. 
James' ideas on the taxonomy of emotions had very definite materialist 
tones. It was not his opinion that emotions could be (or should be) 
differentiated on the basis of the feelings evoked, but rather that: 
"The internal shadings of emotional feeling ... merge endlessly into each 
other. Language has discriminated some of them, as hatred, antipathy, 
animosity, dislike, aversion, malice, spite, vengefulness, abhorrence, etc., 
etc.,; but in the dictionaries of synonyms we find these feelings 
distinguished more by their severally appropriate objective stimuli than 
by their conscious or subjective tone." James (1890). 
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James wanted a conceptualization of emotion that fitted with his idea of a 
scientific approach to analysis, looking beyond descriptions of each specific 
instance of emotional expression to find a single general cause (or set of 
causes) that could be used to explain emotion. 
"The trouble with the emotions in psychology is that they are regarded too 
much as absolutely individual things. So long as they are set down as so 
many eternal and sacred psychic entities ... all that can be done with them is 
reverently to catalogue their separate characters, points, and effects. But if 
we regard them as products of more general causes ... [then] ... the mere 
distinguishing and cataloguing becomes of subsidiary importance." James 
(1890). 
James' theoretical view point removes emotions from being external 
forces to aspects of the functioning of individuals in the course of their 
lives. Emotions cease to be actions of the spirit and become actions of the 
body, moreover a body that has evolved to meet environmental needs. 
Further, emotions become intrinsically involved with the nature of the 
individual and their personality as it comes into being. 
"If our hypothesis is true, it makes us realize more deeply than ever how 
much our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame, in the strictest 
sense of the term. Rapture, love ambition, indignation and pride, 
considered as feelings, are fruits of the same soil with the grossest bodily 
sensations of pleasure and of pain." James (1890). 
The 'same soil' as referred to above is the individual's life experiences, 
bodily perturbations occurring in association with cognitive events. The 
individual's emotional life comes into being through the incorporation of 
ones' own experience of physical 'reflex' responses, basic reactions that 
have their origins in the arisal of the human species through the processes 
of natural selection, into the self. This origin of reflex James (1890) refers to 
as: " ... the principle of revival in weakened form of reactions useful in 
more violent dealings with the object inspiring the emotion ... ". For 
example: "So slight a symptom as the snarl or the sneer, the one-sided 
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uncovering of the upper teeth, is accounted for by Darwin as a survival 
from the time when our ancestors had large canines, and unfleshed 
them ... for attack." James (1890). 
This form of reasoning fits well with James' pragmatist leanings where 
the self is known by an observation of one's own behaviour, in activity in 
the social world. The pragmatic philosophy of Mead and James very much 
sees a self derived from, and defined by, social action and the standards of 
society mediated by linguistics to the conventions of social practice. 
Emotional Development as Self-Organised 
My own feeling about the James-Lange theory is that is that it is almost 
right, except that it has an inherent dualism in its two-component 
implications, and that rather than introspection or current self-analysis as 
' 
the basis of the definition of emotion, I would prefer to see to see it as 
retrospection. It would be my wish to have a model of emotion that allows 
for self-modification and development. A model that sees emotion as 
developing itself as a product of interaction between the capacities of the 
individual as these change over time, and the potential of the 
environment to support action as these become realized by the developing 
character of the self. 
It is my belief that emotions should be seen not as individual entities 
separate from the self, but as an artefact of linguistic convention. The 
differences between different emotions should be seen, as James also 
suggests, as a result of differential situational characteristics, task-demands, 
not as elaboration by experience of a core of genetically-predetermined 
'givens'. These givens being physical attributes (reflexes) or action 
properties or reflections of qualities of the soul. Emotion is a label for a 
class of action. Action that is seen to be relevant to one's perception of self 
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as a social being. But this is not to say that people do not experience 
emotions. They do. As James (1890) puts it: 
"If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our 
consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have 
nothing left behind, no 'mind stuff' out of which the emotion can be 
constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception 
remains." 
But the phenomenal event of 'being in an emotional state' of one kind or 
another is not equivalent to that of say having a particular body 
temperature, or concentration of a particular protein or salt in the blood, 
or alteration in skin conductivity. An emotion is an experience of a 
conscious self-aware being, and, while it cannot be denied that it does 
involve a particular neurochemical/physiological/ autonomic condition, 
it is more than that. It is not the physiological state that is the emotion, it 
is the conscious experience of that state. This experience includes all the 
associations and memories 'connected to' that state as well as awareness of 
the prevailing environmental contingencies. Emotions, moreover, do not 
occur in people. Nor do they occur of people. They occur as people are in 
reference to the world. This is not just heady mysticism or free-floating 
Hegelian Idealism, though it does owe a great debt to Hegel. It is not 
adequate to describe emotions in terms of bodily perturbations, or for that 
matter in terms of cognitive labelling. Emotions have their source in 
reference to real-world events. Events, however, that are perceived by a 
person, by a social individual. 
"All knowledge whatever exists dissolved in the medium of feeling 
[sensibility]. Knowledge is an affair not only of objective relations, but of 
value for me. It bears an indescribable, absolutely personal relation to me, 
so that while you may know exactly the same that I know, my knowledge 
cannot possibly be your knowledge." Dewey, 1891. 
It is my wish that a model of emotion be described that has a 'self-
organising' capacity. But one model is not enough. Given that a self-
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organising system modifies itself (definitively), then the final 'form' of the 
descriptive model will differ, must differ, from the form of the original. 
Any one model that attempts to describe an individual's emotional action 
at all stages of development must fail. Emotional form is not static, it is 
dynamic. It follows from this line of reasoning that attempts to describe 
the emotional life of infants using the adult model will be unsuccessful. It 
has been suggested that it is this attempt to apply the model that give9 the 
apparent teleology to emotional development. It is the belief of the adult 
population that the emotional structure which they possess is the same, in 
embryo (ouch), in their children that produces this primal, and most 
pervasive, self-fulfilling prophecy. 
"If the child is enabled to advance by being under the tutelage of an adult 
or a more competent peer, then the tutor or the abiding peer serves the 
learner as a vicarious form of consciousness until such a time as the 
learner is able to master his own action through his own consciousness 
and control." Jerome Bruner, 1985. 
Any model which I might describe would have to be a description of 
function. A partial description, however, and not of a functional 
connection determined by a hard-wired linkage between parts of the brain 
and various relevant glands, but of a functional interrelationship formed 
out of needs, abilities and environmental opportunities afforded. It would 
be a model of a self-organising system that does not exist in the infant, 
even in the form of unrealized potentials, but develops into being in the 
adult as a function of social practice and thus of the self. 
"The more strongly the senses themselves feel affected by the intensity of 
the inflow which comes to them, the less information they provide. On 
the other hand, if they are expected to yield a great deal of information, 
they must be affected moderately." Kant, 1798. 
If one model of emotion is definitively inadequate, and the course of a 
person's emotional development is the book that each writes for 
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themselves, then what it would be best to describe would be the conditions 
by which, and in which, this system can come into being. It would be a 
theory of creation without a creator, a theory of phenomenal emotional 
evolution. All that you really require for emotions to develop is the 
possession of a memory, a memory that has entries from all the myriad 
aspects of perception including perception of the current state of the 
central nervous system. It must also be possible to compare the current 
status of the 'external world' as it is being experienced. Here we find a 
place for something like Kant's a priori categories. They are the functional 
dynamics of the nervous system. Really, there is only one a priori, the 
maintenance of the status quo. But, seemingly in contradiction to this, a 
status quo that changes. The status quo in this case is information rate, a 
range of tolerance that remains invariant over changing aspects of 
information. What counts as information develops with the individual's 
effectivities. A very Hegelian invariant indeed, each present state 
advancing by means of its own destruction and re-creation toward another 
state. But there is no final state. William James also questioned the need to 
conceptualise the physical substrate of emotion as existing in some form 
separate and unique within the nervous system: 
" .. .it is even now certain that of two things concerning the emotions, one 
must be true. Either separate and special centres, affected to them alone, 
are their brain-seat, or else they correspond to processes occurring in the 
motor and sensory centres already assigned, or in other like them, not yet 
known ... Supposing the cortex to contain parts, liable to be excited by 
changes in each special sense-organ, in each portion of the skin, in each 
muscle, each joint, and each viscus, and to contain absolutely nothing else, 
we still have a scheme capable of representing the process of the emotions. 
An object falls on a sense organ, affects a cortical part, and is perceived; or 
else the latter, excited inwardly, gives rise to an idea of the same object. 
Quick as a flash, the reflex currents pass down through their preordained 
channels, alter the condition of muscle, skin, and viscus; and these 
alterations, perceived, like the original object, in as many portions of the 
cortex, combine with it in consciousness and transform it from an object-
simply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt. No new principles 
have to be invoked, nothing postulated beyond the ordinary reflex circuits, 
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and the local centres admitted in one- shape or another by all to exist." 
James (1890). 
James then sees no need to postulate neural networks specifically for the 
experience of emotion if it is possible to account for them within the 
existing explanatory framework for other forms of behaviour. I would 
depart from James' ideas only as to the nature of the basic elements of 
emotion behaviour, the reflexes. There is nothing within James' thesis 
that is at odds with a learning theory of emotion, other than the 
predeterminist principle inherent in the Darwinian concepts he quotes. I 
would wish to go further than James and question whether the basic 
nature of emotions lies in the potential provided by genetic inheritance. 
Suppression of Emotions 
Within the standard entity description of emotionalism the personal 
attempt to avoid the experience of a particular kin'd of feeling that for one 
reason or another is not desirable is described by the use of metaphors of 
containment. Conditions where the suppression of a particular emotional 
reaction are considered could be that the situation is inappropriate to the 
expression of a particular emotion, or that a particular emotion is socially 
proscribed, or that it is simply too personally disturbing. Within the entity 
description, an unwanted emotion is a thing separate and inaccessible to 
personal volition for its existence. It must be 'held in' until either the 
situation has changed so that it becomes appropriate for it to be 'let out' or 
that it has gone away of its own accord, or another stronger emotion has 
appeared that has 'shouldered it out of the way'. We "bottle up anger", 
"hold back the tears", "(be still my beating heart)", descriptions that utilise 
metaphors of physical restraint or pleas to the emotion itself that it not 
occur. Undesirable emotions are treated as unruly invaders, to be placated 
or subdued. 
133 
An alternative viewpoint is to look at emotional suppression as an act of 
choice. Rather than attempts to invoke unknown forces to hold wayward 
emotions in check we are engaging in a deliberate (if not immediately 
obvious) attempt to avoid the experience of one emotion by the selection 
of another from our behavioural repertoire. Firstly, by focusing on the 
personal experience of the undesired emotion we can shift attention away 
from its original source. If, however, the cause is unable to be avoided in 
this way, by focusing 'internally' then we can seek an alternative trigger 
'externally' for another emotion that is less threatening or more socially 
acceptable. In either case the action is to set a chain of events in motion 
that, rather than holding one emotion down, cause the emotion itself to 
be altered. Rather than being a passive experiencer of emotions we are in 
fact active causes ourselves, by the deliberate seeking of particular features 
of either the external environment or of imagined features that have 
associations in memory that evoke more acceptable responses. But in 
either case it is not choosing one entity over another, it is choosing one 
behaviour over another. Emotional suppression is at basis avoiding one 
behaviour by deliberate concentration on the execution of another. 
What we then see for the revised description of suppression as as active 
choice of behaviour is the general view of emotional change, the shifting 
from the experience of one emotion to another as the replacement of one 
emotion by another through the deliberate triggering of automatic 
routines (schema if you like) of recollection and arousal. Suppression is 
then a deliberate act towards experiencing an emotion of choice, rather 
than towards not having an emotional response at all, towards being 
blank or empty. As active seekers of information the one sure way of 
avoiding an unwanted response to a particular source of stimulation is to 
actively pursue the response to an alternative. The over-all emphasis then 
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is on the active pursuit of the experience of choice, rather than the more 
passive avoidance (if it is actually possible to passively avoid) or ignoring, 
of emotional experience altogether. We are capable taking control of what 
we will respond to, although avoiding the experience of a particular 
emotion may not always be the best thing to do in the long run. 
This option of substituting one emotion experience for another stems 
from the underlying plasticity and adaptability of emotions as learned and 
learnable behaviours. Continued repeated substitution of one emotion 
response with another can, as with any well-practiced behaviour, become 
automatic, until the original response to the eliciting event ceases to have 
potency. 
The Basis for Change in Emotionalism - Successive Replacement 
The development of cognitive function, particularly to the point of the 
attainment of expertise, involves the creation of automatic and 
preconscious routines for the systematic co-ordination of personal state 
with environmental contingencies. As what I would term a 'successive 
replacement' hypothesis would suggest, continued experience of the same, 
or sufficiently similar (ie generalizable) events, results in the 'replay' of a 
successively lesser autonomic reaction. Each successive experience adds its 
own memoria to the context. To put it possibly more simply, 'associative 
pathways' (in network terminology) form (or rather, strengthen) between 
the memory of the currently-being-experienced event and non-arousing 
consequences. Thus for the emotions. To quote William James (1890) 
again: 
"One final generality about the emotions remains to be noted: They blunt 
themselves by repetition more rapidly than any other sort of feeling. This 
is due not only to the general law of 'accommodation' to their stimulus 
... but to the particular fact that the 'diffusive wave' of reflex effects tends 
always to become more narrow ... The more we exercise ourselves at 
anything, the fewer muscles we employ; and just so, the oftener we meet 
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an object, the more definitely we think and behave about it; and the less is 
the organic perturbation to which it gives rise ... This tendency to economy 
in the nerve paths through which our sensation and 1deas discharge, is the 
basis of all growth in efficiency, readiness and skill. Where would the 
general, the surgeon, the presiding chairman be, if their nerve-currents 
kept running down into their viscera, instead of keeping up amid their 
convolutions?" 
To use a 'snarly dog' example, if, after being frightened by a snarly dog 7 , 
the next few snarly-type dogs one met did not savage you (assuming you 
would let one near you), then the memory associated with the perception 
of snarly dogs would gradually come to be 'replaced' by a less-arousing 
one. The degree to which this 'new' memory association would be less-
arousing would be dependent on: a) the extent of the tolerance excess in 
the initial encounter; b) the number of subsequent non-threatening (or at 
least, less-threatening) encounters; c) the similarity between subsequent 
snarly dogs and the first, as well as the homogeneity (in personal 
experience) of snarly dogs as a class, or indeed of dogs as a class. This last 
point relates to the predictive value of the information involved, the 
prototypical or representative nature of the original snarly dog in the class 
of dogs, as to how generalizable the events and consequences would be. 
This is dependent on one's personal perceptual experience, as to how 
finely one would discriminate between them. What must also be 
considered is the significance of making an error. This relates to point a), if 
the initial experience was perceived as so threatening as to make the 
possibility of reoccurrence undesirable, then this would increase the 
likelihood of 'non-replacement', or disassociation. Also, the actions of 
consciousness in examining the event in retrospect, "going over it in 
one's mind" can contribute to the arousing qualities of the association by 
strengthening the 'pathway' if alternative associations are not not made. 
To use more normal terms, it is possible to reason away fear, to talk 
7had one's information tolerances savagely exceeded, so to speak. 
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oneself into a calm state by deliberately accessing alternative memories 
and associations to counteract the anxiety. However, this may not be 
effective if the anxiety is such as to 'dominate' thought, and to result in 
arousal in the absence of the arousing event. This subsequent arousal 
becomes associated with the original event and increases the recalcitrance 
of the original association. To put it another way, lying awake at night 
telling oneself not to be scared of snarly dogs just reinforces the idea that 
snarly dogs are something to be scared of. But this is all minor detail really, 
the central idea remains that successive experiences with similar events 
that are non-arousing will result in a decrease in 'attensity' , which is 
synonymous with novelty. 
Seek and Maintain - Emotionalism 
When discussing human experience as I have done so far, the two terms 
'cognition' and 'emotion' can almost be used interchangeably, where 
perhaps emotion is a 'special case of cognition' involving autonomic 
arousal in response to the recall of previous consequences of current 
actions given the choices available. 'Pure' cognition, and 'pure' emotion 
are hard to find. 
A comparison can be readily made between the development of emotion 
by successive replacement and the initial formation of consciousness 
under the heuristic earlier referred to as 'seek and maintain'. 
Emotionalism, that is, an emotional response, is the end-product of a 
decision-making process. Where, in the learning of cognition the structure 
of co-ordination was hypothesised to be guided by the maintenance of 
tolerance limits of the sensory systems, thus also for emotion. What is 
involved in emotional response is a rational act performed to control 
one's environment to maintain it inside parameters of tolerance. For an 
infant, these parameters are literally the tolerance limits of the sensory 
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systems to their 'mechanical' limits of physiological adaptation. With 
experience the adaptation occurs to both these limits and to that which 
prior experience tells us will be the 'threats' to come. We respond to what 
we know will happen, and so respond to the future by reference to the 
past. Emotional response is behaviour to meet predicted stressors, or 
instances of anticipated change beyond what we feel is acceptable. That the 
stressors considered by an adult may transcend direct physical threat or 
pleasure, and may instead be socialized metaphors is irrelevant. We react 
to events in the ways available to us, and these methods we learn in 
childhood. 
In emotional responding, as in other forms of action, the actions 
performed can be seen as aimed toward the goal of stabilising information 
flow. Within this, the 'feeling' component of emotion can be seen as the 
recall of previous action on a continuum of approach or avoidance, 
toward the result of increasing or decreasing the rate of flow. Whether a 
particular event increases or decreases this rate depends on how 
'informative' it is, that is, how novel, or important. 
This is a very low-level, mechanical description of emotion, and highly 
arguable. It is an attempt to neutralise a description of emotional response, 
and to side-step the potential reflexivity in emotional description, that is, 
talking in terms of personal goals, or motivations. What is sought is to 
describe the significance of emotional response, as action. To this end the 
use of the term 'self' has been used as sparingly as possible. 'Self' is one 
pole of a continuum of an act, and 'object' (or 'event') is the other. 
Neither is separable, it's dialectical once again, that is, reflexive. They are 
interdependent. Emotions are difficult to pin down definitively because 
the common usage of the term covers both the subjective feeling (eg 
angry) and the perceived cause (eg anger). Our metaphoric language, as 
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mentioned earlier, and its relationship to our cognitions, gives this duality 
and confusion. We seek an entity to match to the word so as to convey 
what we mean to ourselves and perhaps to others. We encapsulate the 
abstract in self-related language to ground it in comprehensible experience. 
A behavioural description of emotion (even within the reflexive confines 
of natural language) can aim to outline the act and its bare-bones 
significance. But it is not adequate as a description of the personal 
experience of emotion. That is not intended. It is one, alternate, 
viewpoint, but only one, and it suffers the same limitations as any other 
single viewpoint. A behavioural description can cover emotional 
response, even to the point of postulating hypotheses about feed-back 
relationships in cognition, but listing the dry mechanics of function does 
not adequately convey the complexity of personal experience. 
Utilising the successive replacement model it is required that the action of 
accessing (or making a comparison in) memory is preconscious, but this is 
not to deny that autonomic reactions consistent with phenomenal 
'feeling' responses to environmental contingencies, but occurring as a 
consequence of conscious thought, can occur. But here again the act of 
comparison is preconscious, though the effect may not be. In accessing 
memory we are consciously aware only of the intention to access and the 
consequences of that access. The process of access is opaque. Consciousness 
is constituted of the actions of preconsciousness, the parts of 
consciousness that form the whole, ever-changing according to the 
contingencies of the time, yet invariant around their relation to the 
personal self. 
Identifying types of Emotion 
To further describe the replacement model, there is a preconscious 
memory search involved in the initial stage of the encounter with the 
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event. If there is a 'match' (exact mechanism is irrelevant), then there will 
be, as part of the memory trace, an autonomic nervous system component 
associated with it. Dependent on the degree of change that the accessing of 
this component causes, this may enter into 'conscious awareness', and cue 
the consciousness as to the relative significance that this event (or similar 
events) had in the past. That is, what was the autonomic response 
resulting from the previous encounter ? This has obvious survival 
advantages and, moreover, can be seen as part of a possible precursor to a 
more complex evaluative system. As a basic mechanism for learning, 
previous action consequences are made available to consciousness, which 
can choose whether or not to repeat (or continue) this previous action, 
that is, an 'over-ride' option exists, so that one can choose an entirely 
different act should one so desire. To return more closely to emotion, 
conscious identification of the type of emotion that one is experiencing is 
decided by reference to memory, particularly to those memories that 
would be termed 'social' in nature, ie demonstrative of appropriate 
actions according to the moral order. This involves the selection of an 
appropriate verbal label for what is perceived as the current 'state' of 
'mind'. One's experiences, however, are not merely limited to those 
experiences of which one has had direct phenomenal experience, but also 
those of others which we can share through the use of language, as earlier 
related in the use of metaphors and the social acquisition of cognitive 
patterns. Under this model then, emotions are the result of cognitive 
labelling of a 'feeling' according to a set of rules defined by an individual's 
experience in social interaction mediated by language. Here I must depart 
from the strong thesis of social constructionism (Armon-Jones, 1985), 
which says, simply put, that the cognitive label, even in the absence of the 
'feeling' (qualia) is the essential for emotion. According to this opinion, an 
'emotional attitude', or adherence to a social convention of self-perception 
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within a moral order is both necessary and sufficient to constitute an 
emotion. This I cannot agree with. I feel that a distinction must be drawn 
between an attitude, no matter how 'strongly held', and an emotion. An 
attitude alone is not sufficient, though it is necessary. it is the self-
perception of the act of the assignment of the verbal label, where one 
places oneself on a social dimension of rectitude or conformity that is 
definitive of emotion, but, unaccompanied by evidence of physical 
reaction it becomes a mere abstraction, and not an emotion at all. As 
William James evocatively stated: 
"What kind of emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of 
quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips 
nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose flesh nor of visceral stirrings were 
present, it is quite impossible for me to think. Can one fancy the state of 
rage and picture no ebullution in the chest, no flushing of the face, no 
dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous 
action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face?" 
James (1890). 
Universals in Emotion 
There is a strong body of belief in psychology that no matter how much 
you attempt to reduce emotion development to experience and away from 
genetics there is a point beyond which you cannot go, the region of the 
universals of expression. This belief is based on cross-cultural studies that 
purport to have demonstrated the universal nature of some facial 
expressions across cultures so separate and diverse that any similarities 
that are observable between them can be ascribed to a fundamental 
common origin in species formation. These universal expressions are 
further held to be innately linked to feelings of emotion (personal 
experience of emotion action) that are also 'universal' in nature. The basis 
for the belief in universal expression types for facial communication of 
emotion comes from cross-cultural studies where members of different 
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(non-interacting) races are asked to identify (from photographs) different 
expressions. 
Ekman and Friesen 1971 
In an oft-quoted paper, Ekman and Friesen (1971) looked at the concept of 
'universals' in the relationship between facial expression and emotional 
content in an attempt to substantiate the belief that emotions are to some 
extent innate and unlearned. 
To avoid the influence of popular culture, media transmission, or 
personal experience of stereotypes in the understanding of emotional 
expressions, they analysed the interpretation of facial expressions in 
'preliterate' cultures in New Guinea. Ekman and Friesen's method was 
straight forward, and involved presenting subjects with a series of 
photographs that were held to represent a range of facial expressions that 
had been identified by people from other cultures as representing a range 
of basic emotions. These photographs were then categorised by the subjects 
according to the emotion that they considered that they corresponded to. 
In this particular case, where problems were encountered with the subjects 
remembering lists of emotion terms, as well as an uncertainty as to the 
validity of the translation, a modified method was used where the subjects 
were read a story involving a situation where the expression of a 
particular emotion was considered appropriate. The subjects then had to 
select a photograph that showed the expression they felt that the person in 
the story would have. The emotions that the experimenters chose to use 
were Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Surprise, Disgust, and Fear. 
Briefly, the results showed a significant choice of what the experimenters 
held was an appropriate face for all the emotions except for choosing 
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between Fear and Surprise, where there was considerable confusion. As 
Ekman and Friesen put it: 
"The results for both adults and children clearly support our hypothesis 
that particular facial behaviours are associated with particular emotions. 
With but one exception, the faces judged in literate cultures as showing 
particular emotions were comparably judged by people from a preliterate 
culture who had minimal opportunity to have learned to recognize 
uniquely Western facial expressions." 
That there was no significant difference between the sexes, or over 
different age groups the experimenters held as supportive, given that 
women had even less contact with foreigners than the men, and thus less 
opportunity for experience at discriminating the emotional significance of 
their facial expressions. The similar results then would appear to reinforce 
the unimportance of previous cross-cultural contact. The inability of the 
subjects to distinguish successfully between expressions of Fear and 
Surprise is explained so: 
"Experience within a culture, the kind of events which typically elicit 
particular emotions, may act to influence the inability to discriminate 
particular pairs of emotions. Fear faces may not have been distinguished 
from surprise faces, because in this culture fearful events are almost 
always surprising." 
Here the experimenters are explaining the absence of a difference between 
two emotions, or more properly the lack of identity of each, as a result of a 
lack of practice. Because in their simple primitive-native-type existence in 
conditions of simple-minded primordial savagery they have not had the 
need to develop the sophistication in sensibility that the urbane 
Westerner has. But, we can assume, given time, the latent abilities to 
distinguish between these two emotions will emerge, and the savage will 
become civilized. All implications of patronage aside, the experimenters 
appear to be asking a lot of their results. On the one hand they are saying 
that the link between emotions (the simple ones, whatever they are), and 
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facial expression is innate, but they then explain this inability to 
demonstrate an innate understanding of the difference between 
expressions of Surprise and Fear as being a lack of experience. Counter to 
this, you could argue that in terms of basic components of emotion 
Surprise could be seen to exist as a subset (or derivative) of Fear. Hence 
there is no evolutionary reason why there should be an innate linkage. 
But, the determination as to what the basic components of emotion are 
(assume you ascribe to that point of view) is not clear-cut. 
It is not my wish to deny the existence of observable patterns of 
consistency in action across cultures. What might be suggested however is 
that the explanation offered for this consistency might have its source in 
an origin other than genetic determinism as forging the base reaction 
types, the 'fundamental emotions', or 'emotion primitives' from which . 
socialization constructs the refined forms of the emotionally mature adult. 
A dialectical explanation can be used to avoid the "either genetics or else 
society" approach that this form of dualist interpretation produces. To 
demonstrate, one of the universals proposed is that of smiling, which 
many observers relate as being present from birth onwards (although 
there is some difference of opinion as to age at onset). While it is conceded 
as possible that an infant can learn to smile differentially at different 
people, it is held that the fact that it is a smile at all is evidential of an 
innate link between a 'pleasurable experience' and the response of a smile. 
Is there any way in which it could be conceived that this particular action 
sequence (the smile) could be learned by an infant's experience of its 
world? What is there about the infant, its capacities, and the nature of the 
world with which it acts that could lead to the production of a smile 
response without any need to the recourse of such explanatory constructs 
as emotional motivation and innate reactions to particular types of 
, stimuli (eg the faces of caregivers)? 
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An infant is an active seeker of information, in its actions it attempts to 
control its environment, to influence the pattern of stimulation available 
to it (given its capacities). In the flowing pattern of stimulation available it 
is sensitive to invariance, to structure, to repetitions, cycles. It learns by 
noting the consistencies in the pattern of stimulation, such as causal 
chains, event A is always followed by event B, so when A occurs expect B 
to happen soon after. This kind of causal reasoning can be applied to the 
physical structure, to the consistent patterns of colour light and shade, and 
orientations (directions of relative motion) that constitute real world 
entities. Of course, as mentioned before, hardwiring of minimum 
sensitivities (ie to line orientation, occlusion, figure and ground) would 
give an enormous head start to a perceiver and it is illogical to suggest that 
such things do not exist. It is however questionable to suggest that all such 
sensitivities are givens. The hardwiring of emotional responses is equally 
illogical, constraining as it would the potential for action and hence 
experience (more on that later). In the case of the newborn the range of 
possible actions is limited by the particular developmental stage the infant 
is at (excuse the tautology), and the range of actions that produce a change 
in environmental contingencies is even smaller. It can move its head onJy 
slightly, directing its gaze over a narrow angle as a consequence. It can 
wave its arms and legs around slightly, cry with great facility, and change 
the arrangement of the muscles on its face. There is the intention here 
that all action should be seen as exploratory where the outcome of the 
action is uncertain. This broadens the definition of exploration away from 
simple spatial information-gathering to information-gathering per se. 
'Information' here being a change in the environmental contingencies. 
Gathering information is effecting change. The greatest potential source of 
information in an infant's environment is represented by the people 
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around it. This is not to suggest that there is a 'social environment' 
available for the infant, who does not possess a sense-of-self not having 
had enough experience (or even a completely-formed cortex) to construct 
one from the language-mediated experiences of others. 
Of all the means in its limited behaviour repertoire with which an infant 
can act to effect change, the simplest and least demanding of energetic 
investment is alteration of the arrangement of the facial muscles. This is 
not to suggest that the initial use of the face to control the environment is 
intentional, and hence that the infant has some prior knowledge of the 
outcome. The action of the infant is not intentional at first, intention 
comes only with experience and hence expectation. They are rather simply 
acting in all ways that they are capable of, looking around, waving their 
arms, making random noises with their mouths, opening and closing 
their hands and other such actions that are the delight of keenly-watching 
adults. So why would any one of these actions have more of an effect than 
any other, and what is it about the effect that is significant enough in the 
life of the infant that it might wish to repeat it? The simple answer is 
'scaffolding' (Bruner, 1985). It is not that the actions of the infant are in 
any way intentional, but that the 'keenly-observing adults' think that they 
are. It's not only the infant that is an active seeker of information, but the 
parents are as well. They hover over it looking for particular behaviours 
to label as intentional, and react whenever they observe an apparent 
manifestation of 'reason'. The place where we seek information most 
from others is the face. Parents, acting under the belief that the infant is as 
capable of intentional action as any other human being, are seeking 
evidence of the infant's belief state in its facial expression. And, 
unfailingly, they find it. And having found it, that is, successfully 
achieved bringing into existence the information they seek, they attempt 
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to repeat the act. What I am trying to describe is that there is a reciprocal 
attempt to gain information between parent and infant, the difference 
being that the parent's actions are more specifically goal-directed than are 
the infants. Really, the infants actions aren't goal-oriented at all, it is 
serendipitous that they happen to perform an act that has a significance for 
a watching adult, not intentional. 
The face is the site of greatest effectiveness for the infant, but why a smile? 
It is an old saying that it takes more muscles to frown than it does to smile 
(while it was probably not originally intended to be used this way, it does 
demonstrate the fundamental economy of the act). The smile produces the 
greatest degree of change in the appearance of the face, the cheeks bulge, 
dimples may appear, skin at the corner of the eye wrinkles, the mouth 
often opens to display teeth (if present) and gums (if not), the inside of the 
mouth is displayed and in extreme cases the ears may also shift. So, for a 
very small out-lay of effort, a great degree of change is effected. It is in this 
effectiveness of the action that the reciprocal nature become evident, for it 
is not only the parent reacting to the action of the child but also the child 
to the adult. The sudden alteration in the pattern of stimulation available 
from the parent's face as they smile is very pronounced, and provides a 
great deal of novelty for it. 
So an apparent intentionality and reason in behaviour can be redescribed 
as resulting not from conscious design or knowledge or pre-existing 
instinct or innate connection, but from the assumption that it should be 
there. In the act of seeking a particular form of information we can bring it 
into being. Projection of personal beliefs about the nature of the self as it 
exists in infancy shape our perceptions of what may well be semi-random 
and uncausally-linked events. 
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Affect as Effect 
The attempt to reduce the wide range of emotions that have been 
described through the ages to a single set of basic common emotions is 
necessarily doomed to failure due to reliance on the assumption that it is 
possible there is such a thing as a single indivisible entity that is an 
Emotion. We say: " an emotion is ... "; or " emotions are ... ", and attempt to 
locate within the brain or the nervous system, or in some combination of 
neurological and endocrinological activity some discrete, unique pattern 
of physical change that can be pointed to as representing the physical 
manifestation of a particular feeling. As stated earlier, we have the basis of 
our consciousness in language use, which exists as the product of our on-
going recollection and interaction of ourselves and our environment, 
which is a recollection of bodies moving in space. (Jaynes, 1977). It is our 
experience that events have a material cause, one which can normally be 
traced to a single source. Our consciousness is based on our experiences, 
and we can have no experience of the immaterial. So do we seek to assign 
what we see as a discrete event, an emotion, to a discrete cause, 
neurophysiology. The reality however (or one version of it), is that 
emotions become discrete entities as we seek to describe them, they 
coalesce as, and because, we wish to find them. The apparently discrete 
nature of an emotion is an artefact of the tools which we bring to bear, 
specifically, the language that we use and its structure. 
So how do we describe emotions if not in terms of neurological states? 
Why should we not say that a pattern of events is the physical co-factor to 
a given emotion? It is important here to clarify that when I am referring to 
a single emotion, or rather a basic emotion, I intend this to mean the case 
where a psychologist would say that there a given number of basic 
'emotional units' that are innate, and are combined with the individual 
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life-experiences of a person to give rise to the vast range of sensibility that 
is emotional life. They might say for example that Anger, Joy and Sorrow 
are the basic components of all feeling, and that these are pre-linguistic, 
and can come to be combined with conscious linguistically-mediated 
experience to form the latter subtleties and self-related instances that that 
are labelled and become the socially (culturally) specific reactions or 
feelings that are more normally seen as being emotions. In opposition to 
this I would suggest that rather than characteristic 'low-level' 
physiological sets of interactions as the basis of the taxonomy of feelings, 
we should look instead to a basic set of needs, characteristic motivations 
common to all actions that define the necessary least behaviours of 
persons in their environments. Emotions can then be defined not in 
terms of similarities in patterns of physiology or simple organic response, 
but organised as effects arising from the inter-relationship between ability 
and need. They can be organised in terms of the purposes that they serve 
to the individual experiencing that emotion, their goal-relatedness. 
Fundamental to all situations are the options of certain actions, 
simplistically characterised as approach, avoid or ignore (as earlier 
outlined in the concept of seeking and maintaining an optimal level of 
stimulation in the development of infant consciousness). As the attempt 
is made to reduce the spectrum of emotions down to a few common 
irreducible factors, we are able to get closer to defining the basic elements 
of emotions in terms simple common irreducible needs that exist in our 
lives. The basic units of emotion are then not to be found in 
physiochemistry, but in human social life and its conduct. 
The Social Embodiment of Cognition 
One argument against the idea of language being learned is that of the 
speed with which it is acquired by children, the sudden spurt in 
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vocabulary after the second year, how can it be that something so 
incredibly difficult can be learned so fast? Firstly, we have no idea what an 
appropriate speed for acquiring a first language is. We only ever do it once 
(definitively), and while some do it faster than others we don't have any 
real standard for comparison. Secondly, I feel this argument can be turned 
back on itself and be used to ask with something so difficult as language, so 
diverse in its practice between races, how could it ever have evolved, and 
how could it be genetically transmitted and develop in such a relatively 
short space of time (geologically speaking) to the complex system it is 
now? Given a view point that holds the theory of the arisal of species 
through natural selection to be true, what are the selection pressures that 
have acted to bring about the development of language through gradual 
stages from the simple semiotics of calls that we might surmise comprised 
early language? How can differential selection pressure, or random 
mutation, produce changes in the way that language is used? If we follow 
selection theory and say that sexual shuffling of the genes throws up a 
useful variant that increases the chance for that individual to pass their 
genes on, how can a variation in genetic make-up produce a change in 
ability that allows an individual 1 not a group1 to have an increased facility 
in language that will increase that individual's likelihood of reproducing 
and hence gradually increase the facility of the entire population? What 
particular gradual change is going to increase this reproductive 
probability? And is it likely that even with this increased facility a lone 
individual is going to be able to improve the communication of a group? 
Remember, language is inseparable from communication, which means 
that it is a function of a group, not one person. So it is a change in the 
group, that is required, not in any one person. So now we are talking about 
alterations to the structure of the interaction of the entire group, assuming 
that language does not arise in isolation. Language is a product of the 
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group dynamic. Changes in the nature of language are now becoming 
enshrined not in the genetic make-up of any individual, but in the way 
that the group acts as a whole. The reproductive success of an individual 
who leads a group existence is related to the success of the group in toto. 
The success of each member reflects the success of the group, thus 
survival, and reproductive success, becomes related to the ability of the 
group to be a group, which can be seen to relate to communication. 
Natural selection does not work on groups, it works on individuals. Social 
development is the reverse. 
The genetic aspect of language development need not undergo any 
progression if the social aspect is capable of it. Certainly the changes in 
society can happen at a much greater rate than that for species! The 
essential underpinning of language is the ability to relate events that occur 
across modalities but are connected via what we would normally refer to 
as a causal link. Thus, sounds can evoke the memory of sights or touches 
or smells, and the converse also. Language then can be seen to require not 
a specific ability but a general aptitude. The refinement of language itself 
into complex forms of grammar comes not with physiological 
readjustment (genetic change) but the development of complexity in the 
course of need and usage. When the capacity to utilise language comes 
into being, then language will develop itself. Not as some separate quasi-
mystical entity like the zeit geist, but as a refinement of custom and 
practice that is remembered. Language does not create itself, but language 
use sustains and extends it as its own expansion makes it possible for new 
forms to come into being. The more names we have for things, then we 
can begin to have names for classes of names. As there are options for 
names, then words become known through their relationship to other 
words, rather than to discrete physical things out side of a person and part 
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of their immediate physical experience. Thus experience progresses 
beyond the immediate and known to the possible and imagined. But I 
digress. The central point is that a genetic basis for knowledge of grammar 
is not essential, where that grammar can be learned in the process of use. If 
it is possible for a person to learn a grammatical form in the course of 
social interaction then it is not necessary for it to have a genetic 
instantiation. Considering the number of grammar variations, particularly 
in terms of word order, it can be seen as an advantage not to have this 
fixed, or else second-language learning would be even harder than it is. 
Sociohistorical transmission is a viable alternative to simple genetics for 
the rapid development, communication, and storage of information of 
cultural significance .. Within the framework of social practice and cultural 
organisation the embodiment of cognition remains both highly flexible 
and consistent. Its embodiment in on-going social life ensures that 
alterations to social knowledge and so the available 'social mind' retain 
validity to current situations. Consistent comes not from permanency of 
form, as from currency of application. Paradoxically, social knowledge, and 
language, only remain viably consistent if they remain consistently 
variable. As reality alters over time validity of knowledge only persists if 
language evolves with it. 
The Unlearning of Cognition and Emotion 
With a genetic pre-determination outlook on development there is a set 
time-frame and time-table for life. In contrast, development through a co-
evolutionary perspective of what is known with what can be known, does 
not have to be thought of in this determinist way as the acquisition of 
knowledge to gain tactics toward the gaining of particular goals. Rather, all 
possibilities of organisation exist. The tabula rasa is not empty, it is totally 
full of space and opportunity. The initial state of cognition under this 
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perspective has a near-infinite set of possible end-states. Development and 
experience serve to eliminate the unsupportable, tracing a pattern of both 
possibility and impossibility simultaneously. Thus, cognitive 
development is not so much learning as unlearning. The infant attempts 
all, blind to what is actually possible. The development of self-knowledge 
is at the same time the development of other-knowledge. You discover 
what you can do, and what you are, by experiencing what you can't do and 
what you are not. 
For emotion, this unlearning is represented by the gradual refinement 
through experience of the appropriate co-ordination of responses to 
situations. The apparent decrease in 'emotionality' which is popularly 
held to be a normal part of advancing age is a consequence of this 
maturation in outlook and discrimination rather than an inevitable result 
of having managed to stay alive for a particular period of time. 
The use of the concept of a genetic time-table for life has implicit within it 
that the character of your existence is set. You will be a new-born for a set 
period of time, then infant, toddler, child, youth, adult as the clock runs 
on and the sands run out. 
A final word on the Social-learning view-point on Emotion 
What value is there to be gained from this? How is it of any use to almost 
define emotions out of existence as has been done, and to replace them 
with such vague neologisms as 'action systems' and such like? It is 
contained in the difference between the two statements: 11 People's 
emotions are caused by ... "; and II People feel because ... 11 • One speaks of 
disembodied entities, the other, of ordinary, personal, and potentially 
explicable reason. Emotions as abstractions outside of ourselves are 
timeless, while a person's act of feeling happens now. Hate, Anger, Love, 
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Disgust, Ecstasy, all have no beginning and no end, as they are concepts 
transcendent of any one individual. But I feel angry now, or I can love, 
then hate, then worship, then despise, all present feelings and current 
experiences. My despising is a an event with a cause, it is true only when I 
feel it, and is false when I feel something else. I cannot worship and hate at 
the same time, but Worship and Hate are eternal. They are romantic 
notions, descriptions of states that have become concretised in the 
necessities of the act of communication and brought to life, acquiring the 
status of cause over and above their true value as descriptions as effect. 
The very idea that we can worship and hate at the same time is a product 
of our need to understand by labelling, and in situations of ambiguity, 
where the labels don't quite fit and the subject of our attention has 
qualities (as we perceive) that should involve behaviour consistent with 
judgements both of 'worthy-of-worship' and 'worthy-of-hatred', the labels 
need redefinition to include this 'special case'. Here the concept of 'mixed 
emotions' comes into its own. We feel that we should feel something, 
some arousal, due to the current situation and its similarity to previous 
events we have encountered, yet the set boundaries overlap and merge. 
Our personal beliefs as to emotions being discrete entities demand that a 
discrete difference be drawn. That they should be similar is one thing, 
even composed from the same underlying set of possible emotion 
elements, but the need that they should be separate is quite another. This 
situation of arousal and indecisiveness becomes an emotion in its own 
right, as a handy catch-all that is tagged on when a final decision is not 
possible. When in doubt about the applicability of one or more labels in a 
given situation, then create a new one, part of the 'mixed' group, a hybrid, 
which if used by enough people enters the general lexicon and and a new 
feeling is born. But to return to practical value, is it of benefit to conceive 
of emotions in this way, as semi-arbitrary and flexible, rooted not in some 
154 
common genetic heritage but in the similar needs of people sharing the 
same environment with the same approximate physical abilities 
(effectivities if you like) and available vocabulary? Is there any advantage 
to this approach other than the possible dry satisfaction of dogmatic 
philosophers with a pedantic over-attention to details of syntax? Is it just 
redefinition, much as has been done so often before, to no real 
advancement? Perhaps so, but I do feel that there is merit in taking this 
approach. It gives, I feel, greater legitimacy and personal control to 
individual feelings. In a situation where feeling and experience are so 
closely related, the concepts of emotion and reason come closer together. 
Statements of personal feeling become suffixed with 'because', it's not 
Anger that you feel, rather that you feel angry. One is passive, the other 
active. you are in control of yourself, responsible, and have been really, all 
along. Placing the locus of control with the individual and giving them 
the ability to feel or not to feel (within reason), you point to the world they 
inhabit as providing cause in relation to themselves and their beliefs. You 
say that people feel because of how they are, and also because of the way 
the world is. It is rational to feel, because feeling has a cause, a focus and a 
history. It can be understood. Importantly, it is an on-going process, one 
that doesn't stop. Unwanted feelings don't have to be tolerated, who and 
how you are is not determined solely by your parentage, but can be 
modified, emotions can be replaced, associations can be short-circuited, 
new memories formed and preferable feelings evoked. 
Emotion as the product of individual learning, as synonymous with 
personality and self, is emotion known and demystified. It exists in 
mindless people, unconscious, passionless, people who think and feel 
now but have no thoughts tomorrow as they had none yesterday. 
In defence of the radical view-point 
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"A theory is the more impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises 
is, the more different kinds of things it relates, and· the more extended is 
its area of applicability." 
Einstein (1934) 
Often, in articles and theses in Psychology that discuss highly divergent 
theoretical view-points, the virtues present in contrasting theories are 
pointed out, and a compromise situation is outlined which falls between 
and attempts to demonstrate how taking a radical, perhaps one-sided view 
of a position is often over-narrow and counter-productive. Generally 
speaking, a middle-of-the-road position is espoused as the reasonable 
response to obvious extremes of difference of opinion. In this way radical 
opinions and ideas are frowned upon, and there is the implication that the 
expression of an extreme opinion is perhaps naive, unscientific or even 
immature. The radical opinion is often seen as short-sighted or 
unimaginative, having insufficient scope to see the value in the opposing 
point(s) of view. 
The radical opinions mentioned in this thesis have been the polarised 
opinions of radical behaviourism and cognitivism, differences historically 
fuelled by the sweeping statements of the antagonists and the apparent 
incompatibility of the underlying philosophical stances. The two positions 
are not really incompatible, rather they are representative of appropriately 
different approaches to divergent subject matter. If we look at memory for 
example, we can view it in two different ways. First, the structure of 
events in memory can be viewed as a reflection of the manner in which 
they are ordered by the processes of reason, processes that are prior to 
experience, what I would refer to as a simple cognitive account. Secondly, 
this structure can be seen as a reflection of how they are experienced 
personally, a reflection of external reality as and how it is experienced, a 
simple behavioural account. Alternatively, one can take another view 
156 
that, while not striving to be a compromise, escapes the dualism that 
underlies both of these approaches. 
A simple cognitive account has it that there is a very ordered inside and a 
very disorderly outside. A simple behaviourist account would have it that 
there is an extremely ordered outside and a very simply ordered inside. 
Both make an inside/ outside distinction, but place the source of order at 
different poles. To take a different view in terms of this example one can 
suggest that the manner in which events are related in memory is a 
consequence of the process of reason, but that this process of reason comes 
into being as a result of a personal learning process (as outlined earlier) 
which creates an understanding of how events are related in the world. 
Thus, a simple cognitive account of categorisation can have its roots in a 
simple behaviourist account of the arisal of reason. This is a possible . 
reconciliation of the dualism that does not require the rejection or 
dilution of either radical view. The views are radical, but not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Simple behaviourism can be used to describe the 
process whereby the observed/ experienced causality in one's environment 
is internalized into automatic procedures; simple cognitivism can be used 
to describe how the internalized causality is transformed by the 
subjectivity of personal experience into the characteristic responses that 
comprise personality. Simple behaviourism can be defined as the process 
of labelling only discrete, overt, external action as behaviour. Simple 
cognitivism then is the labelling of covert, inferred, internal action as 
behaviour. The province of study of both is action. But rather than being 
competing paradigms they are complementary methods of analysis, 
overlapping, interacting, yet polarised. Rather than rivals fighting for the 
right to claim the high ground of proof they are differential investigative 
techniques useful for different subject areas. The question then is how we 
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could alter our conceptions of the relationship between these two to 
achieve a more constructive harmony of ideas and unity of purpose. 
As to what I would suggest, in light of what I have found in the course of 
writing this thesis, should be changed, is, quite simply put, nothing. I have 
as yet to be totally convinced that harmony is all that constructive. 
Tension, disagreement, and division are healthy and conducive to 
progress. What a radical statement does for us is to play theoretical devil's 
advocate. When our ideas are strongly challenged by a contrary opinion 
we are forced to examine our assumptions and either prove them right to 
our own satisfaction, or to modify. Violence of argument, while having 
the potential to produce unwanted alienation, can also give energy to 
creation. Compromise has the effect of quieting argument for a time, but it 
is questionable as to whether this is a desirable outcome, or even a 
practical goal. 
On a very basic level, any time an opinion is put forward it will always be 
possible to formulate another opinion that is in direct opposition to it on 
any and all points. For any hypothesis, there is always a contrary one. On 
this basis, all ideas can be radical ideas, depending on where on the 
continuum you stand, moreover, standing on the continuum of opinion 
at all makes your idea radical. Any statement of ideas calls its opposite into 
existence (to echo Hegel). 
There are two ways (at least) of seeing the virtue of the radical. The first is 
the trans-historical: what is radical today is often mainstream tomorrow 
(eg Galileo, Einstein), and what today is mainstream may tomorrow be 
seen as the rankest heresy (eg Newton, Watson). Opinions shift with new 
information that causes the embracing or rejecting of a theory. The second 
obvious virtue is in fertility of ideas: the radical is such because of its 
distance from the mainstream. Because knowledge is referential (if one 
158 
accepts that for the moment), an opinion radical to our own serves as a 
source of reflection and definition on where we currently stand. 
Neither of these two points is in itself particularly earth-shattering, the 
shifting of the pendulum of opinion, and the acceptance of ideas for which 
the time is right and society has advanced to meet them has almost the 
status of a cliche. What I am pointing toward is that rational discourse and 
good-natured cooperation have very seldom been the source of scientific 
advance. The middle-of-the-road, the compromise position, the average, is 
never the stimulus for leaps forward. Definitively, new ideas come from 
unpredictable sources. Psychology is said to suffer from a lack of a coherent 
paradigm, a unified model of how it works that describes how 
psychological investigation should be done and gives fundamental units 
of reference that allow transference of concepts between the different sub-
disciplines. There is no atomic theory in psychology, no quanta that 
underlie it and to which it can be ultimately reduced and comparisons 
made. But is this a problem, or an advantage? Psychology is not like the 
natural sciences. There, there are levels of scale that can be drawn that 
allow blunt division into fields of investigation. But Psychology is 
immeasurably diverse and vastly diffuse. Physics may be said to underlie 
Chemistry which underlies Biology, but there is no such simple hierarchy 
that can be enforced on Psychology. No one aspect of Psychology can really 
be separated from any other, and it's not just a matter of interdependence 
so much as indivisibility. The aspect of Psychology that one is studying at 
any one time is as much a reflection of the chosen tools as it is of the 
subject matter. It's a question of how fine or coarse a level one chooses to 
analyse at. An experiment in Social Psychology is also one in Perception, 
Cognition, Emotion, Psychophysics and all other aspects of Psychology 
because people's personalities are not so readily separable as to yield 
themselves up for such disparate examination. Against this however, the 
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individual often seems implicitly assumed to be a behaviour-producing 
machine, and in the experimental situation all individual differences 
except the one chosen for study are held stable, or so it is intended. 
Randomization of all but the one chosen factor keeps the experiment on 
line and bestows validity. What kind of experiment it is depends 
ultimately on what the experimenter chooses to label it, and what is seen 
as appropriate measures as a consequence of the experimental goals. 
Disunity of purpose means the proliferation of ideas, which the selection 
pressures of the scholar's environment will winnow down. 
A paradigm would represent stagnation for Psychology. The final 
paradigm for Psychology, the operational metaphor to guide research, 
would be a description of the human mind. Psychology's paradigm is its 
goal, it is the field that describes itself. That Psychology should strive for a 
paradigm is appropriate, that it should achieve it is paradoxical. Anything 
that is put forward as the one true method of description in Psychology 
would, by its very existence, be false. 
There can be no one description of the mind that is correct because the 
mind is the total of any one individual, it is the product of their past and 
present. A person's mind is as dynamic and undetermined as they are. 
The mind is their experience, what it was, what it is, and there is only ever 
a probabilistic prediction of behaviour possible, the norm is all that can 
can ever be known, within the bounds of statistical probability. A 
paradigm of the human mind would be at best a generalized picture, an 
averaged analogy that was no-one in particular. Being such, it would 
never fit anyone, could never with any certainty be said to be a description 
of anyone. The trajectory of Psychology towards its goal is asymptotic. 
Emotion defined 
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As regards the study of emotion in Psychology it is arguably the most 
problematic of all, defying description. The definition of emotion will 
never be precise, and, I feel, will never be resolved to anyone's satisfaction. 
Emotion represents the personal understanding and expression of 
personality. As touched on in the Introduction, how a person acts in those 
ways socially understood as being 'emotional' are definitive of what kind 
of person one is. Social status gives a general-level stereotype-based 
expectation of personality-type, but precise knowledge of individualism 
comes only with information about a person's emotional responses, not 
just the abstract attitudes, but their passionate, firmly-held beliefs (if any). 
To define Emotion, if seen as an aspect of the social face of personality, is 
like quick-silver sought with a pair of tweezers. Emotion represents the 
apex of behaviour, comes direct from the beliefs closest to what a person is 
really like. Emotion is then so all-enclosing and so pervasive as a concept, 
both defined by the beliefs of the person who acts and the society who 
judges (and their beliefs about each other) that no single definition or 
approach will ever be adequate for everyone. Again, the ill-fit of language 
to reality introduces variance and allows (if not makes inevitable) 
disagreement. A person defining emotion is defining emotion for 
themselves, reflecting back onto themselves, imposing a grid of experience 
and belief that cuts up human nature and then tries to show how it fits 
back together. But, where any part is removed from the whole, it, by that 
act, is coalesced into a unit that has attributes independent of the parent 
whole and which the parent does not share. The strictly biological, the 
instinctive, the learned, the social, as each different but interconnected 
viewpoint is taken it can only be imperfectly reconciled with the others. 
Indeed, taking a particular viewpoint brings the others into existence. 
So then, if you attempt to define emotion it is not emotion that you are 
defining, but something else that you have created. By naming it you 
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cause it to be, and limit it by its being fitted to meet your capacities for 
explanation. 
"If you can describe it, then it's not the Tao" 
Lao Tzu 
The study of emotion is the study of self, and as such is an endeavour to 
peg out the dimensions of the individual, to provide a synthesis of 
psychological explanations that is as good as we can do. We can only ever 
get a good approximation of what it means to be a person, and this 
approximation is to be found by using as diverse a set of tools of 
explanation and enquiry as we can arrange. To this end we should pursue 
a diversity of approaches, and take odd angles and strange routes. 
Unorthodoxy and the adoption of radical viewpoints diversifies not just 
the methods of analysis but the subject of analysis as well. If we are to seek 
an understanding of human emotion that is appropriate across as wide a 
range of human experience as possible so as to be as true as we can, then 
our subject matter should be whatever is relevant at all to how people see 
themselves, or come to an understanding of themselves as social. So, not 
only standard experimentation, but literature analysis and other forms of 
sociological study. To understand emotion we need to see what emotion is 
for, to see not just the 'what' of personality but the 'why'. We need to see 
how people view their emotional lives and what personal value 
particular ways of dividing up the self into separate emotions has. We 
need to ask 'what is it for ?' 
Within this thesis I have avoided seeking out facts or results of the 
experiments of others as much as possible. I have not been seeking a way 
to ultimate truth but instead have speculated on how to more closely 
approximate the right questions to ask. I have tried to avoid a detailed 
understanding of emotion but have instead sought the simplest 
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explanation possible. I have finally come to the conclusion that the reason 
why emotion remains so difficult to explain is because it is so 
straightforward. It is so simple in its nature that it defies our attempts to 
explain it in anything so complex as language, and for language to convey 
it, it must be padded out with pieces borrowed from the self-perception of 
the person attempting the explanation. There is nothing all that complex 
about emotion, which is probably why we will we will never be able to 
understand it. 
"What we call 'I' is just a swinging door which moves when we inhale 
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